YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC

04/22/03 12:57 PM

THE YEAR-IN-REVIEW 2002:
SELECTED CASES FROM ALASKA
SUPREME COURT, ALASKA
COURTS OF APPEALS, U.S. COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT, AND U.S. DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
ALASKA
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.
IV.

INTRODUCTION......................................................................... 80
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ........................................................... 80
BUSINESS LAW .......................................................................... 87
CIVIL PROCEDURE ................................................................... 95
A. Claim and Issue Preclusion............................................... 95
B. Costs and Attorney’s Fees................................................ 96
C. Miscellaneous..................................................................... 98
V.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW .......................................................... 104
VI. CRIMINAL LAW ....................................................................... 108
A. Constitutional Protections .............................................. 108
B. General Criminal Law .................................................... 112
VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW ................................................................. 132
A. Labor Law ........................................................................ 132
B. Workers’ Compensation ................................................. 136
C. Miscellaneous................................................................... 142
VIII. FAMILY LAW ............................................................................ 144
A. Child Support ................................................................... 144
B. Child Custody................................................................... 147
C. Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights ............ 153
D. Dissolution of Marriage and Distribution
of Property........................................................................ 161
E. Miscellaneous................................................................... 165
79

YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC

80

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

04/22/03 12:57 PM

[20:1

INSURANCE LAW .................................................................... 167
PROPERTY LAW....................................................................... 169
TORT LAW ............................................................................... 184

IX.
X.
XI.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Year-in-Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions handed down in 2002 by the Alaska Supreme Court, Alaska
Courts of Appeals, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
and the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska. The summaries focus on the substantive areas of the law addressed, the statutes or common law principles interpreted, and the essence of the
primary holdings. Attorneys are advised not to rely upon the information contained in this review without further reference to the
cases cited. The Year in Review is also available online at
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/20ALRYearinReview.
The opinions are grouped by general subject matter rather
than the nature of the underlying claims. The summaries are presented alphabetically in the following ten areas of the law: administrative, business, civil procedure, constitutional, criminal, employment, family, insurance, property, and torts.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
In Chugach Electric Ass’n v. Regulatory Commission of
1
Alaska, the supreme court held that Alaska law required Chugach
to obtain commission approval before selling electricity outside the
geographic region to which it had previously been assigned to sup2
ply electric service. Chugach had been granted a certificate of
public convenience and necessity from the commission which allowed it to provide electric service within a specific geographic
area, but it wished to provide electricity to two customers outside
3
of that area. The Regulatory Commission found that it had power
to regulate competition and denied Chugach the opportunity to
4
serve customers outside its area. The superior court affirmed that
Chugach needed commission approval to sell electricity outside its
5
geographic area. The supreme court also agreed that Alaska Statutes section 42.05.221(a) gives the Commission the general power
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

49 P.3d 246 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 254.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 249.
Id.
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to limit competition through the issuance of certificates.6 Further,
the supreme court rejected Chugach’s argument that there was a
distinction between selling electricity as a commodity and provid7
ing electric utility services.
In Cook Inlet Keeper v. State, Office of Management and
8
Budget, Division of Governmental Coordination, the supreme
court held that the State could not exclude any permitted uses or
activities from a Coastal Program consistency review of a specific
project, regardless of whether a general permit for the activity had
9
been previously granted. The Forest Oil Corporation filed permit
applications seeking to install an oil exploration platform over the
10
Redoubt Shoals in Cook Inlet. Under the Alaska Coastal Man11
agement Act , the platform could only be authorized if the State
determined that its use was consistent with the applicable Coastal
12
Program standards. Before the close of the public comment period on the permit, the U.S. EPA issued a general permit authorizing specified wastewater discharges for existing and future ex13
ploratory drilling projects in the upper Cook Inlet. After the
close of the public comment period, the State made a final consistency determination approving the platform but specifically excluding wastewater discharge activities because the EPA’s permit
14
already covered those activities. Cook Inlet Keeper, an environmental group, appealed the matter to the superior court, which af15
firmed the consistency determination. On appeal, the supreme
court held that the various statutory provisions relating to consistency reviews unequivocally established that consistency review
must be a project-specific process and that each consistency review
16
determination must encompass the entire project. The supreme
court also held that the mere existence of an earlier consistency determination for the EPA’s general permit could not justify the exclusion of the wastewater discharge activities from the project’s
17
consistency review. Accordingly, the oil exploration project was

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 252.
Id. at 253-54.
46 P.3d 957 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 965.
Id. at 959.
ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.40.010-.220 (Michie 2002).
Cook Inlet, 46 P.3d at 959.
Id. at 960.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 963.
Id. at 965.
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remanded for a full consistency review that included the wastewa18
ter discharge activities.
In Hayes v. Municipality of Anchorage,19 the supreme court
held that a candidate living within a newly redrawn assembly district met the residency requirement to run for office in that dis20
trict. After Anchorage’s assembly districts were redrawn in September of 2001, candidate Whittle’s home of twenty years fell
21
within a new district. Candidate Hayes filed a petition in superior
court to disqualify Whittle from appearing on the ballot because
Anchorage law required a candidate to have lived in the district he
22
is running in for at least one year prior to the election. The supe23
rior court denied Hayes’s petition. The supreme court affirmed,
holding that Whittle, having lived in the same residence for over
twenty years, fulfilled the requirements of the Charter and was eli24
gible to run for election. The court reasoned that the residency
requirement can only be reasonably intereted to require residency
for at least one year before the election within the geographical
boundaries of an election district as it is drawn at the time of elec25
tion.
In In re Curda,26 the supreme court held that legal errors
committed by a district judge did not amount to ethical violations
because they were not willful or part of a pattern of judicial mis27
conduct. Judge Curda imprisoned a state’s witness at a criminal
hearing because she showed up drunk on the day she was sched28
uled to testify. Judge Curda reasoned that it was the only way to
secure her protection, her children’s protection, and her testi29
The Judicial Conduct Committee investigated Judge
mony.
Curda’s action and recommended that he be given a private repri18. Id. at 967.
19. 46 P.3d 971 (Alaska 2002).
20. Id. at 974.
21. Id. at 973.
22. ANCHORAGE, AK., MUNICIPAL CHARTER, CODE AND REGULATIONS §
4.02(b)(2) (1996); Hayes, 46 P.3d at 972.
23. Hayes, 46 P.3d at 972.
24. Id. at 973.
25. Id. at 974.
26. 49 P.3d 255 (Alaska 2002).
27. Id. at 261.
28. Id. at 255. In an ex parte meeting with Judge Curda, the Assistant District
Attorney expressed the concern that the witness would either fail to appear a second time or at least not be able to stay sober. Judge Curda held a short contempt
proceeding with the witness and the District Attorney before imprisoning the witness for contempt. Id.
29. Id. at 257.

YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC

2003]

04/22/03 12:57 PM

YEAR IN REVIEW

83

mand by the supreme court.30 Reviewing the alleged judicial con31
duct de novo and by a standard of clear and convincing evidence,
32
the supreme court declined to reprimand Judge Curda. The supreme court concluded that although Judge Curda had committed
legal errors by depriving the witness of fundamental due process
33
rights, the errors did not amount to ethical violations because they
34
were not willful or part of a pattern of misconduct.
In Lakosh v. Alaska Department of Environmental Conserva35
tion, the supreme court declared an oil-spill contingency plan
36
regulation invalid as contrary to the enabling statute. The Oil
Pollution Control Act, as modified by the legislature following the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, required persons involved in oil-related activities to obtain approval from the Department of Environmental
37
Conservation (DEC) for oil spill contingency plans. These plans
required such persons to “provide for use . . . of the best available
technology that was available at the time the contingency plan was
38
submitted or renewed.” The DEC adopted a three-tiered approach for determining if a contingency plan provided for the use
39
of the “best available” technology. On plaintiff’s motion for declaratory judgment that the regulation was invalid, the supreme
court found that, for technologies covered in the first two tiers of
the DEC’s approach, compliance with applicable standards essentially served as a proxy for the best available technology determi40
nation. The court found that the DEC’s approach defied the plain
meaning of the term “best” and that the legislative history showed
that the legislature intended best available technology to be an ad41
ditional requirement beyond meeting certain standards. Because
the DEC’s definition did not include any “winnowing” process, the
court reversed the superior court and declared the DEC regulation
42
to be invalid.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 261.
49 P.3d 1111 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1113; ALASKA STAT. § 46.04.30 (Michie 2002).
§ 46.04.030(e) (Michie 2002).
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 18, § 75.445(k) (2001).
Lakosh, 49 P.3d at 1115-16.
Id. at 1117-19.
Id. at 1120.
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In Matanuska Electric Ass’n v. Chugach Electric Ass’n,43 the
supreme court held that the Regulatory Commission of Alaska’s
order compelling the Chugach Electric Association to refund mis44
calculated payments was in fact retroactive ratemaking by a util45
ity, which is prohibited in Alaska. In 1997, plaintiff and Chugach
noticed that the estimate Chugach used to calculate its surcharge
46
was substantially higher than the actual amount. Chugach refused
to refund the overcharged amount, relying on Alaska law that pro47
hibits retroactive ratemaking. In administrative proceedings, the
Regulatory Commission ordered Chugach to refund the difference,
noting that the rule against retroactive ratemaking does not apply
48
to fuel adjustment surcharges. Chugach argued, and the supreme
court agreed, that the fuel surcharge is a commission-made rate,
distinguishable from other surcharges outside the scope of the rule
against retroactive ratemaking, as the Commission had extensively
49
reviewed and approved the rates before enactment. This was in
accordance with the “essential principal” of the rule against retroactive ratemaking: when the estimates are inaccurate, the Commission may not correct previous rates, but may only “prospectively
50
revise rates in an effort to set more appropriate ones.” Further,
“the commission had full power to review additional data” concerning the appropriateness of the surcharge structure then in
51
place, yet chose not to do so. Accordingly, the court affirmed the
decision of the superior court overruling the Commission and held
that the surcharge fell under the rule against retroactive ratemak52
ing.
In Matanuska Electric Ass’n v. Chugach Electric Ass’n,53 the
supreme court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Chugach because (1) the Regulatory Commission
of Alaska had jurisdiction to hear the contract dispute between
43. 53 P.3d 578 (Alaska 2002).
44. The miscalculated payment refers to an overestimated surcharge for “generation and transmission system energy loss.” Id. at 581.
45. Id. at 580.
46. Id. at 582.
47. Id. The purposes of this prohibition are to protect the integrity of the ratemaking process and to aid a utility in planning its finances. Id. at 583.
48. Id. at 582.
49. Id. at 584. The court found the commission’s review of the surcharge to be
substantial enough to constitute a rate. Id. at 585.
50. Id. (quoting Detroit Edison Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 331
N.W.2d 159, 164 (Mich. 1982)).
51. Id. at 586.
52. Id. at 587.
53. 58 P.3d 491 (Alaska 2002).
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Chugach and Matanuska, and (2) Matanuska could have filed a
timely appeal from the Commission’s decision in favor of Chugach
54
if it felt that such decision was in error. Matanuska and Chugach
entered into a purchase and sale agreement (PSA) in 1989 by
which Matanuska agreed to purchase electricity from Chugach and
pay a pro rata portion of Chugach’s actual costs incurred in gener55
A dispute arose between
ating and transmitting electricity.
Chugach and Matanuska about how to charge Matanuska a portion
of additional taxes and interest on gas Chugach had purchased
56
The Regulatory Commission of
from another oil company.
Alaska ruled in favor of Chugach, allowing Chugach to pass the
charges on to Matanuska; Matanuska objected to the ruling and
57
subsequent tariff advice letters. Chugach eventually filed for declaratory and injunctive relief against Matanuska in the trial court,
and Matanuska counterclaimed for declaratory relief for breach of
58
contract. Affirming the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
59
in favor of Chugach, the supreme court ruled that because the
PSA expressly deals with matters within the Commission’s core
area of jurisdiction and evinces the parties’ intent to submit to the
Commission all rate-related disputes arising under the PSA, the
60
dispute was within the Commission’s jurisdiction. The supreme
court further held that the Commission’s interpretation of the PSA
61
was within the scope of the Commission’s power to set rates.
In Samissa Anchorage, Inc. v. Department of Health and Social
62
Services, the supreme court held that the State was not required to
63
pay “prejudgment interest.” In 1999, Samissa Anchorage, Inc.
(North Star), challenged the Department of Health and Social
64
Service’s Medicaid reimbursement rates from 1993 to 1995. The
department agreed to recalculate the rate, but refused to pay the
65
prejudgment interest. North Star appealed the decision regarding
the prejudgment interest, claiming that it was entitled to the pay-

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id. at 492.
Id.
Id. at 492-93.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Id. at 494-95.
Id. at 495.
57 P.3d 676 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 676-77.
Id. at 677.
Id.
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ment under Alaska Statutes sections 09.50.25066 and 09.50.28067 because the claim arose from a contract with the State and therefore
68
the State had waived sovereign immunity. The superior court accepted this argument and reversed the administrative denial of the
69
interest. Upon rehearing the issue, however, the superior court
vacated the previous decision and held that North Star was not en70
The supreme court affirmed,
titled to prejudgment interest.
holding that an award of prejudgment interest can only be author71
ized if the legislature waives the State’s sovereign immunity. The
72
court reasoned that while section 09.50.250 waives sovereign immunity for contract claims, North Star’s claim was not governed by
73
section 09.50.250, but rather by administrative procedures.
In Snyder v. State, Department of Public Safety, Division of
74
Motor Vehicles, the supreme court held that Snyder was denied
his right to due process where (1) the reassignment of his administrative case on remand to a new hearing officer was unannounced,
and (2) where the officer reversed the original hearing officer’s
75
In 1996, Snyder was
credibility findings without forewarning.
charged with DWI after driving his car into a snow bank and failing
76
repeated sobriety tests. At his DMV hearing, Snyder testified before a hearing officer that he was sober at the time of the accident
but that he had consumed three to five beers within the two hour
gap between the time of the accident and the arrival of a state
77
trooper. The hearing officer found Snyder’s testimony about his
post-accident drinking credible, but reasoned that the alcohol Snyder consumed after the accident could not account for the result of
78
his breath test. Accordingly, she concluded that Snyder had failed
to prove that his blood alcohol level was within the legal limit at
79
the time of the accident. Snyder appealed to the superior court,
which remanded for reconsideration because the State had misap-

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Michie 2002).
§ 09.50.280.
Samissa, 57 P.3d at 677-78.
Id. at 678.
Id.
Id.
§ 09.50.250.
Samissa, 57 P.3d at 679-80.
43 P.3d 157 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 160.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id. at 159.
Id.
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plied the burden of proof by placing it upon Snyder.80 By that time,
a new hearing officer was assigned because the original hearing of81
ficer had retired. The new hearing officer affirmed the original
revocation but based her ruling on a new factual theory—modifying the prior hearing officer’s conclusion about the credibility of
Snyder’s testimony and finding that his claim of post-alcohol con82
83
sumption was not credible. The superior court affirmed, but the
84
supreme court vacated and remanded. First, the court ruled that
where a witness’s truthfulness is disputed, denying an in-person
hearing prevents a defendant from presenting evidence in front of
85
a trier of fact who can observe the defendant’s demeanor. Second, the court concluded that because Snyder was not notified of
the reassignment of hearing officers, he was unable to provide any
86
meaningful consent to her participation. Finally, the court concluded that in an administrative revocation proceeding where a
new hearing officer reverses the original officer’s credibility findings, advance notice of the reassignment would have provided a
reasonable opportunity for the accused to respond to the concerns
87
of the new hearing officer.
III. BUSINESS LAW
In Alakayak v. British Columbia Packers, Ltd.,88 the supreme
court held that it is improper to grant a motion for summary judgment in antitrust litigation where the plaintiff presented evidence
that raised material issues of fact as to the existence of an antitrust
89
A number of commercial sockeye salmon fishers
conspiracy.
90
brought an antitrust action under the Alaska Antitrust Act alleging that certain salmon processors and importers conspired to depress the prices paid to fishers for raw salmon. The superior court
91
granted summary judgment for the defendants. On appeal, the
supreme court noted that Alaska courts use federal antitrust law as

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 160.
Id. at 161 (citing Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 345 (Alaska 1998)).
Id. at 161.
48 P.3d 432 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 463.
ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.562 (Michie 2002).
Alakayak, 48 P.3d at 437.
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a guide when considering claims under the Alaska Antitrust Act.92
There is a two-part test for summary judgment in antitrust litigation where the plaintiff’s theory of conspiracy relies entirely on cir93
cumstantial evidence. The court first determines if the evidence
of the defendant’s conduct appears to be as consistent with permis94
sible competition as with illegal conspiracy. If the evidence is
“ambiguous,” the plaintiff can only avoid summary judgment if
there is evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility that the al95
leged conspirators acted independently.” When plaintiff’s theory
is based on conscious parallelism, the plaintiff must present evidence of one or more of five “plus factors,” including: “(a) actions
contrary to the defendants’ economic interest; (b) motive to enter
the conspiracy; (c) a traditional conspiracy agreement; (d) interdefendant conspiratorial communications; or (e) attempts to control
or influence the behavior of other nondefendant sellers or buyers
96
who could thwart the conspiracy.” Because the plaintiffs presented evidence of (1) a collective agreement to end a former
strike, (2) future pricing discussions among processors, (3) collective pressure applied on nonparty processors and importers, and
(4) ovations of “mutual cooperation,” the supreme court reversed
97
the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to all defendants.
Finally, the court found that “suit for a continuing violation may
take place at any time during which the violation was ongoing but
that recovery is limited to the period prior to the filing of suit pre98
scribed by the applicable statute of limitations.”
99
In Collins v. Blair, the supreme court affirmed an order dissolving a corporation formed to settle a dispute over fishing shares
allocated by the federal government and affirmed the equitable dis100
tribution established by the trial court. In 1989, Blair purchased
101
the vessel F/V Milky Way from Collins. The purchase agreement
included an option to purchase that provided for the transfer of
fishing right shares for halibut and sablefish to the corporation
should the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) implement a

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 450.
Id. at 451.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 456-58.
Id. at 463.
No. S-9810, No. 5606, 2002 Alas. LEXIS 111, at *1 (Alaska Aug. 9, 2002).
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *2.
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permit system.102 In 1995, NMFS implemented a permit system,
and Blair was awarded fishing shares based on his Milky Way catch
from 1988-1990, while Collins was awarded shares based on his
103
Under the option to purchase
Milky Way catch from 1984-87.
104
agreement, Collins’s shares should have been transferred to Blair.
Instead of litigating the issue, Blair and Collins entered into a joint
105
venture. Blair never transferred his fishing shares into the joint
106
venture because of a dispute with NMFS. Collins transferred his
shares from another vessel to the corporation, but when he did, he
became ineligible to receive other shares to which he was entitled
107
(the “lost shares”). He therefore transferred his shares back to
108
himself, and NMFS allocated the “lost shares” to him. Blair filed
suit claiming that Collins had breached his fiduciary duty when he
109
Collins countertransferred his shares out of the corporation.
claimed, arguing that Blair had violated his fiduciary duty because
110
he never transferred his Milky Way shares into the corporation.
The trial court ordered the corporation to dissolve and held that,
under the option to purchase, any fishing shares allotted to the
111
Milky Way should have been transferred to Blair. Accordingly,
the trial court ordered an equitable distribution of the corporate
112
assets, whereby the corporation would distribute to Blair the F/V
Milky Way and all of its fishing shares and Collins would retain
113
100% of the corporation’s stock. On appeal, the supreme court
found: (1) that the option to purchase agreement reflected a set114
tlement between Blair and Collins, (2) that Collins had agreed to
contribute his additional Predator shares on starting the joint ven115
ture with Blair, (3) that Blair had not agreed to contribute ap-

102. Id.
103. Id. at *3.
104. Id.
105. Id. at *4.
106. Id. at *5.
107. Id.
108. Id. Blair eventually forced Collins to transfer his shares back into the corporation, at which time the NMFS revoked Collins’ lost shares. Id. at *6.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *8. Further, the court found that Blair had not acted improperly by
forcing Collins to return the shares to the corporation and held that the corporation should therefore pay his legal bills. Id. at *10.
112. Id. at *9-10.
113. Id. at *8.
114. Id. at *15-16.
115. Id. at *17.
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proximately 50,000 pounds of halibut shares to the joint venture,116
and (4) that therefore Collins was wrong to remove his shares.117
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s decision
118
regarding dissolution and distribution of the assets.
119
In Demmert v. Kootznoowoo, Inc., the supreme court ruled
that Kootznoowoo, the Native village corporation for the village of
Angoon, did not distribute corporate wealth in a discriminatory
120
Kootznoowoo, which established a shareholder hiring
manner.
preference, paid for about half of its workers’ transportation costs
121
About sixty-three percent of
for flights originating in Angoon.
122
Kootznoowoo’s shareholders lived outside of Angoon. The court
held that such payment of transportation costs did not constitute
discriminatory treatment among shareholders because the subsidization of flights from Angoon was necessary to maximize efficiency
123
and productivity. Thus, the hiring and subsidization program ensured a “coordinated team[] of workers,” increased shareholder
employment, increased Kootznoowoo’s profits to the benefit of all
the shareholders, and did not distribute corporate wealth in a dis124
criminatory manner.
In D.H. Blattner & Sons, Inc. v. Rothschild & Sons, Ltd.,125
Blattner and Rothschild each separately brought a lien enforcement and foreclosure action against USMX of Alaska each claim126
ing priority for payment over the other. The superior court held
that Blattner’s liens had priority over Rothschild’s liens, “to the ex127
However, the superior
tent that Blattner’s liens were valid.”
court limited Blattner’s lien to its dump lien labor and interest
charges and refused to include non-labor charges or work com128
pleted after mining work ceased. As a result, the superior court
awarded Blattner substantially less than it requested and ordered
that Rothschild was entitled to the remainder of the liquidated as129
On appeal, the supreme court found
sets plus attorney’s fees.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at *18.
Id. at *19-21.
Id. at *28.
45 P.3d 1208 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1209-10.
Id.
Id. at 1211.
Id. at 1212.
Id. at 1211-12.
55 P.3d 37 (Alaska 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that “work” under Alaska Statutes section 34.35.140(a) included
130
However, equipment
both human labor and equipment costs.
costs do not include material costs, and it is the service contract
131
The
that determines the compensation for equipment usage.
court noted that Blattner failed to mitigate its damages, and thus its
recovery was limited to the quantum meruit value of the equip132
ment costs, and not the residual equipment value. Also, recovery
for a dump lien is limited to work performed nine months before
133
cessation. Standby charges are only recoverable when they concern the future development of the mine, and Blattner’s additional
134
Accordingly, the court reliens did not meet that standard.
135
manded the case to the superior court.
In Lake and Peninsula Borough v. Norquest Seafoods, Inc.,136
the supreme court held that a borough could not assess a sales tax
on proceeds from the settlement of an antitrust class action lawsuit
137
settlement between fishers and fish processors. In 1995, Bristol
Bay fishers filed a class action lawsuit against numerous fish processors alleging that the processors violated Alaska antitrust laws by
138
In
conspiring to set below-market prices for sockeye salmon.
1997, the fishers reached a settlement with two of the defendants,
139
Norquest Seafoods, Inc. and Lafayette Fisheries, Inc. The Lake
and Peninsula Borough then determined that the settlement proceeds were subject to its tax on sales of raw fish, characterizing the
140
tax as a post-season adjustment. The fishers and the processors
filed written protests to the borough, which the borough manager
141
denied. The fishers and processors then appealed the decision to
the superior court which held that the settlement was not a taxable
142
143
event. The borough appealed to the supreme court which affirmed the court’s decision, reasoning that the settlement money
was not taxable “because neither the basic allegations of the antitrust action nor the actual provisions of the disputed settlement
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 48.
Id. at 48-49.
Id. at 49.
Id.
Id. at 50-51.
Id.
42 P.3d 521 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 523-24.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 522.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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correspond to any particular sale, or set of sales, within the bor144
ough.”
In Nerox Power Systems v. M-B Contracting Co.,145 the supreme court affirmed the superior court holding that two deeds of
trust should be equitably subordinated to the claims of other creditors of Nerox Power, and that the controlling shareholder should
146
be personally liable for the debts of the company. Nerox Power,
controlled by Nicholas Ross, recorded two deeds of trust on its
147
only asset, a coal mine, while the company was in financial peril.
The beneficiaries of the first deed of trust were Nerox Power’s
president and a company the court found was a standard contractor
148
hired by the company. The beneficiaries of the second deed of
trust were individuals who had contributed money to the corpora149
tion to purchase the coal mine. The court held that the first deed
of trust should be subject to equitable subordination based on the
150
As to the company’s president, the deed of
presence of fraud.
trust was fraudulent, and therefore subject to equitable subordination, because the debt had already been satisfied by the issuance of
151
stock, the deed of trust was a fraudulent conveyance representing
152
a breach of fiduciary duty, and the corporation was “grossly un153
dercapitalized.” As to the additional beneficiary to the first deed
of trust, the court found that a lack of substantiation on either side
of the amount of the debt owed to the contractor warranted the
154
equitable subordination of the claim. The court also held that the
second deed of trust should be subject to equitable subordination
because it would be inequitable to compensate those investors over
155
Finally, the court found that
the rights of bona fide creditors.
Nerox Power was a mere instrumentality of its controlling stockholder Ross, and therefore Ross was liable to the appellees for the
156
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
debts of the company.
157
court was affirmed in all respects.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 523-24.
54 P.3d 791 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 792-93.
Id. at 794, 796.
Id. at 793-94.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 794.
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 798-99.
Id. at 799-800.
Id.
Id. at 793.
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In Reeves v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,158 the supreme court
held that the special verdict correctly established Alyeska’s liability
for breach of implied contract, but that the superior court’s damage
159
award required modification. Reeves developed an idea to build
160
a visitor center near the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. After receiving
assurance from Alyeska’s Fairbanks manager to keep the idea pri161
vate, Reeves orally disclosed this idea to him. Despite receiving
assurances that Alyeska would work with Reeves to build the cen162
ter, Alyeska implemented the plan without Reeves. Reeves filed
suit, and the jury returned a verdict finding Alyeska liable for
breach of an implied contract and a special verdict addressing
163
damages and Reeves’s claim for negligent misrepresentation.
Reeves appealed the trial court’s denial of punitive damages and its
164
The supreme court
limited award of compensatory damages.
found that the proper measure of Reeves’s compensatory damages
was the profit Alyeska actually realized from the center rather than
165
Additionally, the suthe amount Aleyska might have realized.
preme court agreed that punitive damages were improper because
166
Accordthere was no finding of negligent misrepresentation.
ingly, the supreme court affirmed the order striking punitive damages, vacated the compensatory damage award, and remanded for
167
an entry of modified judgment.
In Valdez Fisheries Development Ass’n v. Alyeska Pipeline
168
Service Co., the supreme court upheld the dismissal of contract
and promissory estoppel claims against a prospective purchaser of
a seafood plant when a letter and oral promises were not an une169
quivocal acceptance. In 1993, Alyeska began looking for a wild170
life rehabilitation facility for use in case of an oil spill. Sea Hawk
Seafoods, Inc. was interested in selling its plant to Valdez Fisheries
so that Valdez could lease it to Alyeska for the rehabilitation cen171
ter. Alyeska informed Sea Hawk that Valdez would get the Aly158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

56 P.3d 660 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 662-63.
Id. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 664-65.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 666-67.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 672.
45 P.3d 657 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 665-70.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 662-63.
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eska contract and, therefore, utilize the Sea Hawk plant.172 Alyeska
allegedly further promised that it would lease the plant directly
173
from Sea Hawk if Valdez was unable to buy it. Valdez and Sea
Hawk then signed an agreement for the sale of the plant to Valdez,
174
contingent on Alyeska awarding the contract to Valdez. In 1994,
Alyeska informed Valdez that it was selected as the “winning bidder” and that Alyeska intended to begin negotiating a contract as
175
soon as possible. Valdez and Sea Hawk implemented their con176
Alyeska subsequently broke off
tract for the sale of the plant.
177
negotiations with Valdez. Sea Hawk and Valdez both filed complaints against Alyeska, asserting breach of contract and promis178
The trial court dismissed Valdez’s claims under
sory estoppel.
Rule 12(b)(6) and awarded Alyeska summary judgment on Sea
179
Hawk’s claims. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of the contract claims, finding that Alyeska’s statement that
Valdez was the “winning bidder” did not constitute an unequivocal
180
acceptance. The court also found that Alyeska’s letter was not a
binding agreement to negotiate because it did not contain a specific
181
Regarding Valdez’s promissory esway to resolve differences.
toppel claim, the court held that the “actual promise” requirement
was analytically identical to the “acceptance” required for a con182
tract. Because the court found that Alyeska’s letter did not constitute acceptance, it necessarily followed that the “actual promise”
183
Regarding Sea
element of promissory estoppel was not met.
Hawk’s promissory estoppel claim, the court found that Alyeska’s
promises to Sea Hawk were ambiguous as to duration and price
and held that promissory estoppel cannot be used to defeat the
statute of frauds when the oral agreement contained substantial
184
ambiguity as to key terms.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 663.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663-64.
Id. at 664.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 667-68.
Id. at 668.
Id.
Id. at 670.
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IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Claim and Issue Preclusion
In DeNardo v. Barrans,185 the supreme court held that federal
law required Denardo’s claims in state court be barred under res
186
judicata after a punitive dismissal of the claims in federal court.
Denardo’s federal court claims against nine state employees for
187
wrongful discharge were all dismissed by the federal court. Actions against eight of the defendants were dismissed with prejudice
on summary judgment, and the remaining claim against DeNardo’s
188
supervisor was dismissed with prejudice under Rule 41(b) for
189
In this subsequent
Denardo’s failure to abide by court orders.
state action involving identical claims against the same defendants,
the court held that all nine of the dismissals represented judgment
on the merits warranting claim preclusion and that federal common
law dictated that a punitive dismissal with prejudice was also on the
190
merits, warranting the preclusive effect. Finally, the court ruled
that the claim preclusion extended to the state agencies even
though the agencies were not included in the original federal suit,
as res judicata may preclude an action against a party not included
in a prior action where the newly included party is “in privity” with
191
a party to the prior action. The court found that sufficient privity
exists between a state agency and its employees for claim preclusion to apply, where the employees were sued “for actions taken in
192
the course of their employment.” Accordingly, Denardo’s claims
against state employees, previously dismissed in a prior federal action, as well as against the non-party state agencies for which the
employees worked, were all barred under the doctrine of res judi193
cata.
In Tru-Line Metal Products, Inc. v. United States Fabrication
194
and Erection, the supreme court reversed a summary judgment
195
order that was granted on res judicata grounds. Tru-Line, a third
tier subcontractor, sued United States Fabrication and Erection
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

59 P.3d 366 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 267.
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
Denardo, 50 P.3d at 267.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id.
52 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 151.
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(USF&E), a second-tier subcontractor, for breach of contract in
196
federal court. The district court dismissed the case due to lack of
197
Tru-Line subsequently brought suit
subject matter jurisdiction.
in state superior court, alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation,
198
USF&E moved for and was granted summary
and conversion.
199
judgment on res judicata grounds. The supreme court reversed,
holding that the federal court judgment did not constitute a final
judgment on the merits of the case and that therefore res judicata
200
did not apply.
In Van Deusen v. Seavey,201 the supreme court held that a prior
final judgment denying the Van Deusens’ request for injunctive relief barred a subsequent claim for injunctive relief under the doc202
trine of collateral estoppel. The Van Deusens requested injunctive relief for the removal of sled dogs which were being kept in
their neighbors’ yard and which the superior court had found to be
203
a nuisance due to their barking. In an earlier claim, a final judgment had been issued denying the Van Deusens’ request for in204
junctive relief while awarding money damages for the nuisance.
In this second action for injunctive relief, the supreme court found
that the Van Deusens failed to demonstrate that conditions had
205
changed, and therefore collateral estoppel barred the claim. The
court did note, however, that res judicada did not bar the claim because the nuisance was classified as a temporary instead of a per206
manent nuisance.
B. Costs and Attorney’s Fees
207
In Fleegel v. Estate of Boyles, the supreme court ruled that
both Fleegel and Boyles were entitled to an award of attorney’s
208
fees. Fleegel sued Boyles for damages resulting from an automo209
bile accident. The jury awarded compensatory damages to Flee-

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 152.
Id.
Id. at 153.
Id.
Id. at 154-55.
53 P.3d 596 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 600.
61 P.3d 1267 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1278.
Id. at 1269.
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gel and determined that he was entitled to punitive damages, but
210
awarded zero dollars in punitive damages. The trial court then
211
determined that Boyles, as the prevailing party under Rule 68,
212
was entitled to attorney’s fees. Fleegel then moved for an award
213
of attorney’s fees under Alaska Statutes section 09.60.070, which
awards “full reasonable attorney fees” to victims of certain
214
The supreme court affirmed both awards of attorney’s
crimes.
215
fees. The court determined that a crime victim does not need to
be a prevailing party as defined in Rule 68 to be awarded attorney’s fees because Rule 68 did not address the crime victim’s stat216
Additionally, the court
ute that was enacted six years earlier.
217
found that the laws were intended to operate independently.
218
In Native Village of Quinhagak v. United States, the 9th Circuit held that plaintiffs were entitled to attorney’s fees under the
219
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) for
220
The
fees incurred during required administrative proceedings.
Village of Quinhagak (the Village) sued the federal government
and the State of Alaska, arguing that the federal government erroneously ruled that navigable waters were not protected under
ANILCA (the “where” issue) and that Alaska had no jurisdiction
221
to regulate such waters (the “who” issue). After ten years of litigation, the district court entered a final judgment on the merits in
222
favor of the Village. The Village then filed a motion for attor223
The district court granted the motion only in part,
ney’s fees.
holding that ANILCA did not authorize recovery of costs incurred
224
exhausting administrative remedies. The State appealed the fee
award, arguing that the Village did not raise the “who” issue in its
225
case and should not be entitled to costs on that issue. The Ninth
Circuit held that the district court properly required fee payment
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 1269-70.
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 68.
Fleegel, 61 P.3d at 1270.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.070 (Michie 2002).
Fleegel, 61 P.3d at 1270.
Id. at 1278.
Id. at 1277.
Id.
307 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2002).
16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-233 (2000).
Quinhagak, 307 F.3d. at 1076.
Id.
Id. at 1078.
Id.
Id. at 1079.
Id.
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for the “who” issue as the plaintiffs properly “addressed that issue
226
as required for resolution of their own case.” The Village crossappealed, arguing that the district court erred in determining that
227
The
ANILCA did not authorize pre-litigation fee recovery.
Ninth Circuit held that pre-litigation fees were recoverable under
ANILCA, determining that “providing for recovery of fees pro228
motes Congress’s expressed purpose in enacting” ANILCA.
C. Miscellaneous
229
In Cook v. Rowland, the supreme court held that a
$7,000,000 default judgment against Kim Michael Cook should be
set aside and remanded for a redetermination of damages before a
230
different judge. The default judgment was the result of a wrong231
ful death suit filed by Rowland for the death of her husband.
While Cook was served with the complaint the following day, he
failed to respond within the required twenty days, and Rowland
232
filed for and was granted a default judgment. Cook responded,
moving to set aside the default judgment and made a peremptory
challenge to the assigned judge pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule
233
42(c). The peremptory challenge was denied as untimely and the
234
In
motion to set aside the judgment was subsequently denied.
setting aside the default judgment, the supreme court found that
Cook’s failure to respond was justified by excusable neglect because of Cook’s particular circumstances: severe injuries, confinement in a maximum security facility, lack of familiarity with court
235
rules, and focus on his criminal defense. Additionally, the court
found “good cause” to set aside the default judgment based on: (1)
the potential meritorious defense to the amount of damages; (2)
the magnitude of the judgment itself; (3) the insignificant amount
of culpability in Cook’s conduct relating to the entry of default; and
(4) the minimal duration of the default and lack of prejudice to the
236
plaintiff. For these reasons, the court held that the default judg-

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 1081.
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1083.
49 P.3d 262 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 263.
Id.
Id.
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 42(c); Rowland, 49 P.3d at 263.
Rowland, 49 P.3d at 263-64.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 265-67.
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ment should be vacated and remanded for a new determination of
237
damages.
In DeNardo v. ABC Inc. RVS Motorhomes,238 the supreme
court held that the trial court was within its discretion in dismissing
239
DeNardo’s complaint under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 37,
and that the dismissal of DeNardo’s complaint did not deny De240
Nardo his constitutional rights. ABC fired DeNardo shortly after
he was hired for failure to provide a valid driver’s license and hos241
tile behavior. After DeNardo refused to comply with two orders
compelling discovery, the trial court dismissed DeNardo’s lawsuit
242
under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C). The supreme
court found that DeNardo’s failure to comply with the trial court’s
discovery order was willful and that ABC suffered prejudice as a
243
Further, the supreme
result of DeNardo’s failure to comply.
court found that the dismissal was sufficiently related to DeNardo’s
violation of the discovery order because the dismissed claims were
244
related to the information DeNardo refused to supply. The supreme court held that the dismissal of DeNardo’s lawsuit did not
deny his due process rights or his right to a jury trial and that the
information requested by ABC did not violate DeNardo’s constitu245
tional right to privacy.
In Kaiser v. Sakata,246 the supreme court held that a pro se litigant cannot defeat a motion for summary judgment where he or
she does not make a good faith effort to comply with judicial rules
and procedures and the court makes adequate allowances for the
247
litigant’s pro se status. After being injured in a work-related accident, Kaiser alleged that his physical therapy treatments were
negligently administered by Sakata and caused him additional inju248
ries. In granting summary judgment for the defendants, the superior court noted that Kaiser failed to respond adequately to discovery requests and did not produce an expert to present
countervailing testimony as to whether Sakata had met the appro-

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 267.
51 P.3d 919 (Alaska 2002).
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 37; DeNardo, 51 P.3d at 922.
DeNardo, 51 P.3d at 927.
Id.
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C); DeNardo, 51 P.3d at 922.
Denardo, 51 P.3d at 923-25.
Id. at 926.
Id. at 927-28.
40 P.3d 800 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 801.
Id. at 802.

YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC

100

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

04/22/03 12:57 PM

[20:1

priate standard of care.249 On appeal, the supreme court ruled that
where courts relax the procedural requirements for a pro se litigant, such a litigant is expected to make a good faith effort to comply with judicial rules and procedures, and absent this effort, such
250
leniency properly may be denied. The supreme court held that
summary judgment had been properly granted for the defendants
251
because Kaiser failed to fulfill the Rule 56(e) requirement that
the party opposed to the motion respond with affidavits or specific
252
facts to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact.
253
In Kessey v. Frontier Lodge, Inc., the supreme court held
that requests for continuances based on Alaska Rule of Civil Pro254
cedure 56(f) should be “freely granted” if a party has substan255
tively complied with the rule. The superior court denied Kessey’s
Rule 56(f) request because he failed to provide the necessary affi256
davit in support of the request. Kessey requested a continuance
in order to perform the depositions necessary to counter Frontier
257
Lodge’s summary judgment motion. In a memorandum opposing
summary judgment, Kessey’s attorney stated that he was out of
town when Frontier Lodge filed its summary judgment motion and
was unable to conduct the depositions when he returned due to
258
Betrial preparations for a complex medical malpractice case.
cause such requests should not be denied based on a technical ruling, the supreme court found Kessey had substantively satisfied
259
Additionally, the court found that Kessey was not
Rule 56(f).
“dilatory” as Frontier alleged, but that Kessey’s counsel had been
260
Accordingly, the supreme
actively involved in the litigation.
court reversed the superior court decision granting summary judg261
ment for Frontier Lodge as an abuse of discretion.
262
In McCoy v. State, the court of appeals, in interpreting
263
Alaska Appellate Rule 214, declared that unpublished opinions
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id.
Id. at 803.
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(e).
Kaiser, 40 P.3d at 805.
42 P.3d 1060 (Alaska 2002).
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 56(f).
Kessey, 42 P.3d at 1063.
Id.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1063.
Id.
Id. at 1064.
Id.
59 P.3d 747 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
ALASKA R. APP. P. 214.
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may not be given precedential value, but may be brought to the
264
court’s attention and given persuasive value. The court rejected
the argument that Rule 214 should forbid courts or attorneys from
265
The supreme court had
referring to any unpublished decision.
266
previously issued a standing order calling for the distribution of
unpublished opinions among judges, lawyers, and members of the
267
general public. The court of appeals found this standing order inconsistent with the assertion that unpublished opinions should not
268
be referred to again in the Alaska courts. Accordingly, the court
affirmed its prior decision that Rule 214 permitted judges and lawyers to rely on unpublished opinions for “whatever persuasive
269
power those decisions might have.”
In Reich v. Cominco Alaska, Inc.,270 the supreme court held
271
that Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 47(c)(12), which excludes
prospective jurors who have a financial interest in the litigation,
may also exclude stockholders of a corporation who are not a party
272
to the lawsuit but who may be affected financially by the verdict.
The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant in 1997 alleging
273
The defendant operated a mine
various discrimination claims.
under an agreement sharing costs and profits with the owners of
274
The agreement allowed the defendant to
the mine (NANA).
subtract from gross revenue its costs of defendant lawsuits and any
judgment against it, unless the judgment was based on gross negli275
gence or willful misconduct. At trial, the superior court excluded
for cause all prospective jurors who owned stock in NANA even
276
though NANA was not a party to the lawsuit. The court’s ruling
relied on Civil Rule 47(c)(12) and found that any verdict other than
one holding the defendant liable for gross negligence or willful
misconduct would reduce NANA’s share of the mine’s profits be277
On appeal,
cause the defendant could deduct its defense costs.
the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision regarding
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

McCoy, 59 P.3d at 754.
Id. at 759-60.
Alaska Supreme Court, Standing Order No.3 (March 1981).
McCoy, 59 P.3d at 760.
Id.
Id.
56 P.3d 18 (Alaska 2002).
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 47(c)(12).
Reich, 56 P.3d at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the NANA shareholders and held that the per se rule that excludes
stockholders in a company which is a party to a litigation from being jurors in that litigation also applied to stockholders in a corporation which is not a party to the litigation but which is financially
278
interested in the outcome. Additionally, the supreme court held
that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by finding that
NANA shareholders were financially interested in the outcome of
279
the litigation.
In Shook v. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.,280 the supreme court
held that Shook had standing to appeal the decertification of the
class and that the superior court erred in decertifying the class
281
without specifying its reasons. Shook was a former Alyeska employee who filed a class-action complaint against Alyeska alleging
282
violations of the Alaska Wage and Hour Act. Originally, the superior court granted certification, but it later decertified the class
following the United States Supreme Court opinion in Auer v.
283
Robbins. Shook moved for an entry of final judgment to allow
284
him to appeal the order vacating class certification. On appeal,
the supreme court agreed that Shook had standing to appeal the
285
However, the court stated that bedecertification of the class.
cause Shook is no longer a member of the class, a new class repre286
The supreme court
sentative should be appointed on remand.
then remanded the issue of decertification because the superior
court “made no mention of Civil Rule 23, or any of its require287
ments, and instead gave merit-related grounds for its order.” The
supreme court ruled that it was an abuse of discretion for the superior court to reach the merits of the class action in deciding to de288
certify the class.
In Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. State,289 the supreme court held
that the civil investigative demand (CID) served on Tesoro was not
overbroad, nor were the responsive documents wrongly disclosed

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 23.
Id.
51 P.3d 935 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 937.
Id. at 936.
519 U.S. 452 (1997); Shook, 51 P.3d at 936.
Shook, 51 P.3d at 936.
Id. at 937.
Id.
Id. at 938.
See id.
42 P.3d 531 (Alaska 2002).

YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC

2003]

04/22/03 12:57 PM

YEAR IN REVIEW

103

to outside counsel.290 In the course of investigating Tesoro’s alleged
antitrust violations, the Alaska Attorney General served upon the
291
company a CID for the production of forty-six documents pursu292
ant to Alaska Statutes section 45.50.592. The State retained out293
side counsel to review documents and assist the investigation.
Tesoro petitioned the superior court to modify the CID, arguing
that the demand was overbroad and that disclosure to outside
294
counsel was impermissible. The superior court held that the outside counsel was an employee of the State for the purposes of assisting the investigation, and that the CID was not overbroad, but it
did modify the CID slightly to cover only employees with decision295
Reviewing the superior court decision for
making authority.
abuse of discretion, the supreme court held that the outside counsel
and his firm were authorized employees or designees of the State
296
The
and thus permitted to review the responsive documents.
court affirmed the superior court’s decision, reasoning that the Attorney General is granted broad investigative powers and may use
these powers to the extent he deems necessary, and that the term
“designee” in section 45.50.592 includes employees other than
297
Further, the suthose directly employed by the government.
preme court held that under the general policy of allowing “liberal
discovery in antirust cases” the CID, while broad, was not oppres298
sive.
In Willoya v. State, Department of Corrections,299 the supreme
300
court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
Willoya was incarcerated at Spring Creek Correctional Center
when he was diagnosed with ulcerative colitis that required sur301
After his operation, Willoya brought a negligence claim
gery.
302
against the State of Alaska and the individuals who treated him.
Willoya’s attorney later requested the trial court to allow him to
withdraw from the case because “attorney/client communication

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id. at 533.
Id. at 534.
ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.592 (Michie 2000).
Tesoro, 42 P.3d at 534.
Id.
Id. at 534-35.
Id. at 535.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 541-42.
53 P.3d 1115 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1117.
Id.
Id.
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had broken down.”303 First, the supreme court held that the trial
court did not err in granting the attorney’s request to withdraw because Willoya was present at the withdrawal hearing and did not
offer any support for his claim that the trial court abused its discre304
tion. Second, the supreme court held that the trial court did not
err in denying Willoya’s request for appointment of a discovery
master because Willoya failed to assert any of the five factors laid
305
out in Peter v. Progressive Corp. Third, the supreme court held
that the trial court did not err in denying Willoya’s request for the
appointment of counsel because there is no right to appointed
306
Fourth, the supreme court also held that
counsel in tort cases.
the trial court did not err in denying Willoya’s request for appointment of an expert because appointment of an expert is discre307
tionary and the issues in the case were not unusually complex.
Fifth, the supreme court held that it was not error to deny Willoya’s request for appointment of a medical expert advisory panel
because Willoya had earlier waived his right to such an expert advi308
sory panel. Sixth, the supreme court held that the trial court did
not err in granting summary judgment for the State because Willoya received proper notice of the requirements of submitting affidavits with his opposition to the State’s motion for summary judgment, and he offered no medical expert opinion testimony contrary
to the expert medical opinions offered by the State to establish a
309
triable case of medical negligence. Lastly, the supreme court denied other various claims raised by Willoya because he failed to
310
raise the claims in the trial court or in his opening brief on appeal.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
311
In Evans v. State, the supreme court held seven tort reform
provisions—“(1)the cap on noneconomic and punitive damages
312
under Alaska Statutes sections 09.17.010 and .020; (2) the requirement that half of all punitive damage awards be paid to the
313
State under section 09.17.020(j); (3) the comparative apportion303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. at 1118.
Id. at 1120.
996 P.2d 865, 870 (Alaska 1999); Willoya, 53 P.3d at 1121.
Willoya, 53 P.3d at 1121.
Id. at 1122.
Id.
Id. at 1122-24.
Id. at 1125-26.
56 P.3d 1046 (Alaska 2002).
ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.17.010, .020 (Michie 2002).
§ 09.17.020(j).
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ment of damages under section 09.17.080;314 (4) the revised offer of
315
judgment procedure under section 09.30.065; (5) the limitations
316
tolling procedure under section 09.10.070(a)(2) and .140; (6) the
317
partial tort immunity for hospitals under section 09.65.096; and
318
(7) the ‘statute of repose’ under section 09.10.055” —to be facially
319
constitutional under the Alaska Constitution.
First, the court ruled that damages caps do not violate the constitutional right to a trial by jury, because “the decision to place a
cap on damages awarded is a policy choice and not a reexamination of the factual question of damages determined by the
320
jury.” In addition, the damages caps do not violate equal protection because the plaintiff’s interests in unlimited damages were
merely economic and the State’s interest in tort reform was legitimate—thus, the nexus between the legislative objectives and the
damages caps was adequate to survive an equal protection chal321
lenge. The court also ruled that damages caps do not infringe on
322
the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights and that the damages
323
cap did not violate the separation of powers. Moreover, the court
ruled that damages caps do not infringe on the right of access to the
courts because they are not so drastic as to eliminate the tort
324
remedies that they modify. Second, following its own precedent,
the court ruled that Alaska Statutes section 09.17.020, which requires plaintiffs to surrender half of a punitive damages award to
325
the State does not violate substantive due process rights, does not
effect a taking without just compensation under the United States
326
and Alaska Constitutions, and does not violate the right to a jury
327
trial. Third, the court ruled that the allocation of fault to nonparties provision is not void for vagueness, because although there
are some ambiguities in the statute, they are “not so conflicting and
confused that it cannot be given meaning in the adjudication proc-

314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

§ 09.17.080.
§ 09.30.065.
§ 09.10.070(a)(2), .140.
§ 09.65.096.
§ 09.10.055; Evans, 56 P.3d at 1049.
Evans, 56 P.3d at 1048.
Id. at 1051.
Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1055-56.
Id.at 1057.
Id. at 1058.
Id.
Id. at 1059.
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ess.”328 Also, the allocation of fault to non-parties provision does
not violate the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights, because
the statute reasonably relates to a legitimate governmental purpose
by providing three procedural safeguards to preclude failure to join
329
responsible parties. Fourth, the court held that section 09.30.065
does not violate the right of access to the courts or the right to a
330
jury trial, and is thus facially constitutional. Fifth, inspecting the
plain language of the statute, the court held that the disparate
treatment for minors in the limitations tolling procedure is facially
constitutional because it is rationally based on legitimate state in331
terests of limiting stale tort claims. Sixth, the court held that section 09.65.096, granting partial tort immunity to hospitals, is facially
constitutional because “the legislature has the power to modify
332
common law.” Seventh, the court held the statute of repose to be
facially constitutional because there is no differential treatment
333
and the legislature is free to modify or abolish the common law.
Finally, the court held that the entire act promulgating these provisions does not violate the “one subject” rule of article II, section 13
of the Alaska Constitution because although the act concerns many
different matters, “they are all within the single subject of ‘civil ac334
tions.’”
In Fraiman v. State, Department of Administration, of Motor
335
Vehicles [sic], the supreme court affirmed that Fraiman did not
336
have standing to allege a Fourth Amendment violation. Alaska
State Trooper Tracy attempted to pull over Fraiman after noticing
that Fraiman’s taillights were not functioning properly, but Frai337
man continued driving to a friend’s house. Without the owner’s
explicit permission, Tracy searched and found Fraiman in the loft
338
Fraiman challenged the suspension of his
of his friend’s cabin.
license at an administrative hearing, claiming an illegal search un339
The supreme court affirmed that
der the Fourth Amendment.

328. Id. at 1062 (quoting Williams v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 895 P.2d 99, 105
(Alaska 1995)).
329. Id. at 1063.
330. Id. at 1063-64.
331. Id. at 1064-66.
332. Id. at 1066-67.
333. Id. at 1068.
334. Id. at 1069-70.
335. 49 P.3d 241 (Alaska 2002).
336. Id. at 242.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 243.
339. Id.
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Fraiman had no standing to allege a Fourth Amendment violation
because he was not an overnight guest and could not have had a
340
“legitimate expectation of privacy” in the cabin. In addition, the
court ruled that Tracy’s conduct did not fall under either the “gross
or shocking” or “deliberate violation” standing exceptions of
341
Waring v. State.
In Midgett v. Cook Inlet Pre-Trial Facility,342 the supreme court
held that Midgett’s claims that his constitutional rights were violated by an officer’s actions to stop a fight between Midgett and
343
Midgett
another prisoner were barred by collateral estoppel.
claimed that failure of the officer to follow standard operating procedures, resulting in the other prisoner not being handcuffed, vio344
The court
lated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
upheld the lower court’s summary judgment determining that these
constitutional claims were barred by collateral estoppel, as they
345
Midgett
have been adjudicated and dismissed in federal court.
also claimed a violation of due process because he was not appointed counsel; the court determined there was no violation of
due process because no right to counsel exists for a civil trial and
346
Midgett does not satisfy any of the exceptions to this general rule.
Requiring Midgett to participate telephonically also did not violate
his due process rights because such participation did not bar reasonable access to the court, such participation did not prejudice his
claim, and the costs for his transportation would have been sub347
stantial. Further, Midgett failed to meet the burden of proof that
the defendants were negligent and that this negligence was the le348
Midgett’s claim of breach of congal cause of Midgett’s harm.
tract for failing to comply with the Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) was also dismissed, as the court found that the SOPs did
349
not constitute a contract between Cook Inlet and Midgett. Additionally, the court found no medical malpractice for treatment of

340. Id. at 245.
341. Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 363 (Alaska 1983); Fraiman, 49 P.3d at 245.
342. 53 P.3d 1105 (Alaska 2002).
343. Id. at 1108.
344. Id. at 1108-09.
345. Id. at 1110. The federal judge held that there was no deliberate indifference with respect to Midgett’s medical needs, the force taken by the officers to
break up the fight was applied in good faith, and there was no “conscious indifference.” Id.
346. Id. at 1111-12.
347. Id. at 1113.
348. Id. at 1113-14.
349. Id. at 1114.
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the injury Midgett incurred while fighting with the other prisoner;350
Midgett failed to follow his doctor’s advice in caring for his ankle,
351
and surgery became necessary as a result.
352
In Valdez v. Rosenbaum, the Ninth Circuit held that the constitutional rights of a federal detainee in the Alaska Cook Inlet
Pretrial Facility were not violated by imposing restrictions on his
telephone access during his four-and-a-half months of pretrial de353
tention. After being convicted for drug trafficking and sentenced
to thirty years in prison, Valdez filed a pro se civil rights action
against certain state officials alleging that his pretrial telephone re354
strictions violated a number of his constitutional rights. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Valdez’s procedural due process
claims failed because Alaska law did not create a liberty interest in
355
Similarly,
using a telephone during his pretrial confinement.
Valdez’s substantive due process claims failed because the restriction did not constitute punishment as it was intended to prevent
Valdez from tipping off his co-conspirators about the recently issued indictments, ensuring their capture with minimal danger to
356
the arresting officers, and thus did not constitute punishment.
Additionally, the court held that the telephone restriction did not
violate Valdez’s rights to freedom of speech because a prisoner’s
First Amendment right to telephone access is subject to reasonable
357
Finally, the court held that Valdez’s Sixth
security limitations.
Amendment claim was not cognizable in non-habeas corpus litigation and that his equal protection challenge was waived because he
358
did not raise it on appeal.
VI. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Constitutional Protections
359
In Beaudoin v. State, the court of appeals affirmed the defendant’s murder conviction. Beaudoin was found “guilty but men360
tally ill” for the murder of his mother in September 1997. On the
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

Id. at 1114-15.
Id. at 1109.
302 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 1043.
Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1046-47.
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1049.
57 P.3d 703 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 705.
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night of the murder, Beaudoin confessed to a number of people
361
On appeal,
that he was responsible for stabbing his mother.
Beaudoin argued that his confessions should have been suppressed
because the first confession he made to an Alaska State Trooper
362
was made before he was given his Miranda warnings. The court
found that Beaudoin’s un-Mirandized confession was a “minor interruption in what was otherwise a stream of legally obtained confessions” and therefore the subsequent confessions were not
363
tainted and should not have been suppressed.
364
In Hamilton v. State, the court of appeals rejected a murder
defendant’s claim that a traffic stop leading to his arrest was ille365
gal. Rebecca Dixon awoke one night to find someone stabbing
366
her husband. News of the stabbing was quickly broadcast to the
367
Upon hearing the news, a state trooper stopped a car
police.
traveling in the opposite direction and radioed Fairbanks officers,
asking them to record the license plate number so that the driver
368
could later be contacted. One of the officers followed the car, but
369
the license plate was covered in snow. Stopping the car on the officer’s supervisor’s order, the police officer discovered that it was
Hamilton and found evidence that was used against him in his con370
viction for first-degree murder. On appeal, the court of appeals
declined to consider whether it violated the Alaska Constitution
for the police to use a minor violation, an obstructed license place,
371
as a pretext for making a traffic stop. Instead, the court held that
stopping Hamilton’s car was justified because “a prompt investiga372
tion” was required “as a matter of practical necessity.”
373
In Paul v. State, the court affirmed a denial of a motion to
suppress evidence procured by a private party and used by the po374
P.B. and his minor cousin C.P.
lice to obtain a search warrant.
broke into Alfred Paul’s, P.B.’s uncle’s, room and viewed a portion

361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 707.
59 P.3d 760 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 762.
Id.
Id. at 763.
Id. at 763-64.
Id. at 764.
Id.
Id. at 765-66.
Id. at 767 (quoting Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976)).
57 P.3d 698 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002)
Id. at 703.
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of a videotape depicting Paul having sex with C.P.375 P.B. gave the
376
videotape to the police. The police viewed this videotape in its
377
entirety and obtained a search warrant on this basis. Paul claimed
that the viewing of the videotape by the police violated his Fourth
378
The
Amendment rights and moved to suppress the evidence.
court determined that the test for a “warrantless government
search following a private search,” as established in Walter v.
379
380
United States and United States v. Jacobsen, “is the degree to
which the government’s invasion of the privacy interest exceeds the
381
scope of the private search.” The court ruled that Paul’s privacy
interest had been destroyed by P.B.’s viewing of the videotape,
even though P.B. did not view the entire tape and the police did,
because the portion P.B. viewed was sufficient to find evidence of
382
Furthermore, Alfred Paul claimed that the illegal
wrongdoing.
procurement of the tape by a private party prevented the police
383
from being able to use it as evidence. In rejecting this argument,
the court stated that “it has . . . been settled . . . that a wrongful
search or seizure conducted by a private party does not . . . deprive
the government of the right to use evidence that it has acquired
384
lawfully.”
In State v. Boceski,385 the court of appeals found that a cocaine
dealer had a diminished expectation of privacy when conducting a
drug deal in another person’s home such that a police officer’s
eavesdropping did not violate the cocaine dealer’s Fourth
386
Amendment expectation of privacy. Confidential informant L.H.
387
informed the police that Boceski was a cocaine dealer. Sergeant
Rayme Grubbs arranged for a drug sale between L.H. and Boceski
388
at L.H.’s residence. Grubbs eavesdropped and recorded the con389
versation and arrested Boceski once the deal had taken place.
After being arrested, Boceski sought suppression of “Grubb’s ob375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 700.
447 U.S. 649 (1980).
466 U.S. 109 (1984).
Paul, 57 P.3d at 702.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 703 (citing Walter, 447 U.S. at 656 (citations omitted)).
53 P.3d 622 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002)
Id. at 625.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id.
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servations, the audiotape recording and all of the evidence seized
following Boceski’s arrest, including Boceski’s Mirandized state390
ments.” The trial court suppressed the evidence and granted Bo391
ceski’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, the court of appeals found
that although Boceski had an expectation of privacy for a private
conversation, this expectation was not reasonable in the circum392
stances. The court found Boceski had a diminished expectation of
privacy that is not protected by the Fourth Amendment because
Grubbs overheard the conversation from a place where he had a
right to be, used his unaided, natural senses and did not rely on the
tape recorder, and was in a place where Boceski would anticipate
393
someone might be. The court reversed the order suppressing the
evidence and remanded the case to the superior court for a deter394
mination of evidence to be suppressed for illegal tape recording.
395
In State v. Smith, the supreme court held that Smith was not
in custody for Miranda purposes during police questioning, and
396
thus his confession during questioning could not be suppressed.
Smith had contacted the police when his friends told him he resembled a police sketch of a rapist published in a local newspa397
per. Because Smith sounded suspicious, the police tracked Smith
398
down and questioned him in a police car. After making some incriminating statements, Smith left the car only to be arrested two
399
hours later. At trial, Smith was convicted of kidnapping, sexual
assault, and sexual abuse of a minor, but the court of appeals reversed, finding that Smith was in Miranda custody once the police
400
questioning had become accusatory. Examining the details of the
interrogation and events before and after the interrogation, the supreme court ruled that the questioning was noncustodial based on
the fact that (1) Smith had initiated contact with the police, (2)
Smith voluntarily talked with the police in the police car, (3) the
questioning was by a single police officer occurring in the middle of
the day and lasting only thirty minutes, (4) one of Smith’s friends
passed by during questioning, (5) the tone of the interview was

390.
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 625-26.
38 P.3d 1149 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1161.
Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1151-52.
Id. at 1152.
Id.
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noncustodial, and (6) Smith was informed that he was free to
401
leave. The supreme court concluded, on balance, that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave even though some of
questions were accusatory, the interview took place in a police car,
402
and Smith was arrested shortly after the interview. Accordingly,
403
Smith’s conviction was reinstated.
B. General Criminal Law
404
In Beatty v. State, the court of appeals concluded it was
proper for the trial judge to exclude Beatty’s proposed jury instruction of a lesser included offense because Beatty failed to present
405
sufficient evidence for its inclusion. Beatty was convicted of first406
degree robbery and conspiracy to commit first degree robbery.
He argued that the jury should have been instructed on the lesser
407
While
included offense of attempted first degree robbery.
agreeing with the final result, the court of appeals rejected the trial
court’s reasoning that attempted robbery did not exist separately
408
under Alaska law. Instead, the court of appeals found that the
first degree robbery statute was intended to “criminalize unsuccessful takings of property to the same extent as successful takings of
property,” and not include “anticipatory acts in preparation of a
409
robbery.” Therefore, attempted robbery did exist in the Alaska
statutes through the general attempts statute when a person takes a
410
The
“substantial step towards the commission of that crime.”
court found this could have been shown if Beatty intended to rob
411
the victim but did not use force or threaten the use of force.
However, Beatty failed to produce any such evidence; therefore,
412
the trial judge was correct in excluding the proposed instruction.
413
Accordingly, the lower court’s decision was affirmed.

401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

Id. at 1159.
Id.
Id. at 1161.
52 P.3d 752 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 753.
Id. at 754.
Id. at 753.
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.500(a) (Michie 2002).
Beatty, 52 P.3d at 755.
§ 11.31.100(a).
Beatty, 52 P.3d at 757.
Id. at 757-58.
Id.
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In Blair v. State,414 the court of appeals held that Blair had the
right to be present during the playback of audiotape testimony
during jury deliberations, and that allowing the playback to proceed in Blair’s attorney’s absence was an error requiring the rever415
sal of his conviction and a new trial. Blair was tried for assaulting
416
his wife. His attorney requested that he be present for playbacks
417
of testimony during jury deliberations. Blair’s attorney was out
of his office at the time the judge called to inform him of the jury’s
418
Blair was conrequest, and was not present at the playback.
victed, and his attorney moved for a new trial; the trial court de419
The court of appeals reversed the conviction
nied the motion.
420
The court held that the State had not
and granted a new trial.
met the burden of proving that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, as it was possible that the verdict was affected by
421
Accordingly, the
holding the playback in counsel’s absence.
court of appeals reversed Blair’s conviction and granted him a new
422
trial.
In Brewer v. State,423 the court of appeals held that the trial
judge properly denied the defendant’s eleventh-hour request for
self-representation and compelled the defendant to proceed with a
424
revocation hearing with the counsel of a public defender. Analo425
gizing to Gottschalk v. State and following the Second Circuit’s
426
holding in United States, ex rel. Maldonado v. Denno, the court
held that “a trial judge may deny a defendant’s last-minute request
for self-representation when granting the request would necessarily
delay the trial and the tardiness of the request is due to the defendant’s lack of diligence in pursuing the issue of self427
The court also rejected the defendant’s argurepresentation.”
ment that the State should be estopped from seeking to revoke his
probation because of its failure to grant him a “speedy petition”
reasoning that the defendant never raised the issue at trial, and the
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

42 P.3d 1152 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 1153-54.
Id. at 1153.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1153-54.
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1156.
55 P.3d 749 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 749-50.
602 P.2d 448 (Alaska 1979).
348 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1965)
Brewer, 55 P.3d at 753.
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defendant’s argument was moot since the defendant failed to prove
428
that he was prejudiced by the delay. Accordingly, the court af429
firmed the superior court’s judgment.
In Busby v. State,430 the court of appeals upheld a conviction
431
After having his license refor driving with a revoked license.
voked in Alaska, Busby moved to Nicaragua, where he obtained an
international driving permit under the provisions of the United Na432
tions Convention on Road Traffic. Upon his return to Alaska, he
was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently charged with,
433
and later convicted of, driving with a revoked license. On appeal,
Busby claimed that even though his license was revoked, he was
still entitled to drive in Alaska under the terms of his international
434
The court of appeals held that Busby’s predriving permit.
existing license revocation was a sufficient reason for the State of
Alaska to deny Busby the right to use his international driving
435
permit on Alaska’s roads. Additionally, the court of appeals held
that the State’s authority to prohibit a driver with a pre-existing license revocation from driving on Alaska’s roads does not depend
on whether the State has initiated new proceedings against the
driver or the international driving permit, nor does it depend on
whether the State has required the driver to physically surrender
436
the permit.
In Butts v. State,437 the court of appeals interpreted the phrase
438
“bodily impact” in Alaska’s robbery statute to include indirect
contacts where the defendant does not actually touch the victim
but, instead, exerts impact on property that is attached to the vic439
tim or that the victim is holding onto. Butts accosted a woman in
440
a parking lot and attempted to snatch her purse. The woman resisted and during the ensuing struggle the woman fell to the ground
before relenting and allowing Butts to pull the purse from her
441
In affirming the trial court’s conclusion that Butts had
grasp.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.

Id. at 755.
Id.
40 P.3d 807 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 818.
Id. at 808; Convention on Road Traffic, Sept. 19, 1949, 3 U.S.T. 3008.
Id. at 809.
Id.
Id. at 812.
Id. at 815.
53 P.3d 609 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002)
ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.900(b)(26) (Michie 2002).
Butts, 53 P.3d. at 613-14.
Id. at 611.
Id.
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forcibly taken the purse, the court of appeals reasoned that “bodily
impact” includes indirect contact—impact upon property attached
442
to the victim rather than impact directly upon the person. Additionally, the court held that in order to count as prior felony convictions for purposes of presumptive sentencing under Alaska’s repeat
443
offender provisions, prior out-of-state convictions need only be
pursuant to laws similar, and not identical, to an Alaska counter444
Thus, the court held that Butts’s previous convictions in
part.
Oklahoma for burglary and assault were under statutes sufficiently
similar to Alaska laws to justify their use in presumptive sentencing
even though the Oklahoma statutes were more narrowly defined
445
than their Alaska counterparts.
446
In Carpentino v. State, the court of appeals overruled Carpentino’s conviction for sexual abuse because testimony of the vic447
The victim’s siblings was improperly admitted into evidence.
tim’s brother had testified that Carpentino had climbed into bed
with him and fondled his genitals, and the victim’s mother testified
that the victim’s younger sister had said that Carpentino had
448
climbed into bed with her. The superior court judge allowed this
evidence to show Carpentino’s “plan” or “scheme” to get into bed
449
with young children. The court of appeals concluded that under
450
Rule 404(b)(1) Carpentino’s prior actions were only relevant if
they were seen as precursors to sexual abuse, so the testimony was
inadmissible because its only purpose would have been to “prove
that [Carpentino] is a person who . . . engages in such wrongful
acts” and is therefore likely to have acted in the same way towards
451
the victim. In addition, the “lewd disposition” exception recog452
nized in Soper v. State does not apply to Carpentino because his
behavior consisted of one or two instances of abuse, not the “con453
tinued pattern of sexual abuse” present in Soper.

442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.

Id. at 613.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.145 (Michie 2002).
Butts, 53 P.3d. at 614-15.
Id. at 615-17.
38 P.3d 547 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 549.
Id.
Id.
ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(1).
Carpentino, 38 P.3d at 550.
731 P.2d 587 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
Carpentino, 38 P.3d at 552.
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In Cathey v. State,454 the court of appeals held that the fact that
an armed robbery victim did not expressly tell the 911 dispatcher
that the defendant was armed did not constitute exculpatory evidence that the prosecution was required to disclose to a grand
455
jury. Defendant Cathey and an accomplice broke into an apartment and robbed the two residents at gunpoint; Cathey was convicted of first-degree burglary, first-degree robbery, and two counts
456
of third-degree assault. Cathey asserted on appeal that because
the victim did not expressly mention to the 911 dispatcher that the
robbers were armed, that constituted exculpatory evidence that
457
should have been presented to the grand jury. The court of appeals rejected this argument because the victim’s exact words dur458
ing the 911 call were unclear. Moreover, the court held that regardless of what the victim told the 911 dispatcher, the 911 tape did
not rise to the level of exculpatory evidence, that is, “evidence that
tends, in and of itself, to negate the defendant’s guilt,” and thus the
prosecution was not required to present the 911 tape to the grand
459
jury. Additionally, the court of appeals held that the trial court
properly denied Cathey’s motion for a new trial because it found
that Cathey’s newly discovered evidence was dubious, and further,
460
was not likely to produce a different verdict. Thus, the judgment
461
of the trial court was affirmed.
In Dayton v. State,462 the court of appeals remanded the case to
the superior court to resolve whether the Athabascan database was
the type of data reasonably relied upon by experts who analyze the
463
frequency of genetic profiles. Dayton, an Athabascan Indian, al464
The
legedly sexually assaulted a sixty-seven-year-old woman.
police obtained a DNA sample from the victim and test results
showed that Dayton’s DNA matched the DNA from the sperm
465
sample taken from the victim. However, the forensic serologist
could not calculate a DNA profile frequency for Athabascan Indi-

454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

60 P.3d 192 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 195.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 198-99.
Id.
54 P.3d 817 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 820-21.
Id. at 818.
Id.
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ans necessary to validate the results of the DNA test.466 Dayton received a mistrial and the crime lab created an Athabascan database
467
Dayton objected to the use of the
before the second trial.
Athabascan database because the State had not established its reli468
ability. Dayton further asserted that the State had to disclose the
donors’ individual names so that he could make sure they were not
469
related to him. The court of appeals agreed with Dayton’s first
contention because the trial judge made no findings as to whether
the Athascaban database had been collected and analyzed in such a
470
manner that experts would reasonably rely on it. However, the
court of appeals did not grant Dayton’s motion to disclose the donors’ individual names because this did nothing to help Dayton’s
471
case.
In Dobberke v. State,472 the court of appeals reversed the conviction of a man who retained a rental car after the written and oral
473
agreement had lapsed. In August 1998, Dobberke rented a car
for three days from VanZee, owner of a Hertz Rent-A-Car fran474
chise. He kept the car beyond the initial rental period, but was
475
allowed to extend the rental agreement on several occasions.
Dobberke informed VanZee that he intended to buy the car after
476
VanZee prepared a purchase order
he obtained financing.
477
agreement to assist Dobberke in receiving financing, but Dob478
berke never paid for the car. On February 6, 1999, the police lo479
Dobberke
cated Dobberke, and VanZee repossessed the car.
480
was convicted of first-degree vehicle theft after a jury trial. On
appeal, the court of appeals held that first-degree vehicle theft
must involve an initial trespassory taking; otherwise, first-degree
vehicle theft would completely subsume second-degree theft, which

466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.
478.
479.
480.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id. at 820.
Id. at 820-21.
40 P.3d 1244 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1245.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1245-46.
Id. at 1246.
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makes it illegal to retain a vehicle beyond the time specified in a
481
written contract.
In Garay v. State,482 the court of appeals reversed a superior
court decision and allowed a criminal defendant to withdraw his
483
plea. The defendant had been indicted for first-degree sexual as484
sault and accepted a plea bargain in the face of strong evidence.
Before officially entering the plea, however, the district attorney’s
office received an additional police report and witness interviews
suggesting that the victim of the assault may not have been trust485
worthy. This information was sent to the defense attorney, who
486
neglected to read it. The defendant subsequently entered his ne487
gotiated plea. Later that year, the defendant’s new attorney discovered the documents and asked the superior court to allow the
488
defendant to withdraw his plea. The superior court agreed that
the original attorney’s failure to review the documents amounted
to ineffective assistance of counsel but denied the motion because
489
the defendant failed to show any prejudice that resulted thereby.
The court of appeals reversed, holding that if an attorney is to represent a criminal defendant competently during plea negotiations,
490
the attorney must know the facts of the case. In this case, the attorney’s failure to read documents placed directly in his inbox
491
Furthermore,
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
there was at least a reasonable possibility that the new information
either would have changed the attorney’s advice to the defendant
or would have changed the defendant’s decision to accept the plea
492
bargain. Accordingly, the court of appeals allowed the defendant
493
to withdraw the plea.
In Hammock v. State,494 the court of appeals upheld a trespass
conviction despite the defendant’s arguments that the trial court
495
failed to dismiss prejudicial jurors. Defendant Hammock was re481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.

Id.
53 P.3d 626 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 629.
Id. at 627.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 628.
Id. at 629.
Id.
52 P.3d 746 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 747.
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peatedly asked to leave a bar because he was with an underage
496
person and had a conflict with another patron. He left each time,
497
only to return soon thereafter. Before his trial for second-degree
trespass, he challenged two prospective jurors for cause on the
grounds that they were predisposed to infer his guilt if he refused
498
to testify at trial. The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s decision to deny the challenge of one of the jurors as a valid recogni499
tion of the juror’s change of heart on inferring Hammock’s guilt.
The court of appeals held that the lower court abused its discretion,
however, in denying Hammock’s challenge of the other juror,
Blankenship, who had repeatedly stated that he might disregard
the court’s instructions to apply the law impartially because no one
500
would know he had done so. Nonetheless, the court of appeals
found that Hammock was not prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal
to dismiss Blankenship because Hammock ultimately used a per501
emptory challenge to dismiss the juror.
502
In Johnson v. State, the court of appeals held that denial of a
rehabilitated convict’s motion to seal his criminal records is proper
where the court reasonably determines that the public policy of
allowing public access to criminal records outweighs the individ503
ual’s reasons for sealing his records. Nine years after the completion of his sentence for a conviction for kidnapping and rape, John504
son moved to have the record of his criminal convictions sealed.
Johnson argued that he was fully rehabilitated and that public access to his files had adversely affected his life in many ways (e.g.,
harassing phone calls, vandalism of his shed and truck, false accusa505
tions of threats, and negative attitudes towards him.) The court
of appeals ruled that open access to criminal records is an important and long-standing public policy which can only be overridden
506
in exceptional circumstances. The court of appeals thus applied a
balancing test, weighing the public’s interest in disclosure against
the privacy and reputation interests of the rehabilitated convicts,
while keeping in mind the legislature’s bias in favor of public dis-

496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.

Id. at 748.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 749.
Id.
Id. at 750.
50 P.3d 404 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 405.
Id.
Id. at 405-06.
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closure.507 Affirming the superior court’s denial of his motion, the
court of appeals held that the superior court could reasonably have
concluded that Johnson had not presented such extraordinary cir508
cumstances.
In McGee v. State,509 police discovered evidence against McGee
by intercepting a Federal Express package addressed to him and
510
The
testing it with an ion mobility spectrometer (“Itemiser”).
Itemiser revealed traces of a controlled substance and led the offi511
The package revealed seven
cers to obtain a search warrant.
ounces of cocaine and prompted further investigation of McGee
512
At trial, McGee pleaded no contest to
and his eventual arrest.
drug charges in order to preserve his right to appeal the superior
513
court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. On appeal, the
court of appeals held that the police must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before they can temporarily detain a pack514
age for the purpose of subjecting it to the Itemiser. The court of
appeals subsequently remanded the case to the superior court in
515
order to address the reasonable suspicion question.
516
In Miller v. State, the court of appeals affirmed the superior
court’s decision that Miller failed to prove that his conviction of at517
tempted second-degree sexual abuse of a minor was mitigated.
Miller pled no contest to a reduced charge of attempted second518
During sentencing, he argued
degree sexual abuse of a minor.
that his sentence should be mitigated because his conduct was
among the least serious within the offense, but the superior court
ruled that Miller failed to prove this by clear and convincing evi519
On appeal, Miller first argued that he engaged in only
dence.
520
However, the supreme court found that
minimal misconduct.
under the offense of attempted sexual contact, even minimal
521
touching fell within the offense’s core definition. Second, Miller
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.

Id. at 406.
Id.
51 P.3d 970 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 970.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 971.
Id.
44 P.3d 157 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 160.
Id. at 158.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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argued that his conduct was factually closer to attempted thirddegree sexual assault, so therefore, his conduct was among the least
522
serious of attempted second-degree sexual abuse. The supreme
court rejected this argument because of the differences between
the actus reus of sexual assault and the actus reus of sexual abuse
523
of a minor. The court found that Miller’s belief that the victim
was asleep only led to the possibility of his committing the additional crime of attempted third-degree sexual assault (a charge designed for “insensible” victims) and did not mitigate the crime of
524
attempted second-degree sexual assault of a minor. Accordingly,
the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision that Miller
525
did not prove the mitigating factor.
526
In Morgan v. State, the court of appeals clarified the conditions under which a defendant charged with sexual assault can pre527
sent evidence of prior false accusations by the accuser. Frederick
Morgan, Jr., was charged with engaging in sexual penetration with
a woman while she was intoxicated so as to be incapacitated or un528
The trial judge, relying on
aware that a sex act was occurring.
529
Covington v. State, denied Morgan’s request to be allowed to present testimony that the woman had previously accused men of sex530
ual assault only to admit later that these accusations were false.
Clarifying Covington, the court held that (1) if a defendant proves
that a complaining witness has made prior false accusations of sexual assault, the defendant can both cross-examine the witness and
531
present extrinsic evidence on this point, and (2) the defendant
need not show that the prior accusations had been adjudicated
false by a court, but rather can rely on normal evidentiary methods
to prove the prior false accusations by a preponderance of the evi532
dence to the judge at a foundational hearing. The court then remanded the case to the superior court so that the foundational
533
hearing could be held.

522.
523.
524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.

Id.
Id. at 158-59.
Id. at 159.
Id. at 160.
54 P.3d 332 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 336-39.
Id. at 333-34.
703 P.2d 436 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
Morgan, 54 P.3d at 334.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 334, 338-39.
Id. at 340.
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In Murray v. State,534 the court of appeals ruled that the physical proximity between a firearm and drugs is not evidence alone of
535
a nexus sufficient to find second-degree weapons misconduct.
Murray was convicted of second-degree weapons misconduct after
536
police found a gun in his bedroom and drugs in his living room.
Vacating Murray’s conviction, the court held that the required
nexus between gun possession and a drug offense is that the firearm must aid, advance, or further the commission of the drug of537
fense.
In Ostlund v. State,538 the court of appeals held that the trial
court’s decision not to bifurcate defendant’s trial for driving while
539
intoxicated (DWI) was an abuse of discretion. William Ostlund
was charged with felony DWI for driving while intoxicated while
540
having two prior DWI convictions within the past year. Before
the trial, Ostlund argued that evidence of his prior convictions
would be prejudicial and agreed to stipulate to the prior convic541
tions for sentencing purposes if convicted. The trial court denied
Ostlund’s request and instructed the jury regarding the prior con542
543
victions. The jury convicted Ostlund. On appeal, Ostlund argued that the trial court erred in refusing to let the jury first decide
on Ostlund’s guilt in the current offense, and then decide the issue
544
of his prior convictions. The court of appeals noted that it had
previously recommended bifurcation of DWI trials in order to
“preserve both parties’ right to a jury determination of all issues,
while at the same time avoiding potential for unfair prejudice”
545
against the defendant. Because the trial court failed to adopt the
recommended procedures, the court of appeals determined that it
546
abused its discretion. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed
547
Ostlund’s conviction.

534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.
547.

54 P.3d 821 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 824.
Id. at 823.
Id. at 824-25.
51 P.3d 938 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 941.
Id. (citing Ross v. State, 950 P.2d 587 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997)).
Id. at 942.
Id. at 943.
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In Pearce v. State,548 the court of appeals held that the trial
court judge was not clearly erroneous in ruling that the defendant
had no subjective expectation of privacy with respect to his hand549
written suicide note. Pearce attempted to abduct a woman as she
550
rollerbladed down the highway. During the investigation of the
crime, the police obtained a search warrant for Pearce’s boat to
551
During the search,
search for guns and related accoutrements.
the police lifted a duffel bag off a table and saw a suicide note that
Pearce had written, which first addressed Pearce’s family and then
552
went on to ask whomever found the note to contact his family.
Before the trial, Pearce asked the superior court to suppress the
553
note because it was not included in the search warrant. The superior court concluded that Pearce had no expectation of privacy
554
as the note was intended to be read by third persons. On appeal,
the court of appeals deferred to the superior court’s findings of
555
fact, and held that Pearce’s subjective expectation of privacy was
556
not reasonable. Pearce’s plea that the reader of the note call his
family, and the fact that he purposely left the note on the table of
his boat strongly suggested that he wanted the note read by third
557
parties.
In Richardson v. State,558 the court of appeals held that felony
defendants who receive unsuspended terms of imprisonment exceeding two years can appeal any aspect of their sentences, includ559
ing the revocation of a driver’s license. Richardson was convicted
of murder after a drunk-driving incident in which he killed two
560
people and seriously injured two others. Richardson disobeyed a
warning from a park service employee not to drive and struck an561
other vehicle head on. The trial judge sentenced Richardson to
twenty-eight years of imprisonment and revoked his license for
562
Richardson appealed the license revocation and
twenty years.
548.
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.

45 P.3d 679 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 684.
Id. at 680.
Id. at 681.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 683.
47 P.3d 660 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 664.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 661.
Id.
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the State contended that Richardson did not have the right to appeal this aspect of his sentence because of Alaska Statutes section
12.55.120(a), which the State contended allows only an appeal of
563
The court held
the term-of-imprisonment aspect of a sentence.
that the State’s interpretation of the statute would present many
difficulties, and that the legislature did not intend to make the deci564
The court of appeals afsion of a sentence appeal so difficult.
firmed the license revocation as a reasonable exercise of judicial
565
authority in light of the seriousness of Richardson’s offense.
566
In Riley v. State, the court of appeals affirmed Riley’s two
567
Richard Riley and Edward
convictions for first-degree assault.
Portalla seriously wounded two people when they opened fire on a
568
crowd. The State was unable to determine which of the defen569
dants wounded the two people. The jurors found Riley guilty as
an accomplice after being instructed that “they should decide
whether Riley acted as a principal . . . or, if they could not decide
beyond a reasonable doubt which man fired the shots, they should
570
decide whether Riley acted as an accomplice . . . .” In Echols v.
571
State, however, the court of appeals had held that accomplice liability was established only if the State proved that the defendant
572
In
“acted intentionally with respect to the prohibited result.”
Riley, the court of appeals overturned Echols because hypothetically it would preclude a finding of manslaughter for both Riley
and Portalla as the State could not prove that either party acted as
573
the principal. Accordingly, the court provided the following new
rule: “[w]hen a defendant solicits, encourages, or assists another to
engage in conduct, and does so with the intent to promote or facilitate that conduct, the defendant becomes accountable under
574
575
Thus,
Alaska Statutes section 11.16.110(2) for that conduct.”
563. Id. at 661-62.
564. Id. at 664.
565. Id. at 664-65.
566. 60 P.3d 204 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
567. Id. at 223.
568. Id. at 205.
569. Id. at 206.
570. Id.
571. 818 P.2d 691 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991).
572. Riley, 60 P.3d at 206.
573. Id. at 209.
574. ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.110(2) (Michie 2002) (stating that “[a] person is legally accountable for the conduct of another constituting an offense if with intent
to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense, the person (A) solicits the
other to commit the offense; or (B) aids or abets the other in planning or committing the offense”).
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the State was required to prove that Riley “acted recklessly with
respect to the possibility that serious physical injury would be inflicted on another person” either through his conduct or that of
576
Portalla. The court also found that the jury instruction under the
Echols rule did not constitute plain error because Riley’s attorney
“clarified and corrected” the ambiguity in the jury instruction dur577
The court affirmed Riley’s conviction being his summation.
cause the jury found that Riley “intended to inflict serious physical
injury” which met the “reckless” requirement of section
578
The court also affirmed Riley’s ten-year sentence
11.81.610(c).
despite the fact that Portalla received a lesser sentence because
Portalla had admitted to his participation and assisted the state
579
troopers in the investigation. Additionally, the judge had deter580
mined that Riley was the leader in the action.
581
In State v. District Court (In re Phillips), the court of appeals
held that a trial judge could not reject a plea agreement between
the State and a defendant because the judge felt “the State could
582
Thomas Phillips was
have proved a more serious charge.”
charged with first-degree failure to register as a sex offender, a fel583
ony. The failure to register was first-degree because Phillips had
584
a prior conviction for failing to register. Nevertheless, the State
enetered into a plea agreement on second-degree failure to register, a misdemeanor of which a prior conviction is not a compo585
The district court rejected the plea agreement on the
nent.
grounds that the legislature had determined that the defendant’s
586
conduct constituted a felony, not a misdemeanor. Reversing, the
court of appeals held that the executive branch has the authority to
exercise its discretion in determining what criminal charges will be
levied against a defendant as long as such discretion is “exercised
587
Additionally, the executive
within constitutional bounds.”
588
branch has the discretion to reduce charges to lesser offenses.
575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.

Riley, 60 P.3d at 207.
Id.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 222.
Id.
53 P.3d 629 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 634.
Id. at 630.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 634.
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Therefore, the court held that the trial judge had no authority to
589
reject the plea on this basis.
590
In State v. Felix, the court of appeals held that Criminal Rule
591
35(a) which allows judges to grant “periodic imprisonment” does
not permit judges to grant furloughs, which are solely within the
592
Felix was granted two short
authority of the executive branch.
releases by the trial court as well as a release from custody so she
593
could serve the rest of her sentence in a treatment facility. Two
other prisoners, Fain and Buchanan, were granted short-term releases from the trial court so that they could attend to personal
594
matters. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that the legislature intended Criminal Rule 35(b) to deprive courts of ongoing
authority to monitor Department of Corrections treatment and
placement decisions throughout a defendant’s term of imprison595
ment. The court of appeals therefore held that a judge’s modification of a sentence is proper if premised on codified sentencing
596
goals, rather than a defendant’s short-term needs. The court of
appeals reasoned that once a defendant has been sentenced and
committed to the custody of the executive branch, the executive
branch assumes primary responsibility for the custody and care of
597
The court of appeals concluded that the trial
the defendant.
598
court exceeded its authority in all three instances. Therefore, the
court of appeals reversed the sentence modifications ordered by all
599
three trial courts.
In State v. Hawkins,600 the court of appeals held that the Alaska
601
Sex Offender Registration Act (ASORA) imposes a continuing
obligation to register upon certain sex offenders physically present
within the State, that Hawkins was under a duty to so register, and
that the imposition of criminal sanctions for failure to comply
602
would not violate the federal Ex Post Facto Clause. After being
charged with failure to register as a sex offender, Hawkins moved
589.
590.
591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.

Id.
50 P.3d 807 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
Felix, 50 P.3d at 816.
Id. at 809-10.
Id. at 809.
Id. at 814.
Id. at 816.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 818.
Id.
39 P.3d 1126 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.63.010-.100 (Michie 2002).
Hawkins, 39 P.3d at 1128-29 (citing U.S. Const., art. 1, § 10).
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to dismiss asserting that ASORA violated the Ex Post Facto
603
604
Clause. The magistrate judge agreed and granted the motion.
The court of appeals reversed and remanded, except as to the con605
clusion that Hawkins had a duty to register under ASORA. First,
the court of appeals found that the magistrate’s interpretation was
based on ASORA as it was originally enacted, not as it had been
606
amended. Second, the court concluded that the magistrate’s narrow interpretation defeated the legislative intent to ensure compliance by imposing criminal penalties on certain sex offenders failing
607
to register in order.
In State v. Judson,608 the court of appeals ruled that Judson was
609
entitled to “Nygren credit” for time spent in court-ordered treat610
ment even though Judson himself had requested the treatment.
Judson pled guilty to driving while intoxicated and asked the court
to order him to a residential treatment facility as a condition of his
611
release. Judson subsequently received twenty-one days of credit
612
to his sentence for the time spent at the facility. The court ruled
that such credit was properly applied because the facility subjected
Judson to jail-like conditions and Judson was under court order to
613
In addiundergo the treatment and therefore could not leave.
tion, the court affirmed that the time spent in the facility could be
used to satisfy the minimum jail time requirements of the DWI
statute, as it imposed both inpatient treatment and confinement
beyond the twenty-day statutory minimum if circumstances re-

603. Id. at 1128.
604. Id. The magistrate concluded that failing to register was not a continuing
offense under ASORA and that although Hawkins had a duty to register, he could
not be punished for failing to register by July 1, 1994, consistent with the federal
Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. The court of appeals observed that the magistrate
premised his decision on the conclusion that the Department of Public Safety had
exceeded its authority in passing a regulation extending, for certain sex offenders,
the deadline for initial registration. Id.
605. Id. 1129-30.
606. Id. at 1128.
607. Id. at 1128-29. The court concluded that since ASORA had been
amended to extend the registration deadline for certain sex offenders to January
31, 1996, and because Hawkins was charged with failure to register on January 28,
1998, there was no Ex Post Facto violation. Id.
608. 45 P.3d 329 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
609. See Nygren v. State, 658 P.2d 141, 146 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
610. Judson, 45 P.3d at 333.
611. Id. at 330.
612. Id. at 331.
613. Id. at 332.
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quired.614 Lastly, the court ruled that Alaska’s bail release statute615
is aimed at preventing needless detention, and thus does not mandate that courts consider flight risk and potential danger of the defendant “before imposing a rehabilitative condition that the defen616
dant requests.”
In State v. Malloy,617 the supreme court held that Alaska Stat618
ute section 12.55.125(a)(3), which requires, under a clear and
convincing evidence standard, that a defendant be sentenced to
ninety-nine years without eligibility for parole for first-degree
murder if the defendant was found to have substantially physically
619
tortured the murder victim, was not unconstitutional. The State
gave notice of intent to seek such sentencing under section
12.55.125(a)(3) after Malloy was convicted by a jury of first-degree
620
murder, kidnapping, and tampering with evidence. Malloy challenged the constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that the
State had not been required to prove the aggravating element of
torture beyond a reasonable doubt and torture was not an element
621
The superior court rejected Malloy’s claim and
of the offense.
stated that Malloy would have been sentenced to the maximum
622
term even without the mandatory statutory requirement. Under
623
section 12.55.115, judges have “authority to deny eligibility for
discretionary parole regardless of whether the court finds one of
the aggravating circumstances that trigger a mandatory maximum
624
term under [section] 12.55.125(a)(1)-(3).” The court of appeals
vacated the sentencing requirement denying parole eligibility be625
cause the court found section 12.55.125(a) to be unconstitutional.
626
Relying on Donlun v. State, the court of appeals found that Malloy had not been charged or convicted for the substantial physical
torture claim and as such was being subject to “a new, harsher penalty” than the usual “maximum” penalty, which was defined as a
627
ninety-nine year prison term, regardless of parole eligibility.
614.
615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
627.

Id. at 333.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.020 (Michie 2002).
Judson, 45 P.3d at 334.
46 P.3d 949 (Alaska 2002).
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a)(3) (Michie 2002).
Malloy, 46 P.3d at 950.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.115 (Michie 2002).
Id. at 951.
Id.
527 P.2d 472 (Alaska 1974).
Malloy, 46 P.3d at 953.
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Since the court of appeals decision, the U.S. Supreme Court had
628
addressed this issue in Apprendi v. New Jersey and held that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, in order to increase a sentence
beyond the maximum statutory requirement, the aggravating factor
629
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and given to the jury.
The supreme court noted that Apprendi validated the court of ap630
peals’ view that Donlun is grounded on constitutional principles.
However, the supreme court found that Donlun was incorrectly
applied to Malloy. The court held that because the sentencing
judge had the discretion to sentence Malloy to ninety-nine years
without eligibility for parole without the torture finding, sentencing
Malloy to the same sentence with the substantial physical torture
631
The court held
finding did not exceed the maximum sentence.
that under both Donlun and Apprendi, a sentence must fall “outside the outer limits of the range of sentences that the court could
632
otherwise impose” to exceed the maximum sentence. The court
also rejected Malloy’s claim that the aggravating factor must be
charged as an element of the offense and given to the jury as hav633
ing no basis in the Alaska Constitution and contradicting Donlun.
Under Donlun, when the sentence with the aggravating factor is
within the maximum sentence for the original crime, then the ag634
gravating factor does not need to be included in the charge. Accordingly, the court of appeals decision was vacated and the case
635
was remanded to the superior court for resentencing.
636
In State v. Prince, the court of appeals reversed the superior
court’s dismissal of Prince’s indictment and remanded the case for
637
further proceedings. Police found two men asleep or passed out
in a boat that was partially beached on land within the municipality
of St. Mary’s and partially in the Andreafsky River. The officers
638
found over 100 bottles of alcohol in the boat. Prince and a codefendant were charged for importing and intending to sell alcohol
in a municipality that had banned alcoholic beverages within the

628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.
637.
638.

530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Malloy, 46 P.3d at 953 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490).
Id. at 954.
Id.
Id. at 955.
Id. at 956-57.
Id. at 957.
Id.
53 P.3d 157 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 165.
Id. at 159.
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community pursuant to state law.639 The superior court dismissed
the indictment, finding that the municipality did not have jurisdiction over the land where the boat was found because the land was
640
owned by the State. The court of appeals reversed, holding that
because the State had not limited municipal authority to enforce
ordinances on state-owned land, the land could be subject to mu641
nicipal authority. Further, the court held that the municipal ban
in question did not conflict with state law, so it could be enforced
642
by state law. Accordingly, the judgment of the superior court was
643
reversed.
In Tuttle v. State,644 the court of appeals held: (1) that the defendant’s possession of a firearm in a robbery is not an element of
the offense to be proved to the jury at trial, but is rather a factor to
be proven to the court at sentencing; (2) that the judge was entitled
to rely on out-of-court statements made by co-defendants because
the defendant did not offer testimonial denial of the State’s assertion that he possessed a firearm; and (3) that the State is obliged to
prove the fact of the defendant’s possession of a firearm beyond a
645
646
reasonable doubt. Under Malloy v. State, the court ruled that
although “any factor which increases the maximum punishment for
an offense is an element of the offense that must be proved [sic] to
a jury[,] . . . this rule does not apply to the factors that trigger the
various presumptive terms specified in Alaska Statutes section
647
12.55.125.” Then, following the Court of Appeals of Maryland’s
648
decision in Boyd v. State, the court ruled that the judge can properly rely on the content of co-defendants’ out-of-court statements,
but he must decide each case on its own merits; he cannot rely on
649
personal knowledge of matters outside the judicial record. The
question remained open whether the judge in this case violated this
rule when he relied on a co-defendant’s demeanor from a different
trial to resolve an evidentiary dispute at Tuttle’s sentencing hear-

639. Id. at 158.
640. Id. at 161.
641. Id. at 162-63.
642. Id. at 164.
643. Id. at 165.
644. No. A-8077, No. 1801, 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 90, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App.
May 3, 2002).
645. Id. at *10-*11.
646. 1 P.3d 1266 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000).
647. Tuttle, 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 90, at *9.
648. 581 A.2d 1 (Md. 1990).
649. Tuttle, 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 90, at *6.
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ing.650 The court declined to resolve this issue of law because it vacated the judge’s ruling for failing to apply the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard when determining the factual issue of
651
whether Tuttle possessed a firearm. For these reasons, the court
vacated the judge’s ruling and remanded the case to determine
whether Tuttle possessed a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt
and, if so, to re-sentence Tuttle using a seven-year presumptive
652
term as the starting point.
653
In Wassilie v. State, the court of appeals held that where a
witness claims not to remember the substance of a prior statement
at trial, the witness’ trial testimony is considered inconsistent with
the prior statement for purposes of Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(A),
regardless of whether the claimed memory loss is genuine or
feigned, as the lack of memory at trial is inconsistent with the wit654
One of the victims of the alness’ earlier claim to remember.
leged assault could not remember key details about the assault, de655
First, the court
tails which he had previously testified about.
ruled that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when it
admitted a witness’ prior inconsistent statement without meeting
656
Ultithe full foundational requirements of McMaster v. State.
657
658
mately, following Richards v. State, Van Hatten v. State, and
several federal cases, the court ruled that regardless of whether
memory loss is feigned or genuine, it is nevertheless inconsistent
659
with a prior statement of remembrance. Therefore, the court af660
firmed the judgment of the superior court.
661
In Wright v. State, the court of appeals held that the tardiness
of a peremptory challenge may not be excused where, once the defendant has counsel, the defendant and counsel fail to diligently
662
pursue the potential peremptory challenge. After being arrested
for DWI and refusing to submit to a breath test, Wright was ar663
raigned and his case was assigned to a trial judge. Three months
650.
651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.
661.
662.
663.

Id. at *7.
Id. at *8-9.
Id. at *11.
57 P.3d 719 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 720-21.
Id. at 722; see 512 P.2d 879 (Alaska 1973).
616 P.2d 870 (Alaska 1980).
666 P.2d 1047 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
Wassilie, 57 P.3d at 722-23.
Id. at 723.
38 P.3d 545 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002).
Id. at 547.
Id. at 546
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after the arraignment, Wright’s attorney filed a peremptory chal664
lenge of the assigned trial judge. The trial judge ruled that the
665
While the court of appeals recognized
challenge was untimely.
666
that Riley v. State excuses tardy peremptory challenges where the
defendant has not had a chance to consult with counsel, it con667
cluded that the defendant did not qualify for the exception. The
record showed that Wright had received notice of the trial judge
assigned to his case nearly two months prior to contacting his lawyer and that the lawyer had filed an entry of appearance on August
668
8, 2001. Nevertheless, Wright argued that his lawyer did not become aware of the trial judge’s assignment until August 30, 2001,
and that, therefore, the five-day filing clock should have been
669
deemed to have begun on that date. The appellate court rejected
this argument as a basis upon which to excuse the tardy peremptory challenge, noting that either Wright did not tell his lawyer
670
about the trial judge assignment or that the attorney failed to ask.
In either case, neither Wright nor his attorney acted diligently, a
671
circumstance which Riley does not excuse.
VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW
A. Labor Law
672
In Barnica v. Kenai Peninsula Borough School District, the
supreme court held that Barnica was not entitled to a judicial rem673
edy because his claim was subject to an agreement to arbitrate.
The dispute began when Barnica resigned from his position as a
custodian for the school district in August 1995; he sued the district
eight months later pursuant to the Human Rights Act, Alaska
674
675
The
Statutes section 18.80.220, alleging sex discrimination.
school district requested summary judgment, claiming that Barnica
had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies that were con664. Id.
665. Id.
666. 608 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1980).
667. Wright, 38 P.3d at 546-47.
668. Id. at 546.
669. Id. If the clock were deemed to begin running on August 30, 2001, then
the filing of the challenge on September 7, 2001, would have been timely. Id.
670. Id. at 547.
671. Id.
672. 46 P.3d 974 (Alaska 2002).
673. Id. at 977.
674. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Michie 2002).
675. Barnica, 46 P.3d at 975.
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tained in his collective bargaining agreement.676 The superior court
677
granted summary judgment in favor of the district. The supreme
678
court affirmed. First, the court found that by enacting the Public
679
Employment Relations Act, the Alaska legislature had specifically provided for certain grievance procedures to be followed with
680
Next, the court found that both
arbitration as the final step.
common law and state statutes suggest a “strong public policy in
favor of arbitration” and “support[] giving primacy to contractual
681
grievance/arbitration clauses.” Furthermore, the court found that
682
nothing in the Human Rights Act prohibits the waiver of judicial
683
remedies. The court also compared state law with federal law to
provide history and context to the issue and concluded that the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gilmer v. Inter684
state/Johnson Lane Corp. “more accurately reflects Alaska policy
favoring arbitration” than its decision in Alexander v. Gardner685
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the sumDenver Co.
686
mary judgment.
In DeSalvo v. Bryant,687 the supreme court held that claims im688
plicating the Alaska Wage and Hour Act (AWHA) are precluded
689
In 1997, a year after being hired, five
from private settlement.
mining operation employees sued their employers claiming dam690
ages for, among other things, failure to pay overtime. Two years
later, the employees, without notifying their attorney, entered into
a settlement agreement claiming to release all involved from any
691
liability arising from employment at the mine. The superior court
676. Id.
677. Id.
678. Id. at 977.
679. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.210(a) (Michie 2002).
680. Barnica, 46 P.3d at 977-78.
681. Id.
682. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Michie 2002).
683. Barnica, 46 P.3d at 978.
684. 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (establishing a rule that unless Congress showed an intent to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies, then agreements to arbitrate would
supercede statutory judicial remedies).
685. 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding that an employee was not barred from bringing a discrimination suit under the Civil Rights Act after an unfavorable arbitration decision); Barnica, 46 P.3d at 980.
686. Barnica, 46 P.3d at 981.
687. 42 P.3d 525 (Alaska 2002).
688. ALASKA STAT. §§ 23.10.050-.150 (Michie 2002).
689. DeSalvo, 46 P.3d at 526.
690. Id. at 527.
691. Id.
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later dismissed the action with prejudice while simultaneously de692
nying the plaintiffs’ attorney’s request for fees. The attorney ap693
pealed the judgment and the denial of fees. Reviewing for abuse
694
First, it concluded
of discretion, the supreme court remanded.
that, because the legislature required court supervision in cases involving overtime claims made under AWHA, the trial court was
required to make factual findings regarding whether, under the
695
Second, it held that even if the
facts, the AWHA applied.
AWHA did not apply, the superior court should nevertheless have
696
deployed the catalyst approach in order to determine whether,
697
under that theory, plaintiffs’ attorney was entitled to fees.
In Fairbanks Fire Association, Local 1324 v. Fairbanks,698 the
supreme court, after determining that it could consider the merits
of the moot dispute under the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine, found that the Alaska Labor Relations Agency
(ALRA) had jurisdiction to determine if an issue is subject to arbi699
tration. The union filed grievances against the city on behalf of
two ex-firefighters, claiming that the city “improperly refused to
rehire [the men] for positions that were open in the fire depart700
ment.” The trial court found that the ALRA did not have juris701
702
diction to hear the case. The union appealed. Because only the
reasoning behind the trial court decision was being challenged and
the relief requested by the appealing party had already been
granted by the trial court, the supreme court held that the appeal
703
was moot. However, the court found the appeal met the public
interest exception to the mootness doctrine: “[T]he issue [was]
704
likely to repeat itself,” “the issue [would] continually evade court
705
review,” and “the issues [were] sufficiently important to the pub692. Id.
693. Id.
694. Id. at 528.
695. Id. at 528-29.
696. The catalyst approach is a two step inquiry requiring a plaintiff to show a
causal connection between the filing of the suit and defendant’s action and that
the defendant’s action was required by law. Id. at 530.
697. Id. at 530-31 (stating that if a plaintiff prevails under the catalyst theory,
the court should award attorneys fees under ALASKA R. CIV. P. 82(b)(2)).
698. 48 P.3d 1165 (Alaska 2002).
699. Id. at 1170.
700. Id. at 1166.
701. Id.
702. Id.
703. Id. at 1167-68.
704. Id. at 1168.
705. Id. at 1168-69.
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lic interest to merit consideration.”706 The supreme court held that
707
Alaska Statutes section 23.40.210(a) gave the ALRA the power
708
to decide if an issue was arbitrable. The agency was subject to
much greater review of its jurisdiction decisions and therefore had
greater power than individual arbitrators in determining when is709
Accordingly, the supreme court
sues are subject to arbitration.
710
reversed the holding of the trial court.
711
In Nunez v American Seafoods, the supreme court held that
an employment contract forum selection clause was invalid because
712
it denied Nunez his right, as provided by the Jones Act, to sue in
713
any eligible forum. Nunez was employed by American Seafoods
714
on a fishing boat. He severely injured himself as a result of a fall
on the job and brought suit against his employer alleging admiralty
715
jurisdiction under the federal saving to suitors clause and the
716
Jones Act. American Seafoods moved to dismiss on the basis of
717
a forum selection clause in Nunez’s contract. The superior court
718
upheld American Seafoods’s motion and dismissed the claim.
Reviewing the validity of the forum selection clause and the deci719
First, the
sion to dismiss de novo, the supreme court reversed.
supreme court drew a distinction between general maritime law, on
one hand, and the saving to suitors clause and the Jones Act on the
720
other. Only in general maritime law is there a strong presump721
tion in favor of the validity of forum selection clauses. The Jones
Act and the saving to suitors clause modify the general maritime
722
After exlaw, conferring distinct rights upon injured seamen.
amining the history of the Jones Act, the supreme court concluded
that under its provisions Congress intended to restrict an employer’s ability to contractually limit a worker’s substantive
706.
707.
708.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.
721.
722.

Id. at 1169.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.210(a) (Michie 2002).
Fairbanks Fire Association, 48 P.3d. at 1169-70.
Id. at 1170.
Id.
52 P.3d 720 (Alaska 2002).
Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2000).
Nunez, 52 P.3d at 721.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1333 (2000).
46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (2000).
Nunez, 52 P.3d at 721.
Id.
Id. at 721, 724.
Id. at 721-22.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 722.
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rights.723 Accordingly, the supreme court held that the forum selec724
tion clause violated Nunez’s rights and reversed the lower court.
B. Workers’ Compensation
725
In a per curiam opinion in Bauder v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.,
the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s affirmation of the
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board for the reasons contained in
726
Brock Bauder injured his back
the superior court’s opinion.
727
while working for Alaska Airlines in 1993. He filed a workers’
compensation claim that was eventually reduced by the Alaska
Workers’ Compensation Board and controverted by Alaska Air728
lines. Bauder subsequently filed suit in superior court, claiming
that he was entitled to increased benefits, penalties, and attorney’s
fees; he also alleged that Alaska Airlines’ controversion of his
729
workers’ compensation claim was frivolous or unfair. The superior court affirmed the decisions of the Workers’ Compensation
Board, holding that the Board’s conclusions (reducing Bauder’s
benefits, denying penalties and attorney’s fees, and finding that the
controversion was not frivolous or unfair) were supported by sub730
stantial evidence.
In Bustamante v. Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board,731 the
supreme court held that a trial court has discretion to waive costs
associated with the preparation of transcriptions on an administra732
Bustamante filed a complaint with the Alaska
tive appeal.
Workers’ Compensation Board claiming that he was injured while
733
working at Space Mark. The Board held that Bustamante did not
suffer a compensable injury in the course and scope of his employ734
Bustamante appealed the decision to the superior court
ment.
735
The trial court reand requested a court-appointed attorney.
fused his request for an attorney and eventually dismissed Bustamante’s claim because he failed to pay for the preparation of the
723.
724.
725.
726.
727.
728.
729.
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.
735.

See id. at 723.
Id. at 724.
53 P.3d 166 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 168.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 171-73.
Id. at 173-74.
Id. at 180-82.
59 P.3d 270 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 272-73.
Id. at 271.
Id.
Id. at 272.

YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC

2003]

04/22/03 12:57 PM

YEAR IN REVIEW

137

transcripts from the compensation board hearings.736 Bustamante
appealed and the supreme court held that the trial court erred because it did have discretion to waive the costs of preparing a transcript on administrative appeals as “financial hardship should not
737
preclude access to the courts.” However, the court held that Bustamante was not entitled to a court-appointed attorney because
“the private interest of a litigant to have counsel in a worker’s
compensation case is not nearly as strong as the interest in cases
738
Acwhere litigants are already afforded appointed counsel.”
cordingly, the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s denial of
Bustamante’s request for appointed counsel, reversed the order of
dismissal, and remanded the case for the trial court to “exercise its
739
discretion regarding the preparation of a transcript.”
740
In Dougan v. Aurora Electric Inc., the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s finding that the Alaska Worker’s Compensation Board properly denied penalties and interest on com741
pensation payments to Randy Dougan. Dougan injured his lower
742
back while working as an electrician for Aurora Electric. Dougan saw multiple doctors, was placed on disability, and received
743
pay from Aurora. Dougan filed a petition to the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board alleging misconduct in handling his
744
claims. After adverse rulings at the board level and on appeal in
745
superior court, Dougan appealed to the supreme court. The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s ruling about the penalties and interest, finding that Aurora controverted the claims in
good faith and that Dougan was not entitled to penalties or inter746
The supreme court also found that although the superior
est.
court erred in dismissing thirteen of his fifteen claims, eleven of the
747
Thus, the supreme court remanded
claims were without merit.
the remaining two claims to the superior court for factual determi748
nation. Finally, the supreme court reversed the superior court’s

736.
737.
738.
739.
740.
741.
742.
743.
744.
745.
746.
747.
748.

Id.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 275.
50 P.3d 789 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 794.
Id. at 791.
Id. at 791-92.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 793.
Id. at 794-95.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 791.

YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC

138

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

04/22/03 12:57 PM

[20:1

remand of the compensation rate adjustment and held that the
Gilmore test is no longer necessary when the Board’s initial determination of compensation is based on the amended version of
749
Alaska Statutes section 23.20.220.
750
In Gaede v. Saunders, the supreme court held that private
common law employees may not recover under the Worker’s
751
Compensation Act because such employees are not employed
752
“‘in connection with a business or industry.’” The supreme court
affirmed the Worker’s Compensation Board’s denial of Gaede’s
claim for worker’s compensation benefits, because Gaede was
merely hired by the Saunders to build an addition to their home
753
when he fell off the ladder and was injured. The supreme court
754
ruled that the Worker’s Compensation Act entitles employees to
recover benefits in the event of work-related disability or death
only where the employer is “the state or its political subdivision or
a person employing one or more persons in connection with a busi755
ness or industry.” Following the court’s earlier decisions in Kroll
756
757
v. Reeser and Nickels v. Napolilli, the court further ruled that
the Saunders’ building project was not “a business or industry” because it was not a profit-making enterprise “with a view toward
758
producing goods,” but instead was merely intended for their personal consumption. Thus the Saunders were not employers, and
759
Gaede was not an employee entitled to recovery under the Act.
760
In Justice v. RMH Aero Logging, Inc., the supreme court
held that the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board properly adjusted an employee’s compensation rate after he applied for a ret761
roactive adjustment. Dan Justice began working at RMH Aero
762
Logging, Inc. (“RMH”) in February 1993. On June 3, 1993, Justice injured his foot while on the job and—because the injury did
763
Following the innot heal—was unable to work after June 30.
749.
750.
751.
752.
753.
754.
755.
756.
757.
758.
759.
760.
761.
762.
763.

Id. at 797; ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.220 (Michie 2002).
53 P.3d 1126 (Alaska 2002).
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395 (Michie 2002).
Gaede, 53 P.3d at 1127 (quoting § 23.30.395(13)).
Id. at 1126.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.395 (Michie 2002).
Gaede, 53 P.3d at 1127 (quoting § 23.30.395(13)).
655 P.2d 753 (Alaska 1982).
29 P.3d 242 (Alaska 2001).
Gaede, 53 P.3d at 1127.
Id.
42 P.3d 549 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 551.
Id.
Id.
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jury, Justice received temporary total disability (TTD) payments764
from July 10, 1993, until August 9, 1994, at which point he reached
“medical stability” and began receiving only payments for his per765
manent partial impairment (PPI). On October 13, 1997, Justice
was injured again after his injured foot spasmed while he was
766
working on the roof of his house and caused him to fall. RHM
responded by reinstating his TTD benefits, effective September 1,
767
1997. In December 1997, Justice filed a workers’ compensation
768
claim with the Workers’ Compensation Board. He amended the
complaint in May 1998 to seek a retroactive adjustment of the
original TTD payments, claiming that the calculation of his payment was incorrect because his income in 1992 was “aberrationally
769
The
low and did not accurately predict his future lost wages.”
Compensation Board granted the adjustment, based on Gilmore v.
770
Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board, and RMH appealed to
the superior court which affirmed the Compensation Board’s ret771
roactive adjustment. In reviewing the decision of the Compensa772
tion Board, the supreme court analyzed the application of Gil773
774
more to Justice’s claim. First, the court applied the four Byayuk
factors to decide whether the Gilmore decision should apply to Justice’s claim since Gilmore was decided after Justice’s original in775
jury. The court concluded that Gilmore did apply to claims like

764. The payment amount was $153 per week which was calculated based on
Justice’s gross income from the two previous years; his tax returns indicated that
he made $16,589 in 1992 and $4,305 in 1991. Id.
765. Id.
766. Id. at 552.
767. Id.
768. Id.
769. Id.
770. 882 P.2d 992 (Alaska 1994) (holding that former Alaska Statutes section
23.30.220(a) violated the equal protection clause of the state constitution as it was
applied to Gilmore).
771. Justice, 42 P.3d at 552.
772. Id. (“[The supreme court] independently review[s] the merits of an agency
determination when a superior court acts as an intermediate court of appeal.”)
773. Id.
774. Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Byayuk, 684 P.2d 114 (Alaska
1984). The four factors are: (1) whether the holding either overrules prior law or
decides an issue of first impression; (2) whether the purpose and intended effect of
the new rule of law is best accomplished by a retroactive or prospective application; (3) the extent of reasonable reliance upon the old rule of law; and (4) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule of
law. Justice, 42 P.3d at 554.
775. Justice, 42 P.3d at 554.
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Justice’s so long as the claim was “open to adjudication” and the
776
As to Justice’s claim, the
issue had been preserved for appeal.
court held that the claim was open for adjudication because RMH
waived its statute of limitations defense since it had received notice
777
of the claim but failed to object at the initial hearing. Finally, the
court found the Compensation Board properly granted the rate
adjustment because it focused its inquiry on whether Justice’s past
earnings were an “accurate predictor of his future lost earnings”
and had substantial evidence to support its determination that Jus778
tice’s past employment history was not an accurate predictor.
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the portion of the superior court decision that affirmed the Compensation Board’s decision and reversed and remanded—with instructions to affirm—the
779
portions which did not affirm the Compensation Board.
780
In Robertson v. American Mechanical, Inc., the supreme
court held that Robertson’s amended workers’ compensation claim
was unlawful claim-splitting barred by the doctrine of res judi781
cata. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board dismissed Robertson’s initial report of occupational injury based upon his lower
782
back condition. Robertson then filed an amended report of occupational injury that was functionally identical to his first report
783
The Board dismissed this
but signified an earlier injury date.
784
claim on the basis of res judicata. The supreme court affirmed,
finding Robertson’s amended claim was based upon the same injury and the same “core set of facts” as his initial claim, and thus
785
both claims should have been brought at the same time.
786
In Williams v. Abood, the supreme court affirmed the Workers’ Compensation Board’s disposition of a workers’ compensation
787
claim. The plaintiff injured his knee while working for the defen788
dant. He received workers’ compensation and medical benefits
789
during his treatment and recovery. He later developed an addic776.
777.
778.
779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.
785.
786.
787.
788.
789.

Id. at 556.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 557-58.
Id. at 558.
54 P.3d 777 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 780.
Id. at 778.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 780.
53 F.3d 134 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 136.
Id.
Id. at 136-37.
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tion to painkillers and various psychological problems following his
790
procedure. He eventually brought a variety of claims against the
defendant and reached a compromise and release of virtually all of
his workers’ compensation claims originating prior to July 1,
791
1997. However, in 1998, the plaintiff sued again and requested a
792
The
number of additional workers’ compensation benefits.
Workers’ Compensation Board denied most of the plaintiff’s
793
claims. The Board also severely limited the plaintiff’s request for
attorney’s fees for both his new attorney and his previous attor794
ney. The previous attorney submitted an affidavit regarding his
services to the plaintiff and had attempted to supplement his initial
affidavit with oral testimony and two late-filed, supplemental affi795
davits. The Board refused to consider the late-filed affidavits and
796
awarded the statutory minimum for the attorney’s services. The
plaintiff subsequently appealed to the supreme court, which af797
firmed the Board in all respects. Specifically, the supreme court
held that a majority of the plaintiff’s claims were disposed of by the
compromise and release, that the compromise and release was
valid, that the plaintiff was not entitled to any penalties or claims
for unfair or frivolous controversion of benefits against the defendant, that there was no misconduct by the Board’s panel during the
hearing, and that the Board’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion for re798
Additionally, the supreme court reconsideration was valid.
versed the superior court and held that the Board had the right to
punish the prior attorney for late filing and thus to exclude the late799
filed affidavits. Finally, the supreme court held that the plaintiff’s
new attorney was entitled to only one-half of his fees in recognition
800
of the fact that most of the plaintiff’s claims were denied.
801
In Wollaston v. Schroeder Cutting, Inc., the supreme court
overturned a decision by the Workers’ Compensation Board that
there was substantial evidence to overcome the presumption of

790.
791.
792.
793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.
799.
800.
801.

Id. at 137.
Id.
Id. at 138.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 136, 139.
Id. at 139-48.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 148.
42 P.3d 1065 (Alaska 2002).
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compensability for a logger’s ankle injury.802 Plaintiff Wollaston
was working as a logger for defendant Schroeder Cutting, Inc.,
803
when he injured his ankle after stepping in a hole. Wollaston was
diagnosed with a mild ankle sprain that would need seven to ten
804
days to heal. Over six months later, Wollaston obtained a second
opinion that he was still unable to work and had suffered a perma805
A year before the innent partial impairment of four percent.
jury, Wollaston had injured that same ankle while playing basketball, and co-workers had noticed that he subsequently walked with
806
a limp. In a workers’ compensation action brought by Wollaston,
the Board, relying on the original diagnosis, found that for the ten
day period immediately following the injury there was substantial
807
On
evidence to overcome the presumption of compensability.
appeal, the supreme court noted that the statutory presumption of
808
compensability may be rebutted by presenting a qualified expert
who testifies that, in his opinion, the claimant’s work was probably
809
not a substantial cause of the disability. The court held that the
testimony of the original diagnosis did not satisfy this burden because it did not (1) exclude the work-related injury as a cause of
Wollaston’s continuing problems, (2) directly eliminate the possibility that the work-related injury had consequences beyond the
ten days following the injury, and (3) contain the doctor’s opinion
that Wollaston’s disability was probably not substantially attribut810
able to the work-related injury.
C. Miscellaneous
811
In Charles v. Interior Regional Housing Authority, the supreme court reversed the trial court in holding that the plaintiff had
alleged sufficient facts to survive defendant’s summary judgment
812
motion. Charles, after resigning from Interior Regional Housing
Authority, sued for constructive discharge and breach of the im-

802. Id. at 1066, 1068-69.
803. Id. at 1065.
804. Id.
805. Id.
806. Id. at 1066.
807. Id.
808. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.120(a) (Michie 2002).
809. Wollaston, 42 P.3d at 1067 (citing Big K Grocery v. Gibson, 836 P.2d 941,
942 (Alaska 1992)).
810. Id. at 1067-68.
811. 55 P.3d 57 (Alaska 2002).
812. Id. at 63.
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plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.813 Charles claimed he
was threatened by a co-worker, was subjected to unwarranted criticism, had responsibilities reassigned, was excluded from meetings,
had his travel plans canceled, and was falsely accused of nepo814
tism. Charles was forced to clean out his desk six days after he
815
The trial court
had given thirty days notice of his resignation.
granted summary judgment in favor of the Housing Authority,
holding that Charles had not presented sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact as to whether to impute these actions to the
816
On appeal, the supreme court held that
Housing Authority.
Charles had alleged facts sufficient to impute the harassment to the
817
Housing Authority. Charles’s allegation that his supervisor knew
or should have known about the harassment and failed to take reasonable steps to prevent it raised an issue of fact as to whether
818
Charles was constructively discharged. Further, because Charles
alleged that the Housing Authority “failed to treat similarly situated employees alike” regarding the nepotism policy, the supreme
court held that there was a sufficient issue of fact as to whether the
Housing Authority breached the covenant of good faith and fair
819
dealing.
In Pitka v. Interior Regional Housing Authority,820 the supreme
court ruled that Pitka’s complaint for wrongful discharge was un821
After the
able to withstand a motion for summary judgment.
successful resolution of her grievance, Pitka alleged that IRHA had
demoted her from a Grade 4 to a Grade 3 position, even though
822
she had previously been paid at the Grade 3 level. After the superior court granted summary judgment in favor of IRHA, Pitka
appealed the decision and raised new issues of procedural impro823
After dismissing the new procedural issues,824
priety by IRHA.
the supreme court affirmed the holding of the superior court.825 No
breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing was found

813.
814.
815.
816.
817.
818.
819.
820.
821.
822.
823.
824.
825.

Id. at 59-60.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 63.
Id. at 61-62.
Id. at 62-63.
54 P.3d 785 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 790.
Id. at 787.
Id. at 788.
Id. at 788-89.
Id. at 790.
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because Pitka left on her own volition, she was not, in fact, de826
moted, and IRHA “went out of its way to accommodate Pitka.”
The court also denied Pitka’s claims of constructive discharge,
stating that mere criticism of job performance does not create intolerable working conditions, and pointing to the absence of any
827
campaign forcing Pitka to resign.
VIII. FAMILY LAW
A. Child Support
828
In Fernau v. Rowdon, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court’s calculation of income for former spouses used to determine
829
the proper amount of child support payments. First, the supreme
court held that an individual’s income calculation should not be re830
duced due to temporary changes in income. The supreme court
found that Fernau’s “historical ability to earn well over $100,000
annually” as a physician justified his inclusion in the highest possible income category even though his income had been reduced in
recent months due to the costs of setting up a private medical prac831
tice. Next, the supreme court held that Rowdon’s income should
832
However, rent payments or
not include alimony from Fernau.
proceeds from the lease or sale of property she received in the divorce must be included in her income for child support purposes,
even though the payments were characterized as “uncertain” or
833
“sporadic.” The supreme court also found it was proper to calculate only a part-time income for Rowdon because she was cur834
rently seeking job-training. The supreme court also affirmed the
trial court’s decision to vary the amount of child support upward
835
pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 90.3(c) Under Rule
90.3(c), a court may vary a child support award “for good cause
upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that manifest injustice
836
The court
would result if the support award were not varied.”
found that “the nature of [the] hybrid custody situation, including
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.
831.
832.
833.
834.
835.
836.

Id. at 789-90.
Id. at 790.
42 P.3d 1047 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1053-57.
Id. at 1053-54.
Id.
Id. at 1054.
Id. at 1055.
Id.
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3(c); Fernau, 42 P.3d at 1057-58.
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3(c)(1).
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the additional time the children were to spend with the mother, . . .
the disparity in earning potential, and [Rowdon]’s need to pursue a
career opportunity while caring for three children” made this an
837
unusual case in which variance was proper. Additionally, the supreme court found that awarding Rowdon rehabilitative alimony to
help pay for her education was proper, given that she met the re838
Rowdon had met these requirements set out by the court.
quirements by identifying “her choice to become a teacher, the
costs, and the time required for her education” while Fernau had
839
largely accepted the need for the education. Finally, the supreme
court held that given the disparity in the economic situation between the two parties, as well as the small size of the marital estate,
the awarding of attorney’s fees to Rowdon was not an abuse of the
840
trial court’s discretion.
841
In Hubbard v. Hubbard, the supreme court held that the
stepfather of a child was equitably estopped from having his paternity disestablished because the financial harm element of estoppel
842
had been satisfied. The supreme court found that the custodial
parent of the child had proven that the stepfather, in urging the
natural mother of the child to terminate child support proceedings
against the child’s natural father, had taken positive action in re843
moving the obligation of the natural father to support the child.
With the child and his natural mother facing the uncertain cost and
success of reestablishing child support obligations against the natural father, the supreme court found the financial harm element of
844
Accordingly, the judgment of the
estoppel had been satisfied.
trial court holding that the stepfather was equitably estopped from
845
disestablishing paternity was affirmed.
846
In Laybourn v. Powell, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s decision to impute income to Laybourn for purposes of
847
determining the amount of his child support payments. The court
held it was proper to impute income to Laybourn in the amount of
an estimation as to his earning capacity and not based on an actual

837.
838.
839.
840.
841.
842.
843.
844.
845.
846.
847.

Fernau, 42 P.3d at 1057.
Id. at 1058.
Id.
Id. at 1060.
44 P.3d 153 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 154-55.
Id. at 157.
Id.
Id.
55 P.3d 745 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 746.
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accounting of his income because the court found that Laybourn
had underreported his income and was actively concealing his ac848
tual earnings. The court also held that the trial judge was not biased against Laybourn in warning him of the compelling nature of
849
The
Powell’s evidence prior to Laybourn presenting his case.
trial judge instead was proper in warning Laybourn prior to the
presentation of his case of the possible consequences of presenting
850
false testimony and evidence to the court. Finally, the awarding
of enhanced attorney’s fees was not manifestly unreasonable where
the trial judge made a finding, supported by the record, of bad faith
851
or vexatious conduct by a party.
852
In Olmstead v. Ziegler, the supreme court held that modification of child support was not warranted where the responsible
party was voluntarily and unreasonably underemployed and where
853
his earning capacity was unchanged. Olmstead and Ziegler, both
attorneys, were divorced in 1994, and Olmstead agreed to pay their
854
However, in 1996,
daughter’s daycare and education expenses.
Olmstead’s legal partner left and forced him to become a solo prac855
Although he actively sought other employment, Olmtitioner.
stead’s earnings decreased, leading him to choose to return to
856
school to become a teacher. In 1999, Olmstead filed a motion for
857
an order modifying child support which was subsequently denied.
On appeal, the supreme court held that the trial court had not
abused its broad discretion in denying Olmstead’s motion and
agreed with the trial court that Olmstead had voluntarily reduced
858
his workload as an attorney even before he changed careers. The
supreme court also held that the trial court properly considered
factors other than Olmstead’s decreased earnings such as the reason for the lower earnings and the impact of Olmstead’s career
859
choice on the child. Finally, the supreme court held that the trial

848.
849.
850.
851.
852.
853.
854.
855.
856.
857.
858.
859.

Id. at 747.
Id. at 748.
Id.
Id.
42 P.3d 1102 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1103.
Id.
Id. at 1103-04.
Id. at 1104.
Id.
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1106.
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court had adequately supported its findings that Olmstead’s earn860
ing capacity had not decreased.
861
In Osmar v. Mahan, the supreme court held that children’s
insurance benefits should not be included in a mother’s income
when calculating child support. Mindy Lynn Osmar and Chris Os862
mar married and had one child, Ashley. Chris became disabled
863
and later died. Mindy received Social Security children’s insur864
ance benefits (CIB) because of Chris’s disability and death.
Mindy later married Gary Mahan, with whom she had one son,
865
In determining the
Steele Mahan, before getting a divorce.
amount of child support Mindy would receive from Gary, the superior court included in Mindy’s income the CIB payments that
866
Mindy received on Ashley’s behalf. The supreme court reversed,
finding that Mindy was constrained by federal law from using the
CIB payments for anything other than Ashley’s maintenance and
867
care. Because the money was not available to Mindy to support
Steele while Mindy and Gary were still married, the court held that
it should not be included in Mindy’s income for purposes of calcu868
Additionally, the court cited Alaska Civil
lating child support.
869
870
Rule 90.3 for the proposition that child support is not income.
The court found that the CIB payments were a substitute for Ashley’s father’s child support and thus were more appropriately char871
acterized as child support than as income for Ashley.
B. Child Custody
872
In Atkins v. Vigil, the supreme court held that Alaska was a
child’s home state, thus giving Alaska jurisdiction to hear the child
873
Julian Atkins was born to Veronica Vigil and
custody dispute.
874
Tracy Atkins in 1996. In 2001, Julian went to stay with Veron-

860.
861.
862.
863.
864.
865.
866.
867.
868.
869.
870.
871.
872.
873.
874.

Id. at 1107.
53 P.3d 149 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 149.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 151.
Id.
ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90.3.
Id.
Osmar, 53 P.3d at 151.
59 P.3d 255 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 258.
Id. at 256.
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ica’s mother, Julie Roby, who resided in California. Less than six
months after Julian went to stay with her, Roby filed a petition in
875
Tracy Atkins objected to
California to be Julian’s guardian.
876
Roby’s petition in Alaska. The Alaska superior court held that it
did not have jurisdiction to hear the case because California was
Julian’s home state. Alternatively, it held that even if there was jurisdiction, California’s proceeding still preempted Alaska’s jurisdic877
tion. The supreme court reversed the superior court’s decision.
The supreme court held that Julian’s home state was Alaska because Roby commenced the California proceeding less than six
878
months after Julian came to stay with her. Since a child must reside in a state for at least six months for it to be the child’s home
879
state, Julian’s stay with Roby did not satisfy this requirement.
Furthermore, the supreme court held that Alaska had jurisdiction
to hear the dispute because a child’s home state has exclusive juris880
diction in child custody cases.
881
In Fardig v. Fardig, the supreme court held that a modification of custody order was properly granted in favor of the minor’s
father, because (1) evidence of the mother’s drug abuse was not
precluded by res judicata or collateral estoppel, (2) her move to
882
another state was a substantial change in circumstances, and (3) a
883
grant of custody to the father was in the child’s best interests.
Owen (the mother) and Fardig (the father) were divorced in 1995,
884
and custody was granted to Owen. One year later, Fardig moved
for modification of custody, claiming that Owen’s drug usage im885
paired her ability to properly parent her child. His motion was
granted, and the judge held that Owen’s recent move to California
886
The suconstituted a “substantial change in circumstances.”
preme court held that evidence of Owen’s drug use was not barred
by earlier custody litigation regarding domestic violence, as a “mo887
tion to modify custody does not relitigate a past decision.” Al-

875.
876.
877.
878.
879.
880.
881.
882.
883.
884.
885.
886.
887.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 258.
56 P.3d 9 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 12.
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though Owen claimed that her move to California was temporary,
enough evidence was presented that this move constituted a sub888
Finally, Owen’s drug use was
stantial change in circumstances.
among several factors upon which it was reasonable to conclude
889
that custody by Fardig would be in the best interests of the child.
Pursuant to Alaska law, a nine-factor test is used to determine
what is in the best interests of the child, and includes accounting for
the physical and emotional needs of the child and the capability of
890
each parent. In this case custody was properly awarded to Far891
dig.
In Hamilton v. Hamilton.,892 the supreme court held that the
trial court did not err in making its factual findings nor did it abuse
its discretion by transferring primary physical custody from the
893
mother to the father. Initially, each parent was awarded joint legal custody with primary physical custody being awarded to the
894
mother. However, the father moved to change primary physical
custody because his ex-wife prevented him from visiting the children according to the child custody agreement and then moved
895
The trial court, in
out-of-state without notice to the father.
granting the father’s motion to modify the custody, held that “the
desire and ability of each parent to allow an open and loving frequent relationship between the child and the other parent” was the
most important statutory factor in determining the best interests of
896
the children. The supreme court found that the factual findings
behind this decision satisfied the applicable standard of review and
897
were not clearly erroneous. The supreme court also affirmed the
trial court decision, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the custody order to award custody to the father
because the ex-wife’s move out-of-state constituted a substantial
898
change in circumstances, and a change in custody was in the best
899
interests of the children. Additionally, the supreme court found

888.
Id.
889.
890.
891.
892.
893.
894.
895.
896.
897.
898.
899.

Id. The evidence suggested that her move might potentially be long-term.
Id. at 12-13.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (Michie 2002).
Fardig, 56 P.3d at 14.
42 P.3d 1107 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1110.
Id.
Id. at 1111.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1114-15.
Id. at 1115.
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the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the need for
the children to have a more open and loving relationship with their
father outweighed the need for stability in their relationship with
their mother, finding that the father was acting to pull the children
900
to himself rather than away from their mother. Finally, the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s discretion in addressing both
901
the religious and cultural needs of the children.
902
In Kelly v. Joseph, the supreme court held that a modification of a child custody order was appropriate because there was
sufficient evidence of “changed circumstances” to meet the statu903
tory requirements of Alaska Statutes section 25.20.110(a), and
the evidence showed that the change would be in the best interests
904
of the children under Alaska Statutes section 25.24.150(c). The
custody agreement for the three children was first established in
905
In December 2000, Kelly moved to modify the
October 1999.
custody and visitation provisions of the agreement that were intended to give Kelly contact with the children via telephone and
906
during holidays. The superior court modified the custody agreement and granted primary physical custody of two of the children
907
to Kelly in early 2001. The supreme court upheld the decision of
the superior court regarding the modifications of the custody
908
agreement. The court found that evidence of Joseph’s interference with Kelly’s custodial visitation rights was sufficient to show
“changed circumstances” required by section 25.20.110(a) for the
909
modification of a child custody agreement. The court found that
the superior court had adequately conducted a “best interest analysis” because it had considered the children’s need for professional
mental health care and how relocating might affect their educa910
tional opportunities.
In Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch,911 the supreme court held
that the superior court failed to comply adequately with the remand instructions included in the supreme court’s prior opinion re-

900.
901.
902.
903.
904.
905.
906.
907.
908.
909.
910.
911.

Id. at 1116.
Id. at 1116-18.
46 P.3d 1017 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1017 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.110(a) (Michie 2002)).
Id. at 1018-19 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (Michie 2002)).
Id. at 1016.
Id.
Id. at 1016-17.
Id. at 1019.
Id. at 1017-18.
Id. at 1018.
53 P.3d 152 (Alaska 2002).
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garding the parents’ custody dispute.912 In the initial proceeding,
the superior court awarded both parents legal custody of their son,
awarding the mother primary physical custody with the caveat that
she was not allowed to relocate the son more than sixty-five miles
913
from the father’s residence. Wishing to relocate to Florida, the
914
mother appealed. In its remand instructions, the supreme court
instructed the superior court to determine what would be in the
best interests of the son, assuming that the mother would move to
Florida, and whether the mother’s proposed move was motivated
915
by a desire to make visitation more difficult for the father. On
remand, the superior court modified the joint custody order, giving
the father sole legal authority to decide where the son attended
916
The superior court maintained the mother’s primary
school.
physical custody as long as she resided within a reasonable distance
of the father’s choice of schools, but giving the father primary
917
On
physical custody if she should move beyond that distance.
appeal, the mother argued that the modified joint legal custody
award had the same effect of preventing her from moving to Florida, and that ordering an automatic shift in custody if she should
move to Florida failed to assume that such a move would take
place and precluded any determination as to her motives for mov918
ing. However, the supreme court ruled that because the superior
court’s decision was primarily motivated by an attempt to give the
son frequent contact with both parents, it was clear that the superior court had failed to assume that the mother would move to
919
Florida and had not determined the mother’s motives for moving.
For that reason, the supreme court vacated the superior court’s or920
der and remanded for further proceedings.
921
In Potter v. Potter the supreme court affirmed the superior
court’s modification of child support, yet reversed the modification
922
David Potter and Shelly Brewster reof visitation privileges.
ceived a divorce in 1990 which allowed for shared physical custody

912.
913.
914.
915.
916.
917.
918.
919.
920.
921.
922.

Id. at 153.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 154.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 156-57.
Id. at 157.
55 P.3d 726 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 730.
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of their daughter and for David to pay child support.923 Over the
years, the parties amicably shared custody and visitation, yet as
time went on, Potter saw less of his daughter as she primarily lived
924
with Brewster. As a result, Brewster filed a motion to increase
925
child support and to modify visitation. However, the court stated
926
At
that the trial would be confined to the child support issue.
trial, the superior court increased child support payments and
927
modified the visitation agreement. On appeal, the supreme court
reversed the modification of visitation because Potter was not
given notice that it would be an issue in the evidentiary proceedings and thus the superior court’s order did not satisfy due proc928
ess. At a minimum, due process under the Alaska Constitution
requires that the parties be notified of the subject of proceedings so
929
Acthat they will have a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
cordingly, the notice requirement was not satisfied and the visitation modification was reversed.
930
In Velasquez v. Velasquez, the supreme court held that it was
proper to consider the manner in which the mother left the marriage in determining whom to award custody of the couple’s three
931
minor children. In 1998, Cindy Velasquez abruptly left her marital home without notifying the family of her whereabouts and
932
failed to maintain contact with her children afterwards. The trial
court awarded custody of the minor children to Joe Velasquez,
concluding that the manner in which Cindy left the residence and
933
her lack of contact with her children was indefensible. Reviewing
the trial court’s holding for abuse of discretion, the supreme court
concluded that the trial court properly considered Cindy’s departure without notice, her avoidance of the children and the effect
her conduct had upon the children in making its custody determi934
nation. Such consideration was in accordance with Alaska Stat935
utes section 25.24.150(c), which requires the court to consider the

923.
924.
925.
926.
927.
928.
929.
930.
931.
932.
933.
934.
935.

Id. at 727.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 728.
Id.
Id.
Id.
38 P.3d 1143 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1145.
Id.
Id. at 1146-47.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.250(c) (Michie 2002).
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best interests of the children when awarding custody.936 The court
found that the effect of Cindy’s abandonment upon the emotional
welfare of her children goes directly to the issue of the children’s
937
Accordingly the award of custody of the minor
best interests.
938
children to Joe was affirmed.
C. Adoption and Termination of Parental Rights
939
In E.A. v. State, Division of Family & Youth Services, the supreme court held that the State proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that it made “active efforts” to prevent the breakup of the
940
child’s family, and that the State proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the child would likely suffer serious emotional harm if
941
he was returned to his mother’s custody. E.A., a mother of five
942
943
children, had a history of substance abuse. She relinquished her
parental rights to her eldest three children as well as her young944
est. Her fourth child, H.O., an Indian child, was removed from
E.A.’s custody, and the trial court later terminated E.A.’s parental
945
rights to H.O. upon findings under 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) and §
946
1912(f). E.A. argued on appeal that the State did not make “active efforts” because it failed to obtain an updated psychological
evaluation of E.A and failed to make active remedial efforts for a
947
E.A. also challenged the trial court’s
period of seven months.
holding that her custody of H.O. would likely cause him serious
948
emotional harm. The supreme court held that the trial court did
not err in finding that an additional psychological evaluation of
949
E.A. would have been of “marginal value.” In reaching its decision, the supreme court specifically cited E.A.’s inability to over950
come her substance abuse problems and her “demonstrated lack

936.
937.
938.
939.
940.
941.
942.
943.
944.
945.
946.
947.
948.
949.
950.

Velasquez, 38 P.3d at 1147.
Id.
Id. at 1149.
46 P.3d 986 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 988.
Id.
Id. at 988 n.1.
Id. at 988.
Id. at 988 n.1.
25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000).
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2000).
E.A., 46 P.3d at 990.
Id. at 991.
Id. at 990.
Id.
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of willingness to participate in treatment.”951 The supreme court
further held that the State’s failure to make active efforts to prevent a breakup of the family was insignificant in light of the extensive remedial efforts the State had provided throughout its involvement with E.A.’s children apart from the seven-month
952
period. Additionally, the supreme court held that the expert testimony of H.O.’s therapist and a clinical psychologist, in combination with “substantial evidence in the record,” supported the trial
court’s finding that H.O. would likely suffer serious emotional
953
harm if returned to E.A.’s custody.
In J.A. v. State, Division of Family & Youth Services,954 the supreme court held that expert testimony as to the serious degree of
harm J.A.’s children would likely suffer if they were returned to
J.A.’s custody was sufficiently related to the facts and issues of the
case, despite the fact that the experts based their opinions on hypo955
thetical situations and a limited review of the family’s case file.
In response to reports of sexual abuse and neglect, the Alaska Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family and
Youth Services (DFYS) obtained temporary legal custody of each
956
of J.A.’s three children. Subsequently, DFYS filed, and the superior court granted, a petition to terminate both parents’ parental
957
On appeal, J.A. asserted three arguments under the Inrights.
958
dian Child Welfare Act: (1) that the experts’ testimony was im959
properly based on hearsay reports of sexual abuse; (2) that the
experts’ testimony that the children would likely suffer serious
harm if returned to J.A. was insufficiently related to the facts of the
960
case; and (3) that the superior court over-relied on the experts’
testimony in reaching its ultimate verdict that the children would
961
The supreme
suffer serious harm if returned to J.A.’s custody.
court ruled that each of J.A.’s arguments failed. First, the supreme
962
court ruled that Alaska Rule of Evidence 703 and Alaska case
law explicitly allow experts to rely on otherwise inadmissible evi-

951.
952.
953.
954.
955.
956.
957.
958.
959.
960.
961.
962.

Id. at 991.
Id. at 990.
Id. at 991.
50 P.3d 395 (Alaska 2002).
Id.
Id. at 398.
Id.
25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-23, 1951 (2000).
J.A., 50 P.3d at 399.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 402.
ALASKA R. EVID. 703.
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dence as long as the experts reasonably rely upon evidence that experts in their particular field typically rely upon in forming opin963
ions or inferences upon such a subject. Second, the court ruled
that each expert’s testimony was sufficiently grounded in the facts
and issues of the case because the experts were apprised of the
facts by their review of selected DFYS records and DFYS summa964
ries of relevant facts and the testimony of other witnesses. Third,
the court ruled that the trial court did not over-rely on the expert
testimony because there was substantial evidence in addition to the
experts’ testimony that supported the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that J.A.’s substance abuse and resulting neglect placed his
965
children at significant risk of emotional and physical harm. For
these reasons the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s ter966
mination of J.A.’s parental rights.
967
In J.S. v. State, the supreme court held that “active efforts”
to rehabilitate J.S. and prevent the breakup of an Indian family
968
were not required under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),
and therefore upheld the termination of J.S.’s parental rights.969
The Division of Family and Youth Services (DFYS) removed J.S.’s
970
sons from his care due to reports of sexual abuse. J.S. was subsequently tried and convicted of sexual abuse and sentenced to nineteen years, and DFYS petitioned to terminate J.S.’s parental
971
rights. The superior court found that termination was appropriate, but allowed the State to develop a treatment plan for J.S.,
972
which he had to accept in order to retain his parental rights. J.S.
973
rejected the proposal and his parental rights were terminated.
J.S. appealed, arguing that the treatment plan did not comply with
the ICWA requirement that the State take “active efforts” to pre974
vent the breakup of an Indian family.” The supreme court concluded that the State’s duty was properly discharged by Jack’s con975
The supreme court further held that
viction for sexual abuse.
963. J.A., 50 P.3d at 399-400 (citing Broderick v. King’s Way Assembly of God
Church, 808 P.2d 1211, 1217 (Alaska 1991)).
964. Id. at 401.
965. Id. at 403.
966. Id. at 404.
967. 50 P.3d 388 (Alaska 2002).
968. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000).
969. J.S., 50 P.3d at 389.
970. Id. at 389-90.
971. Id. at 390.
972. Id.
973. Id. at 390-91.
974. Id. at 391 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2000)).
975. Id. at 392.
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DFYS did take all measures required under the ICWA976 to place
the children with one of J.S.’s relatives or other family, and did not
977
Finally,
err by placing the children outside of these guidelines.
the supreme court held that placement with J.S. would likely cause
the children physical or emotional damage because J.S. was crimi978
nally convicted of sexually abusing them. Accordingly, J.S.’s pa979
rental rights were terminated.
In M.J.S. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Di980
vision of Family & Youth Services, the supreme court held (1)
that a child’s godfather did not meet the statutory definition of a
981
guardian for the purposes of determining child abandonment,
and (2) that a parent’s habitual substance abuse resulted in sub982
stantial risk of emotional harm to the child. Spencer, a mother of
four children, had a criminal history and was a habitual substance
983
abuser. She had named Martin Shultz, a friend, as the godfather
of her third child, Janet, and would often place Janet in Shultz’s
984
care during Spencer’s substance abuse relapses. The trial court
985
subsequently terminated Spencer’s parental rights to Janet.
Spencer argued on appeal that she had implemented a plan to have
Shultz named Janet’s legal guardian, thereby precluding the trial
court from finding that Spencer had abandoned Janet under
986
Alaska Statutes section 47.10.013(a)(4), which required proof
that Spencer failed to participate in a plan to reunite the child with
987
Spencer also challenged the trial court’s
a parent or guardian.
holding that her habitual substance abuse exposed Janet to a “sub988
The supreme court affirmed the trial
stantial risk of harm.”
court’s finding that Shultz, although Janet’s godfather, did not meet
the statutory definition of a guardian because he had not been le989
The supreme
gally appointed as Janet’s guardian by the court.
court also upheld the trial court’s finding that Spencer’s habitual
substance abuse exposed Janet to a substantial risk of harm be976.
977.
978.
979.
980.
981.
982.
983.
984.
985.
986.
987.
988.
989.

25 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2000).
J.S., 50 P.3d at 393-94.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 395.
39 P.3d 1123 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1125.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1124.
Id.
Id. at 1124-25.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.013(a)(4) (Michie 2002).
M.J.S., 39 P.3d at 1125.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1125-26.
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cause Spencer’s substance abuse prevented Janet from forming a
990
stable bond with her mother. The supreme court explained that
the risk of harm to the child need not necessarily be a risk of physical danger, but that emotional harm may also justify termination of
991
parental rights.
In P.M. v. State, Department of Health & Human Services, Di992
vision of Family & Youth Services, the supreme court held that
the superior court did not err in refusing to grant new counsel, terminating a father’s parental rights, or refusing to place the child
993
with the father’s parents. In 1996, the superior court adjudicated
J.M.H. and his half brother children in need of aid after they were
994
found with their mother in a wooded area. The Division of Family and Youth Services (DFYS) placed them in the home of
J.M.H.’s half-brother’s father, who later expressed a desire to
995
adopt J.M.H. P.M., J.M.H.’s father, had a history of criminal ac996
tivity and anger management problems. In 1999, DFYS prepared
case plans for P.M. to integrate him into his son’s life, but P.M. did
997
not comply and DFYS filed for termination of parental rights.
P.M. was appointed counsel by the court twice, but both attorneys
were allowed to step down after P.M. harassed them and refused to
998
cooperate. P.M. continued pro se and the superior court subse999
quently terminated his parental rights. On appeal, P.M. argued
1000
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that his
1001
The supreme court
due process rights were therefore violated.
held that he was not denied effective assistance of counsel because
his counsels’ decisions were within the range of reasonable ac1002
Further, given P.M.’s prior behavior towards his counsel,
tions.
the supreme court held that P.M.’s due process rights were not
violated by the superior court’s decision to forego appointing new
1003
The supreme court affirmed the superior court’s termicounsel.

990.
991.
992.
993.
994.
995.
996.
997.
998.
999.
1000.
1001.
1002.
1003.

Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1126 n.12.
42 P.3d 1127 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1137.
Id. at 1129.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1130.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1131.
Id. at 1132-33.
Id. at 1131.
Id. at 1133.
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nation of P.M.’s parental rights1004 because P.M. made no attempt to
1005
and failed to comply with the
locate his son for three years
1006
The supreme court also affirmed the superior
DFYS case plans.
court’s decision to refuse to grant custody to P.M.’s parents because the court’s obligation to place the child with a blood relative
1007
did not apply to placement for adoptive purposes.
In R.G. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Divi1008
sion of Family & Youth Services, the supreme court held that the
termination of R.G.’s parental rights was appropriate because the
evidence showed that her child, E.G., was a child in need of aid un1009
R.G. had a history of
der Alaska Statutes section 47.10.011(11).
1010
Bedifficulty raising E.G., originally due to physical ailments.
ginning in late 1997, the Division of Family and Youth Services
(DFYS) intervened by making several petitions for temporary or
1011
Finally, in September 2000, DFYS
emergency custody of E.G.
petitioned to terminate R.G.’s parental rights; this petition was
1012
On appeal, the sugranted by the superior court in March 2001.
preme court noted that to terminate parental rights there must be
clear and convincing evidence that (1) the child is in need of aid
under section 47.10.011 and (2) the parent did not change the conditions or conduct that placed the child at a substantial risk of harm
1013
While R.G. testified that she had
within a reasonable time.
remedied her physical ailment, obtained stable housing and successfully participated in an anger management program, R.G. was
unable to dispute the superior court’s finding that her emotional
disturbance hindered her ability to care for E.G.—making E.G. a
1014
The supreme court held that there was sufchild in need of aid.
ficient evidence supporting the superior court’s finding that termi1015
Accordingly, the
nation was proper under section 47.10.011(11).
1016
superior court’s order was affirmed.

1004.
1005.
1006.
1007.
1008.
1009.
1010.
1011.
1012.
1013.
1014.
1015.
1016.

Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1134.
Id. at 1136.
Id.
43 P.3d 145 (Alaska 2002).
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.011(11) (Michie 2002); R.G., 43 P.3d at 146.
R.G., 43 P.3d at 146-47.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id. at 148-49.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
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In S.B. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Divi1017
sion of Family & Youth Services, the supreme court upheld the
1018
A child was resuperior court’s termination of parental rights.
moved from his mother and placed with his paternal grand1019
In 1992, the Superior Court of California appointed the
mother.
1020
When the grandgrandmother to be the child’s guardian.
mother’s health declined, the child was sent to Alaska to live with
1021
The grandmother sent a notathe mother of his half-siblings.
1022
In 2000, the surized letter purporting to transfer guardianship.
perior court terminated the parental rights of the child’s natural
1023
mother. The natural mother appealed, claiming that the superior
court had neither subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case nor
1024
The supreme court held that the
personal jurisdiction over her.
superior court had subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the superior court’s order did not modify a California child custody determination because the California determination terminated with
1025
Further, Alaska had
the death of the paternal grandmother.
properly exercised child custody jurisdiction over the case because
1026
Additionally, the supreme
Alaska was the child’s home state.
court held that the superior court exercised proper personal jurisdiction over the natural mother because Alaska had more than
1027
“minimum contacts” with her child.
In S.H. v. State, Department of Health & Human Services, Di1028
vision of Family & Youth Services, the supreme court held that
the trial court did not err in terminating the parental rights of S.H.
and R.H. because the parents failed to remedy conduct that put
1029
R.H. and
their children at risk of physical and emotional injury.
S.H. are the parents of four children who each have serious psy1030
Starting in 1987, ten reports
chological and emotional problems.
of child abuse, including physical, verbal, and sexual abuse were

1017.
1018.
1019.
1020.
1021.
1022.
1023.
1024.
1025.
1026.
1027.
1028.
1029.
1030.

61 P.3d 6 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 22.
42 P.3d 1119 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1127.
Id. at 1120-21.
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made to DFYS.1031 The parents failed to respond to any of DFYS’s
efforts to help them and were also reported to be using crack1032
The supreme court affirmed the holding of the trial
cocaine.
court because S.H. failed to remedy her substance abuse problem
1033
within a reasonable time, termination of their parental rights was
1034
in the children’s best interests, and R.H.’s efforts to remedy his
1035
Further, the trial court did not
conduct were too little, too late.
err in holding that DFYS made reasonable efforts to prevent the
1036
break-up of the family.
In State, Department of Health & Social Services, Division of
1037
Family and Youth Services v. M.L.L., the supreme court upheld
the superior court’s decision not to terminate M.L.L.’s parental
1038
A 1999 proceeding had resulted in
rights to her two daughters.
the termination of the children’s father’s parental rights, and the
1039
The state subsequently
children were placed in foster care.
sought to terminate M.L.L.’s parental rights, but the superior court
ruled that the state did not prove its case beyond a reasonable
1040
On appeal, the supreme court held that while the showdoubt.
ing was sufficient to terminate parental rights under Children in
1041
Need of Aid requirements, it failed the reasonable doubt stan1042
The State claimed
dard under the Indian Child Welfare Act.
that the superior court did not consider the harm to the children by
breaking the bonds with the foster mother and returning the chil1043
The supreme court ruled that proper condren to M.L.L.’s care.
sideration had been given to the bonds between the children and
1044
the foster mother.
In V.S.B. v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Di1045
vision of Family & Youth Services, the supreme court upheld a
1046
Vivian, the children’s mother,
termination of parental rights.
1031.
1032.
1033.
1034.
1035.
1036.
1037.
1038.
1039.
1040.
1041.
1042.
1043.
1044.
1045.
1046.

Id. at 1121.
Id. at 1122.
Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1124-25.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1127.
61 P.3d 438 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 439.
Id. at 440-41.
Id. at 441-42.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.019 (Michie 2002).
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (2000).
M.L.L., 61 P.3d at 439.
Id. at 443.
45 P.3d 1198 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1208.
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suffered from a long history of mental disease and had been hospi1047
In 1998, the Alaska Division of Family and
talized several times.
Youth Services (DFYS) took emergency custody of the children,
placed them in foster care, and filed petitions for adjudication of a
1048
Although Vivian
child in need of aid on behalf of each child.
agreed to the DFYS program to regain custody, DFYS filed a peti1049
The trial
tion for termination of parental rights in May 1999.
court terminated Vivian’s parental rights and Vivian appealed the
1050
The supreme court held that the trial court correctly
decision.
found that the children were children in need of aid because they
had suffered mental injury, sexual abuse, and substantial risk of
1051
The suphysical harm through Vivian’s actions and inactions.
1052
preme court also held that under the Indian Child Welfare Act,
DFYS had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that continued parental custody was likely to result in serious emotional or physical
1053
damage to the child and had proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that reasonable and active efforts had been made to provide appropriate remedial services to Vivian and had been unsuc1054
cessful.
D. Dissolution of Marriage and Distribution of Property
1055
In Edelman v. Edelman, the supreme court affirmed the
lower court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over the husband’s
claims from the Exxon Valdez oil spill and to deny the wife’s attor1056
ney’s fees and costs for the divorce. First, the wife argued that
the trial court’s decision to retain jurisdiction over the Exxon
1057
claims instead of assigning them to her was incorrect. However,
the court found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in
retaining jurisdiction because the exact amount and payout of the
1058
Exxon claims was unknown. Second, the wife argued that the

1047. Id. at 1200.
1048. Id. at 1202.
1049. Id.
1050. Id. at 1203.
1051. Id. at 1204.
1052. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (2000).
1053. V.S.B., 45 P.3d at 1205-06.
1054. Id. at 1206-07 (finding that though Vivian did actively participate in the
DFYS program, her parenting skills improved only marginally and were not sufficient to make her an adequate parent).
1055. 61 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2002).
1056. Id. at 2.
1057. Id. at 4.
1058. Id.
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trial court erred in denying her attorney’s fees and costs because it
did not base its decision on the relative economic situations and
earning powers of the parties and her ex-husband’s vexatious con1059
The court found that the trial court did not abuse its disduct.
cretion because the husband’s economic situation was not significantly better than the wife’s, and there was no evidence that his
1060
alleged delay tactics rose to the level of vexatious conduct.
1061
In Juelfs v. Gough, the supreme court held modification of a
joint sharing agreement for a dog was proper because, as the trial
court noted, the parties were unable to share custody of the dog
1062
The trial court had modified the
without severe contention.
agreement after one incident where Juelfs and Gough argued
about Juelfs’s allotted time with Coho, the dog, and another where
Juelfs’s boyfriend dislocated Coho’s leg while pulling Coho away
1063
The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s
from a dog fight.
modification, holding that as circumstances changed, it was in the
best interest to review and modify the joint sharing agreement un1064
The supreme court
der Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).
also affirmed the trial court’s denial of Juelfs’s request for a change
of judge as untimely and “little more than an expression of [her]
1065
dissatisfaction with the superior court’s ruling.”
1066
In Kinnard v. Kinnard, the supreme court ruled that coverage under a health insurance policy is a marital asset and that Bernard Kinnard was responsible for either reinstating his wife De1067
Bernard
bra’s coverage or paying for her medical bills.
unilaterally removed Debra from his health insurance policy after
the judge presiding over the divorce proceedings ordered him not
1068
The supreme court ruled that
to dispose of any marital property.
the trial court acted within the scope of its authority in holding
Bernard liable because it placed Debra in the position she would
1069
The supreme
have occupied had Bernard not violated the order.
court also affirmed the trial court’s holding that Bernard must
share custody of his biological daughter Kristine with Debra, who

1059.
1060.
1061.
1062.
1063.
1064.
1065.
1066.
1067.
1068.
1069.

Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5-6.
41 P.3d 593 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 597.
Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 597; ALASKA R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6).
Juelfs, 41 P.3d at 598 (alteration in original).
43 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 156.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 156-57.
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was Kristine’s stepmother.1070 Using the standard from Turner v.
1071
Pannick, the supreme court agreed with the trial court’s determination that separating Debra and Kristine would be detrimental
1072
to the child’s welfare.
In Korn v. Korn,1073 the supreme court held that neither interim spousal support nor imputed rental value are marital as1074
sets. After filing for divorce and separating from her husband,
Paula Korn resided in the marital residence rent-free and received
1075
In deciding disputed
interim spousal payments for one year.
property questions, the superior court counted among Paula’s assets the interim spousal payments and an estimated rental value for
living at the marital residence for one year, but provided no factual
findings for including imputed rental value and interim spousal
1076
The supreme court observed that
support as marital assets.
1077
The court also held that
spousal support is not marital property.
a marital residence is not a marital asset until the trial court divided
1078
Therethe property, and thus no rental value could be imputed.
fore, the supreme court vacated the decision and remanded for re1079
consideration and appropriate findings.
1080
In Nelson-Lizardi v. Lizardi, the supreme court held that
the superior court abused it discretion in ruling on pension rights
despite notice that the wife needed additional information to file a
1081
During the Lizardis’ divorce proceedings, the
formal acounting.
superior court did not address the issue of Bob’s pension because
1082
Upon retiring, Bob began to receive
the pension had not vested.
pension benefits and filed a motion to modify child support claim1083
The superior court oring a fifteen percent reduction in income.
1084
dered Jackie to file a request for formal acounting; Jackie instead
filed an “Advice of Counsel” notifying the superior court that she
required additional information in order to determine if a formal
1070.
1071.
1072.
1073.
1074.
1075.
1076.
1077.
1078.
1079.
1080.
1081.
1082.
1083.
1084.

Id. at 154.
540 P.2d 1051 (Alaska 1975).
Kinnard, 43 P.3d at 155.
46 P.3d 1021 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1022.
Id.
Id. at 1022, 1023-24.
Id. at 1023.
Id.
Id. at 1024.
49 P.3d 236 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 241.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 237.
Id. at 236.
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accounting was necessary.1085 The superior court determined that
Jackie was not entitled to any portion of the interest in the pension
1086
Unbecause she failed to file the request for formal accounting.
der the abuse of discretion standard, the supreme court determined
that the superior court erred because it failed to make a ruling on
the merits of the division of the pension when the court and opposing counsel had notice that Jackie needed further information
1087
Accordingly, the case was reto comply with the court’s order.
manded to the superior court to determine the valuation and the
1088
division of the pension.
In Manelick v. Manelick,1089 the supreme court held that in the
property division order, the superior court (1) erred by improperly
valuing the goodwill of the wife’s medical practice, (2) failed to include a debt the parties owed on a piano, and (3) correctly assigned
1090
Reviewing the superior court’s faczero value to a marital car.
tual and legal determinations under the clearly erroneous and
abuse of discretion standards, respectively, the supreme court re1091
The
evaluated the valuation of the couple’s assets and liabilities.
court ruled that the superior court erred in undervaluing the tangible assets of the medical practice because it did not attempt to ob1092
Further, the court ruled that
tain accurate financial statements.
the superior court erred in valuing the goodwill of the wife’s practice because, where no market exists for goodwill, it should be con1093
Second, the court ruled that the supesidered to have no value.
rior court erred by failing to include all assets acquired during the
1094
1095
Third, the court
marriage including the loan for the piano.
ruled that the superior court did not clearly err in valuing a marital
1096
car at zero value instead of a negative value.
1097
In Martin v. Martin, the supreme court held that the trial
court in a divorce proceeding did not err in holding that the hus1098
Don Martin bought an
band’s food store was marital property.
1085.
1086.
1087.
1088.
1089.
1090.
1091.
1092.
1093.
1094.
1095.
1096.
1097.
1098.

Id. at 238.
Id.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 241.
59 P.3d 259 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 263-65.
Id. at 265.
Id.
Id. at 265-66.
52 P.3d 724 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 726.
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Anchorage health food store, Roy’s Health Foods, before marrying
1099
The trial court held that the store was marital property
Melinda.
1100
On appeal, the
and divided it evenly between Don and Melinda.
supreme court affirmed the trial court’s judgment applying the doctrine of transmutation, which states that separate property can be1101
Here, the sucome marital property if the parties so intend.
preme court found that the Martins intended for Roy’s Health
Foods to become a family business because Don used marital funds
to finance the business and because Melinda worked at the store
1102
for many years without pay.
E. Miscellaneous
In H.C.S. v. Community Advocacy Project of Alaska ex rel.
1103
H.L.S., the supreme court held an adult son was entitled to a
new hearing for a determination whether it would be in his father’s
best interests to remove a corporation as his father’s guardian and
conservator and to appoint the adult son because the son had demonstrated that circumstances had materially changed since the cor1104
In 1999, the Community Advocacy
poration’s appointment.
Project of Alaska (CAPA) was appointed by the trial court as the
guardian and conservator of H.L.S. due to his Alzheimer’s Disease
and dementia which caused him to suffer lapses in memory and
1105
At the time the appointment was uncontested by
judgment.
1106
In 2000, H.C.S., H.L.S.’s adult son, filed a petiH.L.S.’s family.
tion asking the trial court to modify and terminate the appointment
1107
of CAPA and to appoint H.C.S. as guardian and conservator.
H.C.S. alleged several grounds, in particular that CAPA had
caused H.L.S. to be institutionalized away from his family and that
1108
The trial court
CAPA had mismanaged H.L.S.’s modest assets.
1109
H.C.S. argued on
held a hearing and denied H.C.S.’s petition.
appeal that it was an abuse of discretion to deny his petition without making fact findings to justify deviating from Alaska Statutes

1099.
1100.
1101.
1102.
1103.
1104.
1105.
1106.
1107.
1108.
1109.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 727.
Id. at 729-30.
42 P.3d 1093 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1094.
Id. at 1095.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sections 13.26.1451110 and 13.26.210.1111 The supreme court held that
the standard of review for an order denying or granting a request
to remove a guardian or conservator was an abuse of discretion,
the same standard as for initial selection of a guardian or conserva1112
After finding existing statutes regarding modification of aptor.
1113
pointments of guardians and conservators to be inapplicable, the
supreme court held that a two-part analysis should apply to petitions to remove or replace guardians or conservators using the pro1114
First, the
cedure for modifying child custody awards as a model.
petitioner must “show that the circumstances of the ward, guardian, or conservator have changed materially since the guardian or
1115
Second, the court must decide
conservator was appointed.”
“whether the existing appointment is in the ward’s best inter1116
The supreme court held that H.C.S. had demonstrated a
ests.”
material change of circumstances and that it was therefore necessary to hold a hearing to consider whether it was in H.L.S.’s best
interests to remove CAPA as guardian and conservator and re1117
The supreme court found that the trial
place it with H.C.S.
court’s hearing failed to address several unresolved factual disputes
about CAPA’s treatment of H.L.S. and his assets and remanded
the case for further fact findings with the burden for proving best
1118
interests on H.C.S, the party seeking the modification.
1119
In Trapp v. State, the supreme court held that conservators
are not shielded by absolute quasi-judicial immunity from claims
1120
asserted by their wards. Trapp was found to be partially incapacitated, and the Office of Public Advocacy (OPA) was appointed as
1121
her conservator. She brought suit against OPA for a variety of
1110. ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.145 (Michie 2002) (stating an adult child of an incapacitated person has greater priority for appointment as guardian than a nonprofit
corporation but that the court shall select the person or nonprofit corporation
“that is best qualified and willing to serve”).
1111. § 13.26.210 (stating a conservator appointed by the court is entitled to consideration before an adult child of the protected person but that the “court, for
good cause, may pass over a person having priority and appoint a person having
less priority or no priority”); H.C.S., 42 P.3d at 1095-96.
1112. H.C.S., 42 P.3d at 1096.
1113. Id. at 1097-98.
1114. Id. at 1099.
1115. Id.
1116. Id.
1117. Id. at 1100-01.
1118. Id. at 1101.
1119. 53 P.3d 1128 (Alaska 2002).
1120. Id. at 1128.
1121. Id.
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claims, and OPA moved to dismiss the suit under absolute quasi1122
judicial immunity. The supreme court found that while no consensus exists among jurisdictions about whether conservators possess absolute quasi-judicial immunity, the conservatorship statute
1123
1124
in Alaska Statutes section 13.26.305 precludes such immunity.
1125
Accordingly, the case was remanded for further proceedings.
IX. INSURANCE LAW
In United Airlines, Inc., v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Com1126
pany, the supreme court determined that indemnification was
1127
The
properly transferred to United Airlines through a sublease.
insurance suit arose out of an accident involving Adrian Sanders,
who hit a United Airlines baggage cart train from the rear with his
1128
The accident occurred on property leased from the
motorcycle.
State by a husband and wife, the Krogstads, and then subleased to
1129
Because Sanders had threatened litigation
United Airlines.
against the State, the State expected the Krogstads to indemnify it
1130
The Krogstads in turn informed
under the terms of the lease.
United Airlines of United’s indemnification under the terms of the
1131
However, this tender was rejected by United Airsublease.
1132
After settling the State’s third-party claim for indemnity
lines.
against the Krogstads, State Farm (the Krogstads’s insurer) was
permitted to substitute for the Krogstads in an indemnification suit
against United Airlines and was also permitted to add its own claim
1133
The superior court granted State Farm’s crossfor indemnity.
motion for summary judgment and denied United Airlines’ motion
1134
The sufor summary judgment on the indemnification issues.
preme court found that because the claim arose out of United Airlines’ operation of the baggage cart, in accordance with the terms
of the sublease, and did not arise out of the Krogstads’ negligence,
“the plain language of the indemnity clause in the . . . sublease re1122.
1123.
1124.
1125.
1126.
1127.
1128.
1129.
1130.
1131.
1132.
1133.
1134.

Id. at 1128-29.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.305 (Michie 2002).
Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1132.
51 P.3d 928 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 929.
Id. at 930.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 931.
Id.
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quires [United Airlines] to indemnify and defend the Krogstads
1135
The supreme court did not
against the state’s third-party claim.”
1136
address the issue of treating non-insurers as insurers.
1137
In Wold v. Progressive Preferred Insurance Co., the supreme
court held that unidentified vehicles are considered uninsured only
when there is a collision, and that Wold’s estate used up all of the
driver’s liability insurance and thus could recover underin1138
In 1995,
sured/uninsured (UM/UIM) benefits from Progressive.
Smith swerved to avoid an oncoming car, but, in the process, acci1139
The driver of the oncoming
dentally killed Wold, his passenger.
1140
Smith’s insurance provided both liabilcar was never identified.
ity and UM/UIM coverage, and Wold’s mother had her own
1141
Wold’s mother sued both
UM/UIM policy through Progressive.
Smith and the unknown driver for claims of wrongful death and
negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and both Wold’s
1142
mother and father sued for loss of consortium. Wold settled with
Smith’s insurer for both Smith’s liability and the unknown driver’s
negligence, and then sought further reimbursement under Wold’s
1143
Progressive argued that it had no duty to reUM/UIM policy.
imburse Wold because (1) the unknown motorist was not consid1144
ered uninsured under Alaska law and (2) Wold had not yet ex1145
The
hausted the policy limits of Smith’s insurance policy.
supreme court found that both Progressive’s policy and Alaska law
required physical contact with an unknown driver in order for the
1146
Therefore, Wold’s
unknown driver to be considered uninsured.
argument that this requirement should not be enforced because it
was undisputed that the accident was caused by a “phantom vehi1147
The supreme court then held that Wold
cle” was not persuasive.
1135. Id. at 932.
1136. Id. at 934.
1137. 52 P.3d 155 (Alaska 2002).
1138. Id. at 157.
1139. Id.
1140. Id.
1141. Id.
1142. Id.
1143. Id. at 158.
1144. Alaska Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, ALASKA STAT. §
28.20.445(f) (Michie 2002) (“payment . . . shall be made only where direct physical
contact . . . has occurred”); Alaska Mandatory Automobile Insurance Act,
ALASKA STAT. § 28.22.201(b) (Michie 2002) (“only where direct contact . . . has
occurred”).
1145. Wold, 52 P.3d at 158.
1146. Id. at 159.
1147. Id. at 159-61.

YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC

2003]

04/22/03 12:57 PM

YEAR IN REVIEW

169

had exhausted the limits of Smith’s insurance policy, as “it was error for the trial court to conclude the settlement used up a portion
1148
The settlement
of a separate ‘per person’ liability policy limit.”
with Smith’s insurer covered both Wold’s mother and father pursuant to their loss of consortium claims, categorizing this claim as a
1149
As
derivative action, not with separate “per person” triggers.
such the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s ruling on the
physical contact issue, but reversed its ruling on the exhaustion of
1150
Smith’s insurance policy.
X. PROPERTY LAW
1151
In Alaska Railroad Corp. v. Native Village of Eklutna, the
supreme court ruled that Damco Paving Corporation (Damco)
could not operate a quarry leased from the state-owned Alaska
Railroad Corporation (the Railroad) under Anchorage zoning
1152
In 1989, the Railroad acquired the quarry from the
regulations.
federal government, which had operated the quarry from the mid1153
Eklutna successfully enjoined the operation of
1940s until 1985.
1154
The suthe quarry pursuant to Anchorage zoning regulations.
preme court affirmed, declaring that when mineral resource opera1155
tions are at issue, Anchorage Municipal Code 21.55.090 over1156
In addition, the court
rides more general sections of the code.
held that the federal government’s continued operation of the
quarry after the enactment of the AMC did not confer conditionaluse status on the quarry because the AMC could not be enforced
1157
against the federal government due to supremacy immunity.
Furthermore, after the transfer of the quarry to the Railroad, there
was no transfer of conditional-use rights, since the federal government never followed the proper procedures to establish the
1158
The court also ruled that the supremacy immunity from
rights.
zoning did not transfer from the Railroad to Damco because the
Railroad’s supremacy immunity is not a transferable property
1148. Id. at 165.
1149. Id. at 165-66.
1150. Id. at 166.
1151. 43 P.3d 588 (Alaska 2002).
1152. Id. at 589.
1153. Id. at 590.
1154. Id.
1155. ANCHORAGE, AK., MUNICIPAL CHARTER, CODE
21.55.090 (1996).
1156. Alaska Railroad, 43 P.3d at 593.
1157. Id. at 596.
1158. Id.
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right.1159 In addition, the court found that no unconstitutional taking occurred because Damco was a state agency, not a private
1160
Accordingly, the supreme court affirmed the supelandholder.
rior court’s summary judgment and order enjoining the quarrying
1161
activities.
In AVCP Regional Housing Authority v. R.A. Vranckaert
1162
Co., the supreme court held that a claim for indemnity for passive negligence was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel
and that the landlord’s claims for express and implied contract indemnity, breach of contract, and negligence were properly dis1163
In 1991, Vranckaert installed gas kitchen ranges in
missed.
twelve apartments for the Association of Village Council Presi1164
From 1992 to 1995,
dents Regional Housing Authority (AVCP).
numerous tenants complained that the ranges did not work properly and later called the fire department complaining of nausea,
headaches, gas odors, and warnings from carbon monoxide
1165
alarms. A group of tenants, the Nilsson plaintiffs, sued ACVP
and Vranckaert, claiming injury as a result of exposure to carbon
1166
AVCP filed a cross-claim against Vranckaert seeking
monoxide.
1167
Both AVCP and
equitable apportionment of damages.
1168
AVCP then sought to amend its complaint
Vranckaert settled.
1169
against Vranckaert to include a claim of equitable indemnity.
Judge Curda denied the motion and dismissed the complaint rea1170
soning that AVCP had not stated a viable cause of action.
Rather than appeal, AVCP filed a new lawsuit against Vranckaert,
asserting express and implied contractual indemnity, indemnity for
1171
Judge
passive negligence, breach of contract, and negligence.
Hunt granted Vranckaert’s summary judgment motion on the
1172
ground that the new claims were barred by res judicata.
Shortly thereafter, a second group of tenants, the Engler plaintiffs, sued AVCP and Vranckaert for the same grounds as the Nils1159.
1160.
1161.
1162.
1163.
1164.
1165.
1166.
1167.
1168.
1169.
1170.
1171.
1172.

Id. at 597.
Id.
Id. at 598.
47 P.3d 650 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 660.
Id. at 652.
Id.
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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son plaintiffs.1173
AVCP again filed a cross-claim against
1174
Vranckaert. Both AVCP and Vranckaert settled with the Engler
1175
In ruling on Vranckaert’s summary judgment motion,
plaintiffs.
Judge Steinkruger allowed AVCP’s claims of implied contractual
indemnity, breach of contract, and negligence, but dismissed its
1176
claims of passive negligence and express contractual indemnity.
On appeal, AVCP’s Nilsson and Engler cross-claims were con1177
First, the supreme court affirmed both dismissals of
solidated.
AVCP’s passive negligence claim, reasoning that the claim was
1178
The supreme
barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel.
court then affirmed Judge Steinkruger’s ruling for Vranckaert on
AVCP’s claim of express contractual indemnity because the contract between AVCP and Vranckaert did not indemnify AVCP
1179
The supreme court reversed
from AVCP’s own negligence.
Judge Steinkruger’s ruling allowing AVCP’s claim of implied contractual indemnity because to hold that Vranckaert must indemnify
AVCP while Vranckaert was still liable to the plaintiffs “would
lead to the unjust result that the indemnitor would face double li1180
The court also reversed Judge Steinkruger’s ruling alability.”
lowing AVCP’s claims for breach of contract and negligence “because they are, in essence, implied contractual indemnity
1181
Finally, the supreme court affirmed Judge Hunt’s disclaims.”
1182
missal of all five claims.
In Barr v. Goldome Realty Credit Corp.,1183 the supreme court
held that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the mortgagee and its dismissal of the mortgagor’s counterclaim were erroneous because there were factual disputes with regard to whether
the mortgagor’s loan was current and whether an overpayment was
1184
Mortgagee
available to apply to the mortgagor’s account.
Donna Barr had assumed ownership of property subject to a deed
1185
Nationsbanc, as beneficiary, initiated foreclosure proof trust.

1173.
1174.
1175.
1176.
1177.
1178.
1179.
1180.
1181.
1182.
1183.
1184.
1185.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 653.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 656.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 660.
46 P.3d 1004 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1006-08.
Id. at 1005.
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ceedings in January 1998 because it believed the underlying note
was in default as no loan payments had been made after October
1186
Barr counterclaimed, claiming that Nationsbanc failed to
1997.
1187
The trial court
credit surplus funds in her escrow account.
granted partial summary judgment to Nationsbanc and dismissed
1188
The supreme court held on
Barr’s counterclaim with prejudice.
appeal that the evidence presented by Barr could be admissible for
1189
the purposes of summary judgment, and further created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the loan was current in Oc1190
The supreme
tober 1997, the month of the last loan payment.
court also held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Nationsbanc could have applied any escrow surplus to
Barr’s monthly payments in November and December 1997 and
1191
Lastly, the supreme court held that the trial
January 1998.
court’s dismissal of Barr’s counterclaim was erroneous because Nationsbanc did not conclusively show that an escrow surplus did not
exist and that therefore “the genuine factual dispute that requires
us to reverse Nationsbanc’s summary judgment motion also re1192
The
quires us to reverse the dismissal of Barr’s counterclaim.”
supreme court reversed the partial summary judgment, vacated the
1193
findings of fact and law, and remanded.
In Cabana v. Kenai Peninsula Borough,1194 the Alaska Supreme
Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Kenai
Peninsula Borough, and ruled that a transfer of land under the Ka1195
nai Peninsula Borough Code (the Code) may be at less than fair
1196
The
market value if the transfer is “in the best public interest.”
Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly (Assembly) had exchanged a
forty-acre parcel of land appraised at $33,700 for a twenty-acre
parcel appraised at $24,500. Neighbors of the forty-acre parcel
sued, claiming that the parcel was not exchanged at fair market
1197
The
value and therefore was exchanged in violation of the Code.

1186. Id.
1187. Id. at 1006
1188. Id.
1189. Id at 1007-08.
1190. Id. at 1008.
1191. Id.
1192. Id. at 1009.
1193. Id.
1194. 50 P.3d 798 (Alaska 2002).
1195. KENAI PENINSULA BOROUGH, AK., CODE
(1998).
1196. Cabana, 50 P.3d at 803.
1197. Id. at 801.

OF

ORDINANCES § 17.10.100.
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court found that the Assembly acted properly in approving the
transfer and ruled that the Assembly was in the best position to de1198
termine whether the transfer was in the Borough’s best interest.
In addition, the court stated that the plaintiffs must do more than
“point[ ] out anomalies” in the land transaction to overcome the
1199
The court also
strong presumption of government propriety.
ruled that the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights were not
violated because there is a “fair and substantial relationship between . . . the land exchange and the legitimate governmental goals
of reducing land use conflicts and protecting public health and
1200
safety.”
In Cizek v. Concerned Citizens of Eagle River Valley, Inc.,1201
the supreme court affirmed the enjoinment of the use of an air1202
The property’s continual suitability for use as an airstrip
strip.
and its sporadic unauthorized use did not maintain its status as a
1203
continuing nonconforming use under Anchorage zoning laws.
The airstrip originated when the land was an unrestricted zoning
1204
Although the land was rezoned to prohibit the airstrip, the
area.
airstrip owner continued to allow two of his friends to use the air1205
Following the sale of adjacent land, the new
strip infrequently.
owners petitioned for and were granted a conditional use of the
1206
airstrip. When the Cizeks then purchased the adjacent land, they
planned to build a home with an attached hangar and to use the
1207
The Concerned Citizens of Eagle River Valley claimed
airstrip.
that the nonconforming use right had lapsed and sought to enjoin
1208
The supreme court rejected the Cizek’s
the use of the airstrip.
argument that the land’s usability as an airstrip sufficed to continue
1209
The court held that actual use is
an existing nonconforming use.
required to continue nonconforming uses and that the intermittent,
unauthorized use by the friends of the airstrip owner was insuffi1210
cient to continue the nonconforming use. The court also rejected

1198.
1199.
1200.
1201.
1202.
1203.
1204.
1205.
1206.
1207.
1208.
1209.
1210.

Id. at 804.
Id. at 803.
Id. at 805.
49 P.3d 228 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 232.
Id.
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the Cizek’s statute of limitations argument, finding that a cause of
action “accrued each day that the property violated the zoning
1211
The supreme court held that neither estoppel nor laches
laws.”
1212
The supreme court also held that the Cizeks
barred the action.
waived their claim for Rule 37 sanctions because they never re1213
quested a hearing. The supreme court additionally ruled that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Cizek’s motion for a new trial because it was the Cizek’s tactical miscalcula1214
Lastly,
tion that prejudiced them and not the trial court’s ruling.
the supreme court found that the Cizeks should not be enjoined
from storing airplanes on the property because such storage is
1215
Accordingly, the supreme court
permitted under zoning laws.
affirmed the superior court’s enjoinment of the use of the airstrip,
but directed the superior court to amend the injunction to allow the
1216
Cizeks to store airplanes on their property.
1217
In Griswold v. City of Homer, the supreme court affirmed
the superior court’s holding that COB, Inc. could continue to use
its property for vehicle maintenance and repair as lawful noncon1218
COB owned property located within an area subforming uses.
1219
These zoning regulations
ject to Homer’s zoning regulations.
prohibited COB from using its property for automobile repair and
1220
These
maintenance unless those uses were “grandfathered in.”
types of uses are “grandfathered in” if they have not been discon1221
COB petitioned the Homer Advitinued for more than a year.
sory Planning Commission to approve of its nonconforming uses on
1222
Griswold, one of COB’s competitors, objected to
its property.
1223
The Commission concluded that COB lost the right
the petition.
to use the property for a public garage but sustained the right to
1224
The suuse of the property for vehicle maintenance and repair.
preme court affirmed this holding because COB documented many
instances of vehicle repair and maintenance on its property since
1211.
1212.
1213.
1214.
1215.
1216.
1217.
1218.
1219.
1220.
1221.
1222.
1223.
1224.

Id. at 233.
Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235.
Id.
Id.
55 P.3d 64 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 67.
Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 67.
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1991.1225 The supreme court further held that the nonconforming
use was for “commercial” automotive service and repair and also
1226
that members of the Commission were not biased.
1227
In Guttchen v. Gabriel, the supreme court held (1) that the
trial court erred in nullifying the Guttchens’ judgment lien based
upon the discharge of the underlying debt in the Gabriels’ bank1228
ruptcy, and (2) that the record established “just and sufficient
reasons” for execution of the Guttchens’ judgment lien more than
1229
In July 1989, the Guttchens were
five years after the judgment.
1230
awarded $7,526 in attorney’s fees and costs against the Gabriels.
The Guttchens recorded the judgment in July 1989 and perfected a
1231
While an
lien on a 1.5 acre parcel of land owned by the Gabriels.
1232
appeal was pending, the Gabriels filed for personal bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy court discharged the Gabriels’ debts in September
1233
The supreme court first held, following Johnson v. Home
1990.
1234
State Bank, that a bankruptcy discharge does not extinguish a
1235
Thus, the supreme court held that it
valid lien on real property.
was error for the trial court to deny the Guttchens’ motion for
leave to execute the judgment lien on the ground that the Gabriels’
1236
bankruptcy extinguished both the underlying debt and the lien.
The supreme court next held that the record established “just and
sufficient reasons” for late execution of the Guttchens’ judgment
1237
The supreme court considered that the 1.5 acre parcel was
lien.
the only property of the Gabriels subject to execution, the Gabriels
controlled the process of subdividing the property, and the Gab1238
riels did not timely act upon the trial court’s order to subdivide.
Additionally, the supreme court considered that as soon as an application was filed by the Gabriel family in 1999 to obtain permission to subdivide, the Guttchens promptly filed their motion for
1239
Accordingly, the supreme court vacated the
leave to execute.
1225.
1226.
1227.
1228.
1229.
1230.
1231.
1232.
1233.
1234.
1235.
1236.
1237.
1238.
1239.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 69-73.
49 P.3d 223 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 226.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 224.
Id.
Id.
Id.
501 U.S. 78, 82-84 (1991).
Guttchen, 49 P.3d at 225.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 227.
Id.
Id.
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trial court’s judgment and remanded with directions to enter a
judgment granting the motion for late execution of the judgment
1240
lien.
In Holta v. Certified Financial Services, Inc.,1241 the supreme
court held that the statute of limitations did not bar Holta from
bringing a non-judicial foreclosure action against Certified Finan1242
Holta acquired an interest in a note originally
cial’s property.
calling for payment on November 15, 1989, secured by the property
known as the Essex Square subdivision now owned by Certified
1243
The recorded deed of trust referred to the underlying,
Financial.
1244
unrecorded note but did not contain in itself a maturity date.
Alaska law establishes a ten year statute of limitations for actions
1245
The supreme
relating to notes that contain no maturity date.
court found that because the instrument that contained the November 1989 maturity date was unrecorded, the ten year statute of
limitations must be followed in accordance with the purpose of the
Alaska statute to “provide subsequent purchasers with record
knowledge and reasonable certainty regarding the vitality of liens
1246
The supreme court also held
recorded against the property.”
that Holta’s deed of trust was not extinguished by the municipal tax
1247
In the municipal tax proforeclosure proceedings that occurred.
ceedings, only the right of redemption of the then-current owner,
1248
Therefore federal law extinguishing liens on property
was sold.
1249
1250
Acdeeds after a IRS tax foreclosure sale was not applicable.
cordingly, the judgment of the superior court was reversed, and the
1251
case was remanded for further proceedings.
In Hurst v. Victoria Park Subdivision Addition No. 1 Home1252
owners’ Ass’n, the supreme court affirmed the summary judgment decision of the court below regarding a dispute about a re1253
On September 14, 1998, the Victoria Park
strictive covenant.
Subdivision Addition Number 1 Homeowners’ Association (Asso1240.
1241.
1242.
1243.
1244.
1245.
1246.
1247.
1248.
1249.
1250.
1251.
1252.
1253.

Id.
49 P.3d 1104 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1105.
Id. at 1105-06.
Id. at 1107.
ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.150(a) (Michie 2002).
Holta, 49 P.3d at 1107.
Id. at 1110.
Id.
26 U.S.C. § 6339(c) (2000).
Holta, 49 P.3d at 1110.
Id. at 1111.
59 P.3d 275 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 276.
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ciation) notified the Hursts that it intended to build a split rail
1254
The Hursts filed
fence along the border of the Hurst’s property.
a complaint alleging that the fence violated the terms of a restric1255
The supetive covenant because it was a permanent structure.
rior court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association,
finding that the fence did not violate the covenant because the purpose for the fence was in line with the purpose of the covenant to
set aside land for “non-intensive recreational and park pur1256
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the superior
poses . . . .”
court’s decision. The court did not rely on case law from other jurisdictions to determine whether the fence was a permanent struc1257
Instead, the court focused on how to construe the restricture.
tion to effectuate the intent of the parties; thus, it considered what
1258
It
the purpose of the restriction was and the nature of the fence.
concluded that the purpose of the covenant was to protect the lot
owned by the Association, not to protect the view of the lot for the
1259
Accordingly, the supreme court held that the fence was
Hursts.
not in violation of the restrictive covenants and affirmed the deci1260
sion of the court below.
In Joseph M. Jackovich Revocable Trust v. State,1261 the supreme court held that because the State did not announce a concrete intention to use or condemn specific parcels of the plaintiffs’
1262
The plaintiffs owned
property, no de facto taking occurred.
property which was projected to be part of a right-of-way acquisi1263
In
tion planned by the Department of Transportation (DOT).
1997, plaintiffs instituted an inverse condemnation suit against the
State, arguing that a de facto taking of property occurs when precondemnation public announcements of a proposed acquisition reduces the economic values of the property, even if the property is
1264
The supreme court affirmed the
never actually condemned.
lower court’s decision and concluded that the “concrete intention”
1254. Id. at 277. The adjoining property, Lot 43, was owned by the Association.
Covenants on that property required that the lot be used for non-intensive recreational and park purposes. The Association wanted to erect the fence to help manage access to and use of the lot. Id.
1255. Id.
1256. Id.
1257. Id. at 277-78.
1258. Id. at 278.
1259. Id. at 279.
1260. Id. at 280.
1261. 54 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2002).
1262. Id. at 295.
1263. Id.
1264. Id. at 296-97.
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test, whereby the State must show a present and certain intent to
condemn the specific property, was the appropriate test, and that
1265
Althe DOT’s announcements did not demonstrate such intent.
though in some cases the court has required compensation to
homeowners because of the government’s pre-condemnation ac1266
tivities by finding that a temporary taking had occurred, a present concrete indication of intent to condemn that property is re1267
At the time the parties sought summary judgment, it was
quired.
still undetermined whether the project would proceed or which
1268
Further, the propparcels would be acquired if it did proceed.
erty owner must prove that the State acted improperly in delaying
the actual condemnation following an announcement of such intent
1269
Here, the
and that as a result the property value diminished.
State did not interfere with the landowner’s economic or physical
1270
use and enjoyment of the property.
In Leisnoi, Inc., v. United States,1271 the Ninth Circuit held that
it had jurisdiction over the district court’s denial of Stratman’s mo1272
This
tion to intervene and that Stratman’s motion was moot.
dispute began when Leisnoi, an Alaska Native Village corporation,
received land pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement
1273
However, an action was filed by Stratman, a rancher,
Act.
claiming that Leisnoi never properly qualified as a Native Village
1274
To
and that the land should be returned to the government.
quiet the title, Leisnoi brought an action against the United
1275
Stratman sought to intervene, however, the United
States.
States filed a disclaimer and the district court quieted title in Leis1276
The Ninth Circuit
noi and dismissed Stratman’s motion as moot.
affirmed the district court’s holding because the plain terms of

1265. Id. at 297-98.
1266. E.g., Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 791 P.2d 610, 614
(Alaska 1990) (allowing recovery to the owners of a parcel of land designated as a
potential school site).
1267. Jackovich Revocable Trust, 54 P.3d at 298.
1268. Id. at 297.
1269. Id. at 298.
1270. Id. at 303.
1271. 313 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002).
1272. Id. at 1184.
1273. Id. at 1182.
1274. Id. at 1183.
1275. Id.
1276. Id.
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U.S.C. § 2409a(e)1277 deprived the district court of jurisdiction once
1278
the United States filed its disclaimer.
In Madden v. Alaska Mortgage Group,1279 the supreme court
held that a new payment on a promissory note extended a lender’s
right to recover its entire debt through foreclosure, even though
1280
Additionally, the suthe debtor had lost title to the property.
preme court held that fees expended in suing to establish the
amount of a debt were not recoverable under a deed because they
1281
A debtor gave Alaska Mortwere not expenses of foreclosure.
gage a promissory note and secured the note by granting a second
1282
Three years
deed of trust on two lots (the Iliaska Subdivision).
later, the debtor defaulted on his first deed of trust and lost title to
1283
the Iliaska Subdivision; he continued, however, to make pay1284
Subsequently, the Maddens
ments on the second deed of trust.
were granted a third deed of trust (subject to Alaska Mortgage’s
1285
Within a year, the original
deed) in order to secure a loan.
debtor stopped making payments on his note and made no pay1286
ments for nine years, causing Alaska Mortgage to commence
1287
The Maddens attempted to block the
foreclosure proceedings.
foreclosure sale, stating that Alaska Mortgage had overstated the
amount due on its deed because many of the original debtor’s late
1288
payments were barred by a six-year statute of limitations.
Alaska Mortgage responded by filing suit and seeking to establish
1289
Before a court could rule on the
the amount due under its deed.
matter, however, the original debtor sent another payment on the
1290
Alaska Mortgage then moved for summary judgment,
note.
claiming that the new payment had revived any portion of the debt
1291
Entering judgment in favor
barred by the statute of limitations.
of Alaska Mortgage, the superior court ruled that the new payment
had revived all installments under the promissory note and the
1277.
1278.
1279.
1280.
1281.
1282.
1283.
1284.
1285.
1286.
1287.
1288.
1289.
1290.
1291.

28 U.S.C. § 2409a(e) (2000).
Leisnoi, 313 F.3d at 1184.
54 P.3d 265 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 266.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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deed of trust.1292 On appeal, the supreme court held that, even
though the debtor was technically out of possession of the Iliaska
Subdivision at the time he made his new payment, he maintained
an interest in the mortgaged property to the extent that the mort1293
Furthermore,
gage secured the non-time-barred installments.
the court held that a subsequent grantee who has notice of a valid
1294
Acand enforceable prior lien assumes the risk of an extension.
cordingly, the supreme court held that allowing the debtor to revive the time-barred installments simply returned the Maddens to
1295
holding subsequent to Alaska Mortgage’s deed, and remanded
the case for reduction of attorney’s fees to reflect only the fees in1296
curred in performing the actual foreclosure sale.
1297
In Miller v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough the supreme court
held (1) that a borough ordinance which allocated paving special
assessments to residential lots on a per lot basis did not conflict
with state law, and (2) a borough ordinance limiting special assessments to twenty-five percent of the lots’ tax-appraised value did
1298
not apply to the local improvement district in question. The Matanuska-Susitna Borough Assembly enacted an ordinance which
assessed the cost of road improvements equally to each lot within
1299
the scope of the newly created improvement district. The Millers
owned nine lots within the improvement district and argued that
the borough acted contrary to state law by assessing the cost of im1300
provement equally on a per-lot basis. State law provides a default method of assessing improvement costs “against property in
1301
proportion to the benefit received.” However, Alaska law also
authorizes municipalities to prescribe special assessment proce1302
dures if they so choose. Noting that the per-lot method of assessing improvement costs was presumptively valid, the court held
that since the Millers had not shown that the benefit to their property was grossly disproportionate compared to the benefit conferred upon other assessed properties, the per-lot method was not

1292.
1293.
1294.
1295.
1296.
1297.
1298.
1299.
1300.
1301.
1302.

Id.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 271.
54 P.3d 285 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 287.
Id. at 288.
Id.
Id. at 289; ALASKA STAT. § 29.46.060 (Michie 2002).
Id. at 289-90.
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irrational and therefore valid.1303 Finally, the court held that the ordinance at issue supplanted older procedures for improvement assessments and that, consequently, a twenty-five percent limit on as1304
sessments did not apply.
In Municipality of Anchorage v. Suzuki,1305 the supreme court
1306
held that Alaska Statutes section 09.55.275 requires municipalities to seek replat approval when the municipality seeks an ease1307
The municipality
ment which results in a “boundary change.”
sought easements for the properties of Dong Joon Lim and Lisa
Suzuki which required the destruction of a part of Lim’s property
and either the destruction or movement of part of Suzuki’s prop1308
The superior court consolidated the cases and found that
erty.
the requests for easements on both properties constituted a bound1309
The supreme
ary change in accordance with section 09.55.275.
court held that “an easement that is not coextensive with the property owner’s property line and that functionally interferes with the
landowner’s exclusive use is a boundary change under section
1310
The court first concluded that excluding easements
09.55.275.”
from “boundary change” would render sections of the statute
1311
meaningless. The court then concluded that the legislative intent
favored a broader interpretation of “boundary change” in order to
1312
Berequire coordination between state and local governments.
cause the two easements constituted a “boundary change,” the supreme court affirmed the superior court decision to require replat1313
ting for both easements.
In Ogar v. City of Haines,1314 the supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s summary judgment decision that the city was not
equitably estopped from requiring Ogar to remove structures that
1315
In 1990, the previous
were in violation of the city right-of-way.
owners of the Ogars’ property requested an appropriate vacation,
but failed to complete the vacation process and built a residential

1303.
1304.
1305.
1306.
1307.
1308.
1309.
1310.
1311.
1312.
1313.
1314.
1315.

Id. at 291-92.
Id. at 292.
41 P.3d 147 (Alaska 2002).
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.275 (Michie 2002).
Suzuki at 149.
Id.
Id. at 149-50.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 154.
51 P.3d 333 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 333.
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garage which encroached on the city’s right-of-way.1316 The encroachment did not come to the attention of the Ogars until
1317
At that point, Ogar applied for a thirty-foot vacation for
1997.
the garage, a ten-foot overhang extension, and an adjacent fuel
tank. The city planning commission approved a fifteen-foot vacation for the original garage but required Ogar to remove the overhang, remove the fuel tank, and have the property surveyed, replat1318
Ogar complied with most of
ted, and paid at the current value.
the city’s conditions but never removed the overhang or the
1319
Instead, Ogar filed suit against the previous owners and
tank.
the city. Ogar’s amended complaint alleged that the city negligently failed to correct the encroachment by failing to inspect the
property and requested that the city be equitably estopped from
1320
In reviewrequiring her to remove the overhang and fuel tank.
ing the grant of summary judgment, the supreme court noted that
four elements must be proven to make out a claim for equitable estoppel: (1) “[A]n assertion of position by conduct or word”; (2)
“reasonable reliance thereon”; (3) resulting prejudice; and (4) en1321
The
forcement of the estoppel to the extent that justice requires.
court held, however, that the city never made any assertions either
to Ogar or the previous property owner which would satisfy this
1322
Nor did the court find that the city’s failure to
requirement.
“prevent or cure the encroachment” was sufficient to show equita1323
As the first of the four elements was not met, the
ble estoppel.
court found that there was no basis for the equitable estoppel and
1324
affirmed the summary judgment.
In Rockstad v. Global Finance & Investment Co.,1325 the supreme court held that a renewed default provision was not triggered when the lessee attempted to pay late rent before he re1326
Rockstad operated a dry
ceived written notice of default.
cleaning business on commercial property leased from Global Fi1327
Although the lease
nance and Investment Company (Global).

1316.
1317.
1318.
1319.
1320.
1321.
1322.
1323.
1324.
1325.
1326.
1327.

Id. at 334.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 335.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 336.
Id.
41 P.3d 583 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 589.
Id. at 584.
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provided that rent was due on the first day of each month, Global
1328
In August 1999,
commonly accepted payments on the tenth.
Rockstad failed to tender the amount due for more than ten days
1329
In September 1999, Rockafter Global had sent written notice.
stad went to pay the rent on the tenth day of the month, but arrived
1330
Rockstad left a
at the office at 5:10 PM after the office closed.
1331
Global remessage explaining that he attempted to pay the rent.
turned the call refusing late payment and sent Rockstad notice to
1332
The notice stated that Rockvacate the premise immediately.
stad’s failure to pay timely rent was his second default in two
months and that Global was exercising its power under the Re1333
newed Default provision of the lease to terminate the lease.
1334
When Rockstad refused to vacate, Global filed suit.
The superior court concluded that Rockstad had breached the lease, but that
the breach was not material as Rockstad had attempted delivery
1335
The superior court declined to
within minutes of the deadline.
evict Rockstad if he paid the late rent, interest, and the reasonable
1336
Rockstad appealed.1337 The supreme
costs of the proceeding.
court reversed the superior court’s decision holding that the Renewed Default provision had not been triggered as Global did not
send written notice of the second default before Rockstad at1338
The supreme court determined that the provitempted to cure.
1339
sion was ambiguous as to whether written notice was required.
The court reasoned that the provision did require written notice in
order to effectuate the reasonable expectations of the contracting
parties, to render none of the disputed provisions superfluous, to
favor continuing the lease, and to disfavor the lessor and drafting
1340
party.

1328.
1329.
1330.
1331.
1332.
1333.
1334.
1335.
1336.
1337.
1338.
1339.
1340.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 584-85.
Id. at 585.
Id. at 584.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 587.
Id. at 588-89.
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XI. TORT LAW
1341
In Central Bering Sea Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Anderson, the
supreme court reduced the jury’s award for lost earnings but affirmed the punitive damage award for claims involving constructive
1342
Anretaliatory discharge, promissory estoppel and defamation.
derson’s suit alleged that Central Bering Sea Fishermen’s Association (“Association”) and its president had wrongfully discharged
her in retaliation for her investigation of misappropriation of Association funds and that both the president and the Association made
defamatory statements regarding Anderson’s reason for dis1343
At trial, the jury returned a verdict for Anderson on two
charge.
theories of wrongful termination and awarded money for back pay
and lost future wages. The jury also awarded her money for emotional distress and loss of reputation resulting from the deprivation.
It then awarded punitive damages against the Association’s presi1344
On appeal, the Association ardent and the Association itself.
gued that the economic damages award was in error and the puni1345
Regarding the economic
tive damages award was excessive.
damages, the supreme court found that the jury’s verdict was incorrect because it failed to rely on the amount and duration of the
1346
Accordingly, the
contract that Anderson actually expected.
court recalculated the award to reflect only a one-year loss of
1347
As to the punitive damages, however, the court was
earnings.
unwilling to reverse the jury’s finding. First, the court concluded
that the discussion of corruption in Anderson’s closing argument
1348
Next, it determined that while the trial court
was appropriate.
should not have instructed the jury about the statutory cap on punitive damages, the instruction was harmless error, particularly since
the court instructed the jury not to use the cap as a gauge for the
award and because the award was much less than the statutory
1349
Finally, the court held that the trial court properly refused
cap.
1350
The court deterto remit the jury’s punitive damages award.
mined that the jury properly considered both common law factors
1341. 54 P.3d 271 (Alaska 2002).
1342. Id. at 275.
1343. Id. at 275-76.
1344. Id. at 276-77.
1345. Id. at 277.
1346. Id. at 278. In this case, she only expected a one year contract for $60,000$65,000 a year. Id.
1347. Id.
1348. Id. at 279-80.
1349. Id. at 281-82.
1350. Id. at 282.
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and statutory factors in calculating the award,1351 and it concluded
that the jury’s award also met the guidelines suggested by the
1352
Accordingly, the decision of the
United States Supreme Court.
1353
court below was reversed in part and affirmed in part.
1354
In Fenner v. Municipality of Anchorage, the supreme court
declined to adopt a “substantial certainty” standard for intentional
1355
Fenner
tort actions involving the workers’ compensation system.
1356
Fenner rewas injured while driving a plow truck for the city.
ceived workers’ compensation but sued the city alleging that a
1357
combination of its actions rose to the level of an intentional tort.
The supreme court recognized that although the workers’ compensation system is generally the exclusive remedy for employees injured in the workplace, it does not apply in cases of intentional
1358
Fenner argued that the court had adopted the substantial
torts.
certainty standard for intentional torts in an earlier case, but the
supreme court dismissed his argument, reasoning that where the
claim arises in the workers’ compensation environment, specific in1359
On this basis, the court held that Fenner had
tent is required.
failed to submit any evidence that the municipality specifically intended to injure him and affirmed the trial court’s entry of sum1360
mary judgment.
In Fernandes v. Portwine,1361 the supreme court affirmed the
superior court’s decision of a nuisance case under Alaska Statutes
1362
section 09.10.050 : (1) requiring the plaintiffs to prove nuisance
by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) applying a six-year statute
of limitations; (3) denying defendant’s request for a jury view; (4)
refusing to enjoin plaintiffs’ plumbing business; and (5) denying
1363
The Portwines’s brought suit
both parties’ attorney’s fees.
against Joaquim Fernandes claiming that he created a nuisance and
1364
Fernandes
sought to enjoin him from the disputed activities.
counterclaimed that the Portwines defamed him and that they used
1351.
1352.
1353.
1354.
1355.
1356.
1357.
1358.
1359.
1360.
1361.
1362.
1363.
1364.

Id. at 282-83.
Id. at 284.
Id. at 285.
53 P.3d 573 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 577.
Id. at 574.
Id.
Id. at 575.
Id. at 576-77.
Id. at 577-78.
56 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2002).
ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.050 (Michie 2002).
Id. at 3.
Id.
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their land for non-permitted industrial uses.1365 First, the court held
that because the plaintiffs were suing under standard nuisance statutes, the superior court correctly used the preponderance of the
1366
Second, the court upheld the superior court’s
evidence standard.
determination that a six-year statute of limitations governs this
1367
The court ruled that in a statute of limitations context, the
case.
meaning of trespass in the statute is interpreted broadly to encompass any unlawful interference with one’s person, property, or
1368
Third, reviewing the trial court’s denial of defendant’s
rights.
request for a jury view, the court held that the trial judge did not
1369
Fourth,
abuse his broad discretion under this permissive rule.
the court held that given the scant testimony presented at trial, the
superior court did not err in finding defendant’s cross-claim “was
1370
Finally, reviewing the application for
not established at trial.”
attorney’s fees, the court upheld the superior court’s judgment that
where there is no prevailing party, each party should bear its own
1371
For these reasons, the court affirmed
costs and attorney’s fees.
1372
the superior court’s decision in its entirety.
1373
In Hinsberger v. State, the supreme court held that the plaintiff would be unable to demonstrate breach of preexisting duty and
therefore had no claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress
1374
Hinsberger sued the State, alleging negligence based
(NIED).
on the delay of medical treatment while he was incarcerated and
1375
The State subsequently moved for summary judgment
NIED.
on both claims and the superior court granted the State’s mo1376
Hinsberger appealed the NIED judgment.1377 While he
tions.
conceded that he did not have a physical injury as a result of the
1378
NIED, he claimed that the preexisting duty exception applied.
The supreme court rejected this argument, reasoning that because
Hinsberger did appeal the superior court’s judgment regarding
negligence, then as a matter of law the State did not breach its
1365.
1366.
1367.
1368.
1369.
1370.
1371.
1372.
1373.
1374.
1375.
1376.
1377.
1378.

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 8-9.
Id. at 9.
53 P.3d 568 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 569.
Id. at 570.
Id.
Id.
Id at 571.
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duty, and Hinsberger would be unable to establish the breach of
1379
For these reasons, the court
duty required for the NIED claim.
1380
affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment.
1381
In Kallstrom v. United States, the supreme court held that a
cause of action for NIED does not exist for an “unwitting instrument” - a plaintiff who becomes a participant in the infliction of
1382
At a
another’s injuries through the negligence of the defendant.
public dance hall, Kallstrom retrieved a drink for a nine-year-old
girl from a pitcher sitting next to the sink, which she believed to
1383
“In fact, the pitcher contained a lye-based
contain fruit juice.
caustic detergent that caused severe, permanent internal injuries to
1384
After the federal district court
[the girl] when she drank it.”
granted the government’s motion to dismiss on Kallstrom’s claim
for NIED, Kallstrom appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap1385
In turn, the circuit court certified the case to the Alaska
peals.
Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 407(a) of the Alaska Rules of
1386
Appellate Procedure because the facts of the case were not ade1387
The supreme court ruled
quately covered by Alaska case law.
that “[g]enerally, damages are not awarded for NIED in the ab1388
sence of physical injury” and identified two exceptions to this
rule: “the bystander exception” and “the preexisting duty excep1389
Kallstrom was precluded from recovering under “the bytion.”
stander exception” because she had no blood relation to the victim
1390
and had only passing involvement with her prior to the injury.
She was precluded from recovering under “the preexisting duty exception” because she did not have a contractual or fiduciary duty
1391
The court also declined to recognize a
with the government.
duty of care to protect “unwitting instruments” from emotional
harm because the harm to such plaintiffs is not reasonably foreseeable and plaintiffs in the “unwitting instrument” scenario vary too

1379.
1380.
1381.
1382.
1383.
1384.
1385.
1386.
1387.
1388.
1389.
1390.
1391.

Id at 572.
Id. at 573.
43 P.3d 162 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id.
ALASKA R. APP. P. 407(a).
Kallstrom, 43 P.3d at 164.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 165-66.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166.
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widely to allow a court to meaningfully distinguish legitimate
1392
claims.
In Kava v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.,1393 the supreme
court held that: (1) a manufacturer’s evidence of comparative risk
was admissible; (2) the plaintiff was entitled to a new trial on issues
not already litigated when the superior court sua sponte declared a
mistrial as to one claim; (3) determination of a new trial was in the
superior court’s discretion; and (4) evidence of an indemnification
1394
Abner Gologergen died after
agreement was properly excluded.
1395
His estate filed a
losing control of his Honda three-wheel ATV.
wrongful death action against Honda and Sitasuak, Honda’s local
1396
On appeal, the
distributor, on behalf of the estate’s dependants.
estate first argued that the superior court erred in admitting
1397
The supreme court held
Honda’s evidence of comparative risk.
that the evidence was admissible and revelvant because it went to
1398
The estate also argued that it
the issue of punitive damages.
should have been granted a new trial because the superior court
1399
Though
sua sponte declared a mistrial on the negligence claim.
the supreme court agreed that the superior court had acted sua
sponte, it held that the estate was not entitled to a new trial on all
claims because it would relitigate issues that the jury had already
1400
However, the court held that a new trial was necessary
decided.
for the issue of comparative fault because, had the jury found
Honda negligent, they could have assessed greater comparative
1401
The supreme court also remanded the issue to be deterfault.
mined under the correct standard: whether, in the superior court’s
1402
discretion, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
Finally, the supreme court held that the superior court properly excluded evidence of Honda’s indemnity agreement as the there was
no deceptive appearance of adversity between Honda and Sitasuak
1403
which might cause an appearance of bias.

1392.
1393.
1394.
1395.
1396.
1397.
1398.
1399.
1400.
1401.
1402.
1403.

Id. at 167-68.
48 P.3d 1170 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 1174, 1176, 1177, 1179.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
Id. at 1174.
Id.
Id. at 1175.
Id. at 1176.
Id.
Id. at 1177.
Id. at 1179.
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In Laidlaw Transit, Inc., v. Crouse,1404 the supreme court held
that Laidlaw, a school bus company, was vicariously liable for a bus
driver’s actions because she was acting within the course and scope
1405
Shawn Crouse was injured when the bus on
of employment.
1406
A postwhich he was riding slid off the road and rolled over.
1407
Afaccident drug test revealed marijuana in the driver’s blood.
ter trial, the jury awarded Crouse compensatory damages as well as
1408
The trial court modified the
$3.5 million in punitive damages.
1409
On appeal, the supreme
punitive damages award to $500,000.
court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the bus driver’s outrageous conduct occurred in the course and scope of her employ1410
Additionally, the sument, rendering Laidlaw vicariously liable.
preme court held that evidence of Laidlaw’s financial resources was
relevant to a punitive damages award and the remittitur of punitive
damages award was warranted based on the difference between
punitive and compensatory damages, the relatively minor injuries
sustained by Crouse, and the low annual revenues of Laidlaw from
1411
its Alaska operations.
In Liimatta v. Vest,1412 the supreme court held that exclusion of
evidence regarding Vest’s documented pre-accident drug seeking
1413
In 1997, Liimatta struck
behavior was an abuse of discretion.
1414
Vest sufVest with her truck while Vest was riding a bicycle.
fered broken bones, trauma to her teeth and face, as well as bruises
1415
At trial, the superior court excluded evidence of
and abrasions.
Vest’s pre-accident drug seeking behavior, concluding that, al1416
A jury
though relevant, it was redundant and highly prejudicial.
1417
Liimatta appealed
later awarded Vest $97,287.26 in damages.
1404. 53 P.3d 1093 (Alaska 2002).
1405. Id. at 1096.
1406. Id.
1407. Id.
1408. Id. at 1097.
1409. Id.
1410. Id. at 1099.
1411. Id. at 1103-04.
1412. 45 P.3d 310 (Alaska 2002).
1413. Id. at 312-13. Drug seeking behavior is “a pattern of seeking narcotic pain
medication or tranquilizers with . . . complaints of severe pain without an organic
basis.” Id. at 313 (citations omitted).
1414. Id. at 312.
1415. Id.
1416. Id. at 313 (noting that the trial court applied Alaska Evidence Rule 403
which may allow evidence to be excluded if the probative value is outweighed by
the prejudicial effect).
1417. Id. at 312. The superior court set final damages at $119,219.91. Id.
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and Vest cross appealed.1418 Reviewing the trial court’s decision for
1419
abuse of discretion, the supreme court reversed and remanded.
First, the court concluded that the evidence of Vest’s pre-accident
drug seeking behavior was highly relevant to Vest’s claim for loss
of enjoyment of life, to the issue of causation, and to Vest’s credibility, and therefore, its probative value was not outweighed by the
1420
Second, recognizing that Wasserman
danger of unfair prejudice.
1421
v. Bartholomew permits evidence to be excluded as cumulative,
the court held that the standard set forth in Wasserman had not
been satisfied and, therefore, afforded no basis upon which to ex1422
Third, the court stated that the medical tesclude the evidence.
timony provided at trial established an adequate foundation upon
1423
Concluding, therefore, that excluwhich to admit the evidence.
sion of the evidence was an abuse of discretion, the court further
1424
ruled that it could not, as required by Alaska Civil Rule 61, say
with fair assurance that the exclusion of evidence did not sway or
1425
Consistent with this ruling, the court reversed
affect the jury.
1426
and remanded for a new trial.
In Moody v. Delta Western, Inc.,1427 the supreme court held that
1428
The Firefighter’s Rule
the Firefighter’s Rule applies in Alaska.
bars firefighters and police officers from recovering from injuries
caused by the negligence of others in situations that required their
1429
An employee of Delta Western left a fuel truck unpresence.
1430
An intoxicated man enlocked and with the keys in the ignition.
1431
Moody,
tered the truck and drove recklessly around the town.
the police chief, responded to reports of the recklessly driven fuel
1418. Id.
1419. Id.
1420. Id. at 313-15.
1421. 923 P.2d 806 (Alaska 1996).
1422. Liimatta, 45 P.3d at 315 (citing Wasserman, 923 P.2d at 813 (stating that
evidence is excludable as cumulative where it supports uncontested or established
facts or repeats a point made by previous evidence)).
1423. Id. at 316.
1424. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 61.
1425. Liimatta, 45 P.3d at 317 (citing Korean Air Lines Co. v. State, 779 P.2d
333, 339 (Alaska 1989)).
1426. Id. The supreme court also held the superior court abused its discretion
on several other evidentiary rulings but did not base its reversal on those grounds.
Id. at 318-19.
1427. 38 P.3d 1139 (Alaska 2002).
1428. Id. at 1139-40.
1429. Id. at 1139.
1430. Id. at 1140.
1431. Id.

YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC

2003]

04/22/03 12:57 PM

YEAR IN REVIEW

191

truck.1432 When Moody’s car attempted to stop the fuel truck, the
1433
truck hit the car causing Moody permanent injuries. Moody filed
suit against Delta Western, alleging that the company negligently
1434
Delta Westfailed to remove the keys from the truck’s ignition.
ern was granted summary judgment by the superior court based on
1435
The supreme court examined the public
the Firefighter’s Rule.
policy reasons noted by a majority of other courts considering this
issue—namely, that the public, through salaries, already compensates public safety officials to respond to dangerous situations often
1436
caused by negligence. Therefore, requiring the public to also pay
for injuries incurred by officers in such responses imposes a double
1437
Acpayment on the community for services already purchased.
cordingly, the supreme court affirmed the superior court’s grant of
1438
summary judgment to Delta Western.
1439
In Powell v. Tanner, the supreme court held that a genuine
issue of material fact remained as to whether Harcourt was vicari1440
ously liable for Tanner’s accident. Tanner was hired by Harcourt
1441
as an Independent Contractor to sell its educational materials.
She came to Anchorage to demonstrate the materials at a teacher
1442
After picking up the rental car, she attempted to
in-service.
1443
Powell sued
change lanes and collided with Powell’s vehicle.
Harcourt under multiple theories, including respondeat superior
1444
The superior court granted summary judgment for
liability.
Harcourt finding that Harcourt could not be liable under the “in1445
The supreme court reviewed this
dependent contractor rule.”
determination de novo to find that a genuine issue of material fact
remained as to whether Tanner was an independent contractor or
1446
The court used factors from the Restatement
an employee.
(Second) of Agency § 220(2) (1958) to determine that factual disputes remain for many of the factors, making a grant of summary
1432.
1433.
1434.
1435.
1436.
1437.
1438.
1439.
1440.
1441.
1442.
1443.
1444.
1445.
1446.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1141-42.
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1143.
59 P.3d 246 (Alaska 2002).
Id. at 255.
Id. at 247.
Id.
Id. at 248.
Id.
Id.
Id.

YEAR IN REVIEW 2002_FINAL.DOC

192

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

04/22/03 12:57 PM

[20:1

judgment inappropriate.1447 Further, the court found that the superior court’s striking of witnesses did not need to be decided because
by reversing the grant of summary judgment, it was likely that discovery would be re-opened and no prejudice would exist by ex1448
cluding the witnesses.
In Prentzel v. State, Department of Public Safety,1449 the supreme court reinstated Prentzel’s negligence and civil rights
1450
Prentzel was arrested, but released without being
claims.
1451
Prentzel sued,
charged, for violating his DWI release conditions.
alleging false arrest, negligence in training the officers, and viola1452
The trial court dismissed all claims on the
tion of his civil rights.
1453
The supreme court reinstated Prentzel’s claim against
pleadings.
the arresting officers, because the allegation of malice created a
1454
factual question that could not be disposed of on the pleadings.
Additionally, the supreme court found it was error to dismiss
Prentzel’s negligence claims, because the legal question of whether
or not the State owed Prentzel a duty to supervise and train state
troopers so they do not make the mistakes made in this case is best
1455
The court also ruled that the supedecided in a factual context.
rior court erred in not construing the civil rights claim to cover the
actions of the state troopers and their supervisors acting in their
1456
personal capacities. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of
1457
claim because the issue was inadequately
Prentzel’s Bivens
1458
briefed.
In Wasserman v. Bartholomew,1459 the supreme court held (1)
that the trial court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, (2)
the trial court did not misapply the test to determine whether the
police had used excessive force, and (3) the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by denying a motion to disqualify the trial court
1460
In 1990, Wasserman was grocery shopping when he was
judge.
1447. Id. at 249.
1448. Id. at 254.
1449. 53 P.3d 587 (Alaska 2002).
1450. Id. at 596.
1451. Id. at 589.
1452. Id.
1453. Id. at 590.
1454. Id. at 591.
1455. Id. at 592.
1456. Id. at 595-96.
1457. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
1458. Prentzel, 53 P.3d at 596.
1459. 38 P.3d 1162 (Alaska 2002).
1460. Id. at 1165.
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mistaken for a dangerous fugitive by police officers.1461 The officers
1462
When
wrestled Wasserman to the ground and handcuffed him.
1463
Wasserthey realized their mistake, the officers released him.
man subsequently sued officers for injuries allegedly sustained
1464
The trial court ruled in favor of the officers,
during the incident.
1465
The supreme court affirmed.1466 The
and Wasserman appealed.
trial court’s rulings were not erroneous because it had made detailed findings, indicated the evidentiary support, evaluated the
credibility of the witnesses, and explained its weighing of the evi1467
The trial court did not misapply the test to determine
dence.
whether the police used excessive force against Wasserman because the court used the well-established objective reasonableness
1468
Finally, the trial court did
test and applied the facts accordingly.
not abuse its discretion by denying Wasserman’s motion to disqualify the trial court judge because mere evidence that a judge has
exercised his judicial discretion in a particular way is not sufficient
1469
to require disqualification.
1470
In Wells v. State, the supreme court held that the State was
1471
immune from liability under Alaska law for failing to install a
1472
Wells was inguardrail because such an act was discretionary.
jured in a car accident and claimed that his injuries were due to the
failure of the State to install a guardrail on the road where the ac1473
By statute, the State was immune from liability
cident occurred.
from tort suits “based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
1474
The court held that the installation
the part of a state agency.”
of guardrails was discretionary and thus the State was immune
1475
The supreme court also held that state standards
from liability.
and requirements for the construction of roads do not apply to the
maintenance of roads constructed prior to the issuance of the stan1461.
1462.
1463.
1464.
1465.
1466.
1467.
1468.
1469.
1470.
1471.
1472.
1473.
1474.
1475.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1166.
Id.
Id. at 1165.
Id. at 1167.
Id. at 1169-70 (applying Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
Id. at 1170-71.
46 P.3d 967 (Alaska 2002).
ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Michie 2002).
Wells, 46 P.3d at 969.
Id. at 968-69.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.50.250.
Wells, 46 P.3d at 969-70.
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dards.1476 The court affirmed the denial of Wells’ motion for summary judgment and held the State had no duty to adhere to “clear
zone” standards in the maintenance of the road in question because such standards were not in place when the road was designed
1477
Finally, the court held that the trial court was within
and built.
its discretion in allowing the State and Chugach Construction
Company, who constructed the road, to amend their expert witness
lists, as the State and the construction company had a plausible
claim of surprise to the Wells’ expert witness’s testimony claiming
Wells was injured by striking the boulders on the side of the road,
1478
Accordingly, the supreme
which had not been asserted earlier.
1479
court affirmed the trial court’s decisions on summary judgment.
Jason S. Veloso*

1476. Id. at 970.
1477. Id. at 971.
1478. Id.
1479. Id.
* The Editor wishes to thank Jacquelyn Sumer, Joseph Davies, Tillman Finley,
and the authors of The 2002 Year-in-Review: Marika Athens, Justin Curley, Sarah
Davis, Shefaali Desai, John Fred, Joseph Gagnon, Thomas Godwin, Merrill
Hoopengardner, Cindy Levine, Mac McBryde, Keith Rogers, Alyssa Rower, and
Peter Smith.

